On the nature of transference interpretation and why only it can bring about analytic change.

Transference interpretation has always been regarded as very important to psychoanalytic practice. However, analysts differ on its centrality relative to other forms of intervention. This paper argues that transference interpretation as introduced by Freud and then taken up and developed by Klein ("transference interpretation proper") is, in fact, the only form of intervention that could bring about essentially analytic change. To understand why, a taxonomy of different forms of intervention commonly practiced within the analytic situation is presented, including interventions that relate to transference, but do not constitute transference interpretation proper. The latter kind is then described in detail. Next, the paper defines analytic change. It relies on a particular perspective on what it is to come to know psychic truth; one that sees such knowing as a lived state of mind, rather than a state of having knowledge about one's dynamics. This foundational Freudian perspective has been especially advanced through Klein's notion of phantasy. Given this view of analytic change it becomes clear that it can only be brought about through transference interpretation proper. The paper also addresses reasons why it seems especially difficult to embrace this view in contemporary psychoanalytic culture, while stressing how crucial it is to do so.

Remembering, repeating and working-through as a step in Freud's ongoing struggle with the "what", "why" and "how" of analytic knowing in the curative process.

In this paper the author offers a new reading of Freud's "Remembering, Repeating and Working-through", examining the complex nature of central concepts that Freud presents within it. She demonstrates the text's special role in an ongoing effort of Freud's to articulate and ground the heart of his analytic insight that knowledge cures. While the insight itself is very well-known, the fact that Freud struggled throughout his life with its articulation and grounding is not. The struggle centered on questions pertaining to how analytic knowing could, not only enlighten the patient, but actually change his unconscious dynamics, and why the patient, having already "opted" for pathology in place of knowing would come to accept it; and ultimately, what was the nature of the knowledge offered in analysis and the individual's relationship to it that allowed for such dramatic changes to occur. The author briefly presents some of her earlier work on Freud's struggle with these issues and how Melanie Klein resolved them. It is in this context that she demonstrates how in Remembering, Repeating and Working-through" Freud may be seen to be taking important steps towards developing his ideas on analytic knowing and in ways that anticipate Klein's resolutions. This points to the close tie between Klein's and Freud's thinking on the nature of the analytic process and the person's desire for self-knowledge on which it relies, brings out the richness of this thinking and grounds its value to contemporary psychoanalysis.

The role of repetition in narcissism and self-sacrifice: A Freudian Kleinian reflection on the person's foundational love of the other.

Through reexamination of Freud's thinking on the "compulsion to repeat", including detailed study of his Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), this paper brings to the fore a central tension in Freud's thinking on the roles narcissism and love in his foundational view of the person. While Freud conceptualizes the person as self-serving, aiming primarily to maximize personal satisfaction in accordance with the "pleasure principle," he develops an alternative view of the person as primarily loving, desiring to truly encounter the other and reality, even if painful, and guilty when he fails to do so (largely because of conflicting narcissistic/destructive aims). This basic loving desire is associated with Eros and the life instincts, which, counter to what is commonly thought, is what Freud ultimately posits as lying beyond the pleasure principle. From this perspective, narcissistic pleasures become associated with death. The paper goes on to show how while Freud struggled to conceptually ground the view of the person as contending with his desire to love and inevitable inner obstacles to it, Kleinian psychoanalysis takes this view as basic and develops it further. One significant development finds expression in ideas on how the desire to love is not only non-narcissistic, but, rather, is self-sacrificing. Clinical implications are noted.

Freud's view of death and repetition as grounds of a Kleinian approach to narcissism: Implications for clinical practice.

Central to a Kleinian view of the person and the analytic process is the notion that narcissism is mainly pathological, involving the denial of the object, of his existence as independent of oneself or of his having value. The author will argue that the study of how this view is grounded in Freud's thinking, especially his thinking on the death instinct, and particularly in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle, deepens the understanding of this Kleinian view and points to its complexity. Also, through this study what essentially characterizes Kleinian practice, distinguishing it from other kinds of analytic practice is highlighted and Freud's ongoing relevance and contribution to contemporary Kleinian practice is made apparent.

Committed to a Single Model and Open to Reality.

A view prevails that holding multiple models enhances analytic work, enriches our understanding of pathology, offers different methods of working to meet the needs of a range of patients, and reflects openness to other approaches and the complexity of reality. Against this view it is argued, based on an examination of the nature of analytic models, that because they present comprehensive, divergent conceptions of the person and of analysis, their integration in the context of clinical work, or any shifting between them, is impossible. Although under certain circumstances multiple models seem to be held, in fact this is not so. Adherence to one's commitment to a single model facilitates, rather than constricts, openness to reality and awareness of its complexity.

Reflections on Klein's radical notion of phantasy and its implications for analytic practice.

