A theory of visibility measures in the dissociation paradigm.

Research on perception without awareness primarily relies on the dissociation paradigm, which compares a measure of awareness of a critical stimulus (direct measure) with a measure indicating that the stimulus has been processed at all (indirect measure). We argue that dissociations between direct and indirect measures can only be demonstrated with respect to the critical stimulus feature that generates the indirect effect, and the observer's awareness of that feature, the critical cue. We expand Kahneman's (Psychological Bulletin, 70, 404-425, 1968) concept of criterion content to comprise the set of all cues that an observer actually uses to perform the direct task. Different direct measures can then be compared by studying the overlap of their criterion contents and their containment of the critical cue. Because objective and subjective measures may integrate different sets of cues, one measure generally cannot replace the other without sacrificing important information. Using a simple mathematical formalization, we redefine and clarify the concepts of validity, exclusiveness, and exhaustiveness in the dissociation paradigm, show how dissociations among different awareness measures falsify both single-valued measures and monocausal theories of "consciousness," and formulate the demand that theories of visual awareness should be sufficiently specific to explain dissociations among different facets of awareness.

Explaining the gradient: Requirements for theories of visual awareness.

We propose that any theory of visual awareness must explain the gradient of different awareness measures over experimental conditions, especially when those measures form double dissociations among each other. Theories meeting this requirement must be specific to the measured facets of awareness, such as motion, contrast, or color. Integrated information theory (IIT) lacks such specificity because it is an underconstrained theory with unspecific predictions.

Induced dissociations: Opposite time courses of priming and masking induced by custom-made mask-contrast functions.

We present a new experimental technique to induce dissociations between the visibility of a masked prime and its ability to induce a priming effect in response times. In three experiments, we systematically couple an independent variable known to influence the priming effect (prime-mask SOA) with a variable expected to influence prime visibility but not priming (mask contrast). This way, we create mask-contrast functions where mask contrast either increases with SOA, decreases, or remains constant at maximum or minimum levels. We show that different mask-contrast functions can lead to qualitatively different time courses of masking without affecting the time course of priming, allowing for double dissociations (e.g., increasing priming effects under decreasing prime visibility). For the first time, we demonstrate such double dissociations for response priming by color as well as shape stimuli. We also show that the technique requires stimuli that decouple the mask's ability to mask the prime from its ability to activate the response. We conclude that mask-contrast functions can accentuate or even induce dissociations between priming and masking, opening new possibilities for studying perception without awareness.

Interpreting and responding to ambiguous natural images in spider phobia.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: The fast detection of and response to threatening stimuli is an important task of the human visual and motor systems, and is especially challenging when stimuli are ambiguous. This study investigates the perception, evaluation and fast response to ambiguous natural spider stimuli in spider-fearful and non-anxious participants. METHODS: Stimuli were created by gradually morphing natural images of spiders and non-spiders (a crab, a starfish, a bunch of keys, and a flower). In Study 1, participants rated the images on perceptual and emotional dimensions and responded to them in a response priming task to measure rapid information processing. In Study 2, results were validated and extended in a different paradigm by using a go/no-go task. RESULTS: As expected, spider-fearful participants showed an interpretative bias for ambiguous stimuli (i.e., perceived them as more similar to spiders) and rated spider(-like) stimuli as more unpleasant, arousing, and disgusting. In Study 1, spider stimuli were preferentially processed in spider-fearful participants as observed in faster responses to spider targets-however, responses were not different to comparison participants for ambiguous stimuli. Study 2 suggests that this finding can be explained by differences in stimulus duration. LIMITATIONS: No participants with positive attitudes towards spiders or a second fearful comparison group were included. CONCLUSIONS: We suggest that these findings can be explained by the nature of the applied tasks that tap into early phases of visual processing, thereby relying on feedforward-mediated low-spatial-frequency information extracted via the fast, subcortical path to the amygdala.

We prefer what we fear: A response preference bias mimics attentional capture in spider fear.

The extent to which emotionally significant stimuli capture visual attention remains elusive because a preference for reporting or choosing emotionally significant stimuli could mimic attentional capture by these stimuli. We conducted two prior-entry experiments to disentangle whether phobic and fear-relevant stimuli capture attention or merely produce a response bias in spider-fearful participants. Prior entry denotes the effect that attended stimuli are perceived earlier than unattended stimuli as indicated by temporal order judgments. We presented phobic (spiders), fear-relevant (snakes) and neutral stimuli in pairs with varying temporal onset. The participants' task was to indicate which stimulus was presented first (Experiment 1) or second (Experiment 2). In the first experiment, spider-fearful but not control participants indicated that they had perceived spiders as occurring earlier in time, suggesting a prior-entry effect for spiders in this group. But surprisingly, in the second experiment, spider-fearful participants indicated more frequently that they had seen spiders as being presented second. This finding rules out a genuine prior-entry effect and instead suggests a strong preference for the response option associated with the feared animal. This response bias may result from a hypervigilance toward the feared stimulus and contribute to maintaining avoidance behavior in individuals with specific phobias.