Predicting social relations model effects from conditional expectations.

The Social Relations Model (SRM) is a conceptual and mathematical model of interpersonal responses in dyads. The SRM permits estimation of responses of one to many (the actor effect) and the responses of many to the one (the partner effect) at the individual level of analysis. The SRM also permits estimation of the unique responses of actors and partners in specific dyadic arrangements (the relationship effect). During the four decades that the SRM has been used empirically, most attention was focused on estimation of variance and covariance of components. More recently, second stage modeling has occurred in which SRM effect estimates are used as variables in multivariate models. Consequently, it has become important to have good predictions of SRM actor, partner, and relationship effects. A method proposed by Warner, Kenny, and Stoto has been used to predict these effects. Here we propose an alternative matrix-based estimation method that predicts the latent SRM random effects from their conditional expected values given observed data. Analytic work and Monte Carlo simulations indicate that our conditional-expectation predictions of SRM effects are more valid and precise than the traditional predictions. They will improve second-stage Social Relations Modeling and also have practical uses as well (in, e.g., determining employee salary raises). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie judgments.

Decades of research has shown that people are poor at detecting lies. Two explanations for this finding have been proposed. First, it has been suggested that lie detection is inaccurate because people rely on invalid cues when judging deception. Second, it has been suggested that lack of valid cues to deception limits accuracy. A series of 4 meta-analyses tested these hypotheses with the framework of Brunswik's (1952) lens model. Meta-Analysis 1 investigated perceived cues to deception by correlating 66 behavioral cues in 153 samples with deception judgments. People strongly associate deception with impressions of incompetence (r = .59) and ambivalence (r = .49). Contrary to self-reports, eye contact is only weakly correlated with deception judgments (r = -.15). Cues to perceived deception were then compared with cues to actual deception. The results show a substantial covariation between the 2 sets of cues (r = .59 in Meta-Analysis 2, r = .72 in Meta-Analysis 3). Finally, in Meta-Analysis 4, a lens model analysis revealed a very strong matching between behaviorally based predictions of deception and behaviorally based predictions of perceived deception. In conclusion, contrary to previous assumptions, people rarely rely on the wrong cues. Instead, limitations in lie detection accuracy are mainly attributable to weaknesses in behavioral cues to deception. The results suggest that intuitive notions about deception are more accurate than explicit knowledge and that lie detection is more readily improved by increasing behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers than by informing lie-catchers of valid cues to deception.

Embodiment, agency, and attitude change.

Attitude embodiment effects occur when the position or movement of a person's physical body changes the way the person evaluates an object. The present research investigated whether attitude embodiment effects depend more on biomechanical factors or on inferential cues to causal agency. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that actual movements of the physical body are not necessary to create attitude embodiment effects when inferential cues imply agency for another person's physical movements. Experiment 3 showed that actual movements of the physical body are not sufficient to create attitude embodiment effects when inferential cues imply nonagency for those movements. In all 3 experiments, inferential cues to agency played a more important role in attitude embodiment effects than did actual agency, suggesting that theories of embodiment and attitude embodiment need to consider inferential cues to agency alongside biomechanical mechanisms.

Individual differences in judging deception: accuracy and bias.

The authors report a meta-analysis of individual differences in detecting deception, confining attention to occasions when people judge strangers' veracity in real-time with no special aids. The authors have developed a statistical technique to correct nominal individual differences for differences introduced by random measurement error. Although researchers have suggested that people differ in the ability to detect lies, psychometric analyses of 247 samples reveal that these ability differences are minute. In terms of the percentage of lies detected, measurement-corrected standard deviations in judge ability are less than 1%. In accuracy, judges range no more widely than would be expected by chance, and the best judges are no more accurate than a stochastic mechanism would produce. When judging deception, people differ less in ability than in the inclination to regard others' statements as truthful. People also differ from one another as lie- and truth-tellers. They vary in the detectability of their lies. Moreover, some people are more credible than others whether lying or truth-telling. Results reveal that the outcome of a deception judgment depends more on the liar's credibility than any other individual difference.

On lie detection "wizards".

M. O'Sullivan and P. Ekman (2004) claim to have discovered 29 wizards of deception detection. The present commentary offers a statistical critique of the evidence for this claim. Analyses reveal that chance can explain results that the authors attribute to wizardry. Thus, by the usual statistical logic of psychological research, O'Sullivan and Ekman's claims about wizardry are gratuitous. Even so, there may be individuals whose wizardry remains to be uncovered. Thus, the commentary outlines forms of evidence that are (and are not) capable of diagnosing lie detection wizardry.

Accuracy of deception judgments.

We analyze the accuracy of deception judgments, synthesizing research results from 206 documents and 24,483 judges. In relevant studies, people attempt to discriminate lies from truths in real time with no special aids or training. In these circumstances, people achieve an average of 54% correct lie-truth judgments, correctly classifying 47% of lies as deceptive and 61% of truths as nondeceptive. Relative to cross-judge differences in accuracy, mean lie-truth discrimination abilities are nontrivial, with a mean accuracy d of roughly .40. This produces an effect that is at roughly the 60th percentile in size, relative to others that have been meta-analyzed by social psychologists. Alternative indexes of lie-truth discrimination accuracy correlate highly with percentage correct, and rates of lie detection vary little from study to study. Our meta-analyses reveal that people are more accurate in judging audible than visible lies, that people appear deceptive when motivated to be believed, and that individuals regard their interaction partners as honest. We propose that people judge others' deceptions more harshly than their own and that this double standard in evaluating deceit can explain much of the accumulated literature.

Meta-analysis of raw mean differences.

This article discusses the meta-analysis of raw mean differences. It presents a rationale for cumulating psychological effects in a raw metric and compares raw mean differences to standardized mean differences. Some limitations of standardization are noted, and statistical techniques for raw meta-analysis are described. These include a graphical device for decomposing effect sizes. Several illustrative data sets are analyzed.

The triangle of interpersonal models.

This article develops a framework for social psychology, the triangle of interpersonal models (TIM). TIM is a 2-dimensional classification scheme for the impact of people on social-psychological phenomena. TIM classifies a social-psychological phenomenon by the number of people who contribute to the phenomenon and the number of distinct social-psychological functions that those people serve. TIM includes models for phenomena that involve 1 person, 2 people, 3 people, and p people. In those phenomena, people serve 1, 2, 3, or f distinct social-psychological functions. TIM decomposes complex phenomena into components that reflect different levels of interpersonal causation. It brings rigor to holistic conceptions of social psychology and offers a fresh perspective on the relationship between the individual and the group.