Strategic learning of people's names as a function of expected utility in young and older adults.

People's names are challenging to learn at all ages. Because people somewhat know this, they might spontaneously use cost-efficient encoding strategies and devote more resources to learn names that are most likely to be useful. To test this hypothesis, we created a pseudo-incidental learning situation in which young and older participants were exposed to 12 characters from a TV show and reviewed face-name-instrument triplets. Characters' probability of appearance was specified via importance labels (main or secondary characters, bit parts). A surprised cued recall test showed that young adults performed better than older ones, and that semantic information was better recalled than names. Consistent with cost-efficient encoding strategies, participants in both groups recalled names and semantic information about most important characters better. Interestingly, there were large individual differences: people who reported using cost-efficient strategies performed better. At the individual level, memory advantages for most important characters' names and semantic information correlated.

Strategies to resolve recall failures for proper names: New data.

Personal names are particularly susceptible to retrieval failures. Studies describing people's spontaneous strategies for resolving such failures have indicated that people frequently search for semantic or contextual information about the target person. However, previous experimental studies have shown that, while providing phonological information may help resolve a name-recall failure, by contrast, providing semantic information is usually not helpful. In the first study, in order to reduce a bias present in previous studies of spontaneous strategies, explicit instructions were given to participants, specifying that the focus of the study was on a voluntary search for information. Participants reported strategically searching for semantic/contextual strategies when they tried to resolve a name-retrieval failure more often than they reported searching for phonological/orthographic information. In addition, phonological/orthographic strategies were perceived as more difficult than semantic/contextual strategies. In a second experiment, we investigated whether retrieving phonological information by oneself is objectively difficult in a face-naming task: in the event of retrieval failure, participants were instructed to search for phonological information in some trials and for semantic information in other trials. Participants recalled semantic information in 94% of the trials when instructed to search for semantic information. By contrast, when instructed to search for phonological information, participants remained unable to recall any correct piece of phonological information in about 55% of the trials. This result shows that the retrieval of phonological information is objectively difficult. This difficulty could explain why people do not privilege searching for phonology to resolve name-retrieval failures.

Belief in memories may be relinquished as often for adulthood as for childhood events, but for different reasons.

The age distribution of nonbelieved memories (NBMs) reported by young and older adults typically reflects a large proportion of events dated to childhood. The present study aimed to further investigate the age of origin of NBMs by using instructions that include an NBM related to adulthood. Participants aged from 40 to 80 years were asked to describe an NBM, to explain why they had stopped believing their memory, and to rate its phenomenal characteristics. Participants also described and rated an age-matched believed memory (BM). The results revealed a similar proportion of nonbelieved events experienced in childhood and adulthood, thus calling into question the hypothesis that NBMs are mainly related to childhood events. We also found that NBMs might emerge for different reasons depending on the time of events. Additional analyses indicated that, overall, the influence of temporal distance on the ratings of phenomenal characteristics was similar for BMs and NBMs.

Which Information Helps Resolve Recall Failures for Familiar People's Names?

Personal names are particularly susceptible to retrieval failures. In the present paper, studies describing people's spontaneous strategies for resolving failures in recalling personal names as well as laboratory studies of experimentally induced resolution of name recall failures are reviewed. The review indicates that people frequently use spontaneous strategies based on a search for structural, semantic, and contextual information about the target person. On the other hand, both cueing and priming experimental studies have shown that providing phonological information may help resolve a recall failure, whereas providing structural or semantic information is usually not helpful. A possible explanation of this discrepancy between the spontaneous use of semantic/contextual information and the experimentally demonstrated uselessness of this kind of information is provided. Finally, the role of syntactical similarity (belonging or not to the same part of speech) in the efficiency of phonological priming is discussed.

Mirror efficiency in the assessment of visual pursuit in patients in minimally conscious state.

OBJECTIVE: Visual pursuit should be tested with a mirror in patients with disorders of consciousness. This stimulus was indeed more efficient than a person or an object, and the auto-referential aspect was supposed to be the key feature. The present study tested the hypothesis that the mirror was more efficient because of its self-aspect. METHODS: The mirror was compared (1) to the patient's picture and to the picture of a famous face, in 22 patients in minimally conscious state and (2) to the patient's picture and a fake mirror, which had dynamical and bright aspects of the mirror, without reflecting the face, in 26 other patients in minimally conscious state. RESULTS: The mirror was more efficient than the patient's picture, which was not statistically different from the famous face. The second part of the study confirmed the statistical difference between the mirror and the picture. However, the fake mirror was neither statistically different from the mirror nor from the picture. CONCLUSIONS: Although our results suggest that the hypothesis proposed by previous studies was partly wrong, they confirm that the mirror is the best stimulus to use when assessing visual pursuit.

The cognitive psychology and neuroscience of naming people.

