Hardening subnational budget constraints via administrative subordination: The Italian experience of recovery plans in regional health services.

Since 2007, Italian regions running large deficits underwent recovery plans (Piani di Rientro) imposed by the central government. The goal was twofold: regions were asked (i) to restore a balanced budget and (ii) to continue supply the set of services defined by the constitution. We investigate whether recovery plans have reached their objectives. Our evidence suggests that recovery plans have proved to be an effective mechanism to eliminate subnational governments deficits. We also do not find any significant effects on health care utilization and on citizens' health. Overall, spending efficiency has likely improved.

Bailing out expectations and public health expenditure.

We use a "natural experiment", the fiscal adjustment of Italy in the 1990s to meet the Maastricht criteria, to test a simple model of soft budget constraint that closely resembles the intergovernmental relationships in the Italian public health care sector. We show that the link between the ex-ante financing by the Central government and the health expenditure by regions was stronger when regional expectations of future bailing outs were presumably lower. Confirming previous research, we also prove that more fiscally autonomous regions were more financially responsible and that a political "alignment" effect was present, with "friendly" regional governments controlling more expenditure than unfriendly ones. Our results suggest that, at least in Italy, bailing out expectations by regions may be the missing variable emphasised by [Culyer A.J., 1988. Health care expenditures in Canada: Myth and reality. Canadian Tax Papers, 82] for empirical models explaining health expenditure. Our results also raise some worries about the outcome of the current decentralization process in Europe.