ABSTRACT
Several forensic sciences, especially of the pattern-matching kind, are increasingly seen to lack the scientific foundation needed to justify continuing admission as trial evidence. Indeed, several have been abolished in the recent past. A likely next candidate for elimination is bitemark identification. A number of DNA exonerations have occurred in recent years for individuals convicted based on erroneous bitemark identifications. Intense scientific and legal scrutiny has resulted. An important National Academies review found little scientific support for the field. The Texas Forensic Science Commission recently recommended a moratorium on the admission of bitemark expert testimony. The California Supreme Court has a case before it that could start a national dismantling of forensic odontology. This article describes the (legal) basis for the rise of bitemark identification and the (scientific) basis for its impending fall. The article explains the general logic of forensic identification, the claims of bitemark identification, and reviews relevant empirical research on bitemark identification-highlighting both the lack of research and the lack of support provided by what research does exist. The rise and possible fall of bitemark identification evidence has broader implications-highlighting the weak scientific culture of forensic science and the law's difficulty in evaluating and responding to unreliable and unscientific evidence.
Subject(s)
Accidental Falls , Head Injuries, Closed/diagnosis , Shaken Baby Syndrome/diagnosis , Accidental Falls/statistics & numerical data , Child Abuse/legislation & jurisprudence , Child Abuse/statistics & numerical data , Child, Preschool , Cross-Sectional Studies , Diagnosis, Differential , Head Injuries, Closed/epidemiology , Head Injuries, Closed/etiology , Humans , Infant , Infant, Newborn , Mandatory Reporting , Shaken Baby Syndrome/epidemiology , United StatesABSTRACT
This paper examines how many of the states have changed their respective scientific-evidence admissibility standards under the influence of the United States Supreme Court's 1993 Daubert decision. The authors offer a definition of what constitutes a Daubert state, and using this definition classify the fifty states into three categories. These are: Frye states (15 states, 10 with codified evidence rules patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)); Daubert states (26 states, 24 with FRE-based rules), and non-Frye/non-Daubert states (9 states, 7 with FRE-based rules). The authors discuss how the reliability requirement varies among the non-Frye states, and examine how particular types of evidence have fared in the Daubert era. Finally, the authors offer some predictions for the scientific evidence trends of the states.