The use of proper names enables us to designate entities, including people, at a very specific level of categorization: the unique entity or the individual. The paper presents a general overview of psychological/cognitive and neuroscientific studies that have compared the production of proper names, in particular people's names, with the production of common nouns during the last thirty years. The search for specific brain correlates of proper naming included single-case and group studies of patients with brain lesions, and studies utilizing functional neuroimaging or brain electrical stimulation with healthy participants. These studies have led neuroscientists to hypothesize that the recall of proper names involves a rather complex network including mainly left frontal and temporal regions. Behavioural evidence supports the view that proper names are more difficult to recall than common names, and scientists have proposed different explanations for this relative difficulty. Finally, several new directions for future research are proposed to improve our understanding of both cognitive processes and their brain correlates involved during proper name recall.

A Self-Reference Effect on Memory for People: We Are Particularly Good at Retrieving People Named Like Us.

In the present study, it was evaluated whether one's own name may produce a self-reference bias in memory for people. Results from Experiment 1 indicated that, in a verbal fluency task, participants recalled a greater number of known (familiar or famous) people with the same first name as their own than did paired participants, and vice versa. In the first experiment, paired participants knew each other but were not close. Experiment 2 examined whether this self-reference effect would still occur when the comparison target was a close other. This experiment showed that such a self-reference bias also occurred even when the paired persons were close (partners or very good friends). Overall the present paper describes a new naturalistic case of the self-reference effect.

Nonbelieved memories in middle-aged and older people.

Previous studies have reported that young participants typically date events that they remember, but no longer believe they experienced, to the period of childhood. The present study investigated whether participants aged between 40 and 79years dated events related to relinquished memories to the period of childhood, as do younger people, or whether they dated such events to a period later in life. The study also compared believed and nonbelieved memories with respect to memory perspective (1st vs 3rd person perspective). Results indicated that the majority of middle-aged and older people dated nonbelieved memories to the period of childhood (median age=8years). No correlation was found between the participants' current age and their age at the time the nonbelieved event occurred. In addition, results showed that believed memories were more likely to be retrieved from a 1st person perspective than were nonbelieved memories.

Similarities between the target and the intruder in naturally occurring repeated person naming errors.

The present study investigated an intriguing phenomenon that did not receive much attention so far: repeatedly calling a familiar person with someone else's name. From participants' responses to a questionnaire, these repeated naming errors were characterized with respect to a number of properties (e.g., type of names being substituted, error frequency, error longevity) and different features of similarity (e.g., age, gender, type of relationship with the participant, face resemblance and similarity of the contexts of encounter) between the bearer of the target name and the bearer of the wrong name. Moreover, it was evaluated whether the phonological similarity between names, the participants' age, the difference of age between the two persons whose names were substituted, and face resemblance between the two persons predicted the frequency of error. Regression analyses indicated that phonological similarity between the target name and the wrong name predicted the frequency of repeated person naming errors. The age of the participant was also a significant predictor of error frequency: the older the participant the higher the frequency of errors. Consistent with previous research stressing the importance of the age of acquisition of words on lexical access in speech production, results indicated that bearer of the wrong name was on average known for longer than the bearer of the target name.

Impairment of age estimation from faces in Alzheimer's disease.

A prerequisite for any function in social cognition is the perception and processing of social cues. Age estimation is a skill that is used in everyday life and is fundamental in social interactions. This study evaluated whether facial age estimation is impaired in patients with mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease (AD). The current age of faces is known to have an impact on age estimation, and therefore stimuli belonging to different age groups (young, middle-aged, and older adults' faces) were used. As expected, an impairment of age estimation from faces was observed in mild to moderate AD patients. However, the profile of impairment depended on the age of faces and stage of the disease. Mild AD patients presented difficulties mainly in assessing the age of middle-aged adults. In moderate disease stage, these difficulties also affected the age estimation of young adult faces. Interestingly, AD patients remained relatively good at estimating the age of older adults' faces, compared to healthy controls.

Detection of visual pursuit in patients in minimally conscious state: a matter of stimuli and visual plane?

OBJECTIVES: The aim of this study was to determine whether the assessment of pursuit eye movements in patients in minimally conscious state (MCS) is influenced by the choice of the visual stimulus (study 1) and by the moving plane (study 2). METHODS: Patients with MCS (MCS- and MCS+) in the acute (<1 month post-injury) or chronic (>1 month) setting were assessed. The Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) procedure was used to test visual pursuit of a moving mirror, object and person (study 1, n = 88) and to test vertical and horizontal visual tracking (study 2, n = 94). RESULTS: Study 1: Patients with visual pursuit tracked preferentially the moving mirror over the moving person or object. Study 2: Patients displaying visual pursuit, especially in MCS- and in chronic setting, preferentially tracked on the horizontal rather than the vertical plane. