On the evolution of hoarding, risk-taking, and wealth distribution in nonhuman and human populations.

This paper applies the theory of the evolution of risk-taking in the presence of idiosyncratic and environmental risks to the example of food hoarding by animals and explores implications of the resulting theory for human attitudes toward risk.

Evaluating big deal journal bundles.

Large commercial publishers sell bundled online subscriptions to their entire list of academic journals at prices significantly lower than the sum of their á la carte prices. Bundle prices differ drastically between institutions, but they are not publicly posted. The data that we have collected enable us to compare the bundle prices charged by commercial publishers with those of nonprofit societies and to examine the types of price discrimination practiced by commercial and nonprofit journal publishers. This information is of interest to economists who study monopolist pricing, librarians interested in making efficient use of library budgets, and scholars who are interested in the availability of the work that they publish.

Evolution in health and medicine Sackler colloquium: a public choice framework for controlling transmissible and evolving diseases.

Control measures used to limit the spread of infectious disease often generate externalities. Vaccination for transmissible diseases can reduce the incidence of disease even among the unvaccinated, whereas antimicrobial chemotherapy can lead to the evolution of antimicrobial resistance and thereby limit its own effectiveness over time. We integrate the economic theory of public choice with mathematical models of infectious disease to provide a quantitative framework for making allocation decisions in the presence of these externalities. To illustrate, we present a series of examples: vaccination for tetanus, vaccination for measles, antibiotic treatment of otitis media, and antiviral treatment of pandemic influenza.

One Chance in a Million: Altruism and the Bone Marrow Registry.

Stem cell transplants save lives of many patients with blood diseases. Donation is painful, but rarely has lasting adverse effects. Patients can accept transplants only from donors with compatible immune systems. Those lacking a sibling match must seek donations from the general population. The probability that two unrelated persons are compatible is less than 1/10,000. Health authorities maintain a registry of several million genetically tested potential donors who agree to donate if asked. We find that the benefits of adding registrants of every race exceed costs. We also explore the peculiar structure of voluntary public good provision that faces potential donors.

The costs and benefits of library site licenses to academic journals.

Scientific publishing is rapidly shifting from a paper-based system to one of predominantly electronic distribution, in which universities purchase site licenses for online access to journal contents. Will these changes necessarily benefit the scientific community? By using basic microeconomics and elementary statistical theory, we address this question and find a surprising answer. If a journal is priced to maximize the publisher's profits, scholars on average are likely to be worse off when universities purchase site licenses than they would be if access were by individual subscriptions only. However, site licenses are not always disadvantageous. Journals issued by professional societies and university presses are often priced so as to maximize subscriptions while recovering average costs. When such journals are sustained by institutional site licenses, the net benefits to the scientific community are larger than if these journals are sold only by individual subscriptions.