Emotion-based learning: insights from the Iowa Gambling Task.

Interest in the cognitive and/or emotional basis of complex decision-making, and the related phenomenon of emotion-based learning, has been heavily influenced by the Iowa Gambling Task. A number of psychological variables have been investigated as potentially important in understanding emotion-based learning. This paper reviews the extent to which humans are explicitly aware of how we make such decisions; the biasing influence of pre-existing emotional labels; and the extent to which emotion-based systems are anatomically and functionally independent of episodic memory. Review of literature suggests that (i) an aspect of conscious awareness does appear to be readily achieved during the IGT, but as a relatively unfocused emotion-based "gut-feeling," akin to intuition; (ii) Several studies have manipulated the affective pre-loading of IGT tasks, and make it clear that such labeling has a substantial influence on performance, an experimental manipulation similar to the phenomenon of prejudice. (iii) Finally, it appears that complex emotion-based learning can remain intact despite profound amnesia, at least in some neurological patients, a finding with a range of potentially important clinical implications: in the management of dementia; in explaining infantile amnesia; and in understanding of the possible mechanisms of psychotherapy.

A novel set-shifting modification of the iowa gambling task: flexible emotion-based learning in schizophrenia.

Although it might seem that people with schizophrenia would perform poorly on measures of emotion-based learning, several studies have shown normal levels of performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; C. E. Y. Evans, C. H. Bowman, & O. H. Turnbull, 2005; L. M. Ritter, J. H. Meador-Woodruff, & G. W. Dalack, 2004; B. Shurman, W. P. Horan, & K. H. Nuechterlein, 2005; K. E. Wilder, D. R. Weinberger, & T. E. Goldberg, 1998). The present article describes a newly developed modification of the IGT involving initial familiarization with the basic contingency pattern then 3 periods of contingency shift. Control participants showed substantial gains during the later trials of each shift period. Analyzed in terms of positive symptoms, those with schizophrenia were little different from control participants. Those high in negative symptoms could perform the basic task but showed remarkably poor performances (no better than chance) in the shift phases, retaining a preference for decks that had previously been "good," even when they experienced substantial losses.

Subjective awareness on the Iowa Gambling Task: the key role of emotional experience in schizophrenia.

The key role of emotion in complex decision-making is commonly assessed using the Iowa Gambling Task, and has recently been a substantial research topic in neuropsychology. However, the question of subjective experience on such emotion-based learning measures has yet to be fully investigated, largely because previous studies have focussed primarily on behavioral performance measures. The present study investigated subjective experience on the Gambling Task, using a more systematic and quantitative method than that previously employed: evaluating the ability of participants to 'interrogate' emotion-based learning systems. The study also investigated subjective experience in a population (people with schizophrenia) in whom the question of emotional awareness is of special interest. People with schizophrenia showed learning on the Gambling Task at levels entirely comparable with that of controls. Both groups of participants also showed substantial, and rapidly developing, awareness of which decks were 'good' and 'bad'. Importantly, greater awareness was a significant correlate of good performance on the Gambling Task, for both groups, suggesting that there may be greater conscious awareness of emotion-related information in complex decision-making than had previously been appreciated.

Artificial time constraints on the Iowa Gambling Task: the effects on behavioural performance and subjective experience.

In the last decade, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has become a widely employed neuropsychological research instrument for the investigation of executive function. The task has been employed in a wide range of formats, from 'manual' procedures to more recently introduced computerised versions. Computer-based formats often require that responses on the task should be artificially delayed by a number of seconds between trials to collect skin-conductance data. Participants, however, may become frustrated when they want to select from a particular deck in the time-limited versions--so that an unintended emotional experience of frustration might well disrupt a task presumed to be reliant on emotion-based learning. We investigated the effect of the various types of Iowa Gambling Task format on performance, using three types of task: the classic manual administration, with no time limitations; a computerised administration with a 6-s enforced delay; and a control computerised version which had no time constraints. We also evaluated the subjective experience of participants on each task. There were no significant differences in performance, between formats, in behavioural terms. Subjective experience measures on the task also showed consistent effects across all three formats-with substantial, and rapidly developing, awareness of which decks were 'good' and 'bad.'

Emotion-based learning on a simplified card game: the Iowa and Bangor Gambling Tasks.

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been widely used in the assessment of neurological patients with frontal lesions. Emphasis has been placed on the complexity of the task (i.e., four decks of varying contingency pattern) with the suggestion that the participant must use emotion-based learning to deal with a complex decision-making process. The present study used a single deck card game (the Bangor Gambling Task, BGT), matched in many respects with the Iowa Gambling Task, in which the contingencies varied over time (gradually becoming worse for the participant) rather than across deck (as in the IGT). Forty participants performed both tasks. Performance on the tasks showed many similarities, with participants showing a comparable pattern of incremental learning on both tasks, reaching an analogous final level of performance. More importantly, there was a high correlation (r(2) = .93) in performance between the two tasks, the most salient feature of which was that virtually every participant who fell below categorisation of impaired IGT performance, also did very poorly on the BGT. These findings bear on the question of whether arguments about the 'complexity' of the Iowa Gambling Task necessarily explain why it appears to require emotion-based learning. The Bangor Gambling Task might also be a useful tool for clinical neuropsychologists, in the assessment of patients with executive dysfunction-given that the task is easier and quicker to administer than the Iowa Gambling Task, but appears to share the same performance features.

Real versus facsimile reinforcers on the Iowa Gambling Task.

The Iowa Gambling Task (([Bechara et al., 1994]) is an effective neuropsychological tool for the assessment of 'real-life' decision-making in a laboratory environment. It has been employed in a wide range of circumstances, though researchers have sometimes employed real money reinforcers instead of the facsimile (or 'monopoly'-type) money used by. The present study investigated whether the type of reinforcer produced any differences in performance. There were no significant differences between the two conditions, though the Facsimile Money condition produced a greater range (and a higher standard deviation) than the Real Money condition. This finding is especially important when considering the Gambling Task as a tool in clinical neuropsychology--where there are risks, at the individual subject level, of both false positive and false negative classification errors.

Direct versus indirect emotional consequences on the Iowa Gambling Task.

The Iowa Gambling Task has been widely used in the assessment of neurological patients with ventro-mesial frontal lesions. The Iowa Group has claimed that the Gambling Task is too complex for participants to follow using cognition alone, so that participants must rely on emotion-based learning systems (somatic markers). The present study investigates whether similar tasks can be performed without direct somatic markers. In a 'Firefighter' task closely matched to the classic Gambling Task, participants evaluate the performance of others--so that they experience reward and punishment indirectly. In contrast to the gradual improvement in performance seen on the classic Iowa Gambling Task, participants on the Firefighter Task showed no learning effect, mirroring the performance of patients with ventro-mesial frontal lesions, and suggesting that the task is very difficult to perform without direct somatic marker information. The use of this task as empirical measure of 'empathy' are discussed.