Analysts may incorporate many of Melanie Klein's important contributions (e.g., on preoedipal dynamics, envy, and projective identification) without transforming their basic analytic approach. In this paper I argue that adopting the Kleinian notion of unconscious phantasy is transformative. While it is grounded in Freud's thinking and draws out something essential to his work, this notion of phantasy introduces a radical change that defines Kleinian thinking and practice and significantly impacts the analyst's basic clinical approach. This impact and its technical implications in the analytic situation are illustrated and discussed.

Understanding Freud's conflicted view of the object-relatedness of sexuality and its implications for contemporary psychoanalysis: A re-examination of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.

Through a re-examination of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), this paper reveals a fundamental tension in Freud's thinking on the nature of the individual and of his sexuality. In this text Freud portrays the individual and sexuality as inherently object-related and at the same time as inherently independent of such relatedness. The way in which Freud presents these contradictory ideas suggests that he was not merely undecided on object-relatedness and sexuality but rather that the contradiction was integral to this thinking. The paper offers an explanation of the meaning of this contradiction, of why it has been neglected in the analytic literature, and of some implications for contemporary psychoanalysis and its approach to sexuality.

THE QUEST FOR TRUTH AS THE FOUNDATION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PRACTICE: A TRADITIONAL FREUDIAN-KLEINIAN PERSPECTIVE.

In responding to the question of whether truth in psychoanalysis is relevant today, the author presents what she refers to as a traditional Freudian-Kleinian perspective. According to this perspective, truth is not only relevant, but rather the quest for it is the alpha and omega of psychoanalytic practice. The author reviews Freud's approach to truth and then discusses Klein's essential contribution to its understanding, grounding, and enrichment, highlighting Klein's thinking about phantasy and the life and death instincts. Finally, the author contends with the opposing view that the quest for truth is no longer relevant to contemporary analytic practice.

Conceptualizing splitting: On the different meanings of splitting and their implications for the understanding of the person and the analytic process.

While "splitting" is a familiar concept, its meaning is not as self-evident as is commonly assumed. In different contexts, it refers to different phenomena and is supported by different understandings of psychic dynamics. In this paper, the author presents four different conceptualizations of splitting, which capture the essential aspects of contemporary psychoanalytic discourse on the concept. There is a dissociative kind of splitting, which involves splitting off, in the face of trauma, whole personalities, which to some extent remain accessible to consciousness; there is a disavowal kind of splitting that splits off our awareness of disturbing realities or their meanings in our efforts to avoid the inner restraints imposed by repression; and there are two forms of splitting of the object into good and bad-one focusing on the splitting of representations of the object due to ego weakness and environmental determinants, and the other on the splitting of the mind itself in a primarily destructive act aimed at sparing the good from the destructiveness of our death instinct. All four conceptualizations have their origins in Freud's writing and then are further developed in the work of later analysts. The author argues that understanding the nature of these various conceptualizations of splitting can contribute to analytic theory and practice. It also sheds light on the essential nature of analytic approaches and how they offer different perspectives on the unity and disunity of man's basic nature.

Further evidence for the case against neuropsychoanalysis: How Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou's response to our critique confirms the irrelevance and harmfulness to psychoanalysis of the contemporary neuroscientific trend.

In their paper "The case for neuropsychoanalysis" Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou (2015) respond to our critique of neuropsychoanalysis (Blass & Carmeli, 2007), setting forth evidence and arguments which, they claim, demonstrate why neuroscience is relevant and important for psychoanalysis and hence why dialogue between the fields is necessary. In the present paper we carefully examine their evidence and arguments and demonstrate how and why their claim is completely mistaken. In fact, Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou's paper only confirms our position on the irrelevance and harmfulness to psychoanalysis of the contemporary neuroscientific trend. We show how this trend perverts the essential nature of psychoanalysis and of how it is practiced. The clinical impact and its detrimental nature is highlighted by discussion of clinical material presented by Yovell et al (2015). In the light of this we argue that the debate over neuropsychoanalysis should be of interest to all psychoanalysts, not only those concerned with biology or interdisciplinary dialogue.

On 'the fear of death' as the primary anxiety: how and why Klein differs from Freud.

It is well known that Melanie Klein held the view that 'fear of death' is the primary source of anxiety and that her position is explicitly opposed to that of Sigmund Freud, who maintained that that fear cannot in any way or form be a source of anxiety. In a previous article on Freud's Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (Blass, 2013), the author argued that, counter to what is commonly portrayed in the literature, Freud's considerations for rejecting the fear of death as a source of anxiety were based on relational and experiential factors that are usually associated with Kleinian psychoanalysis. In light of this affinity of Freud with Klein a question arises as to the actual source of their differences in this context. The present paper offers an answer to this question. The author first presents some of her earlier findings on what led Freud to reject the fear of death as a source of anxiety and then turns to investigate Klein's considerations for accepting it. This takes us beyond her explicit statements on this matter and sheds new light on the relationship of her views regarding death and anxiety and those of Freud. In turn this deepens the understanding of the relationship of Freud and Klein's conceptualizations of the psyche and its internal object relations, pointing to both surprising common ground and foundational differences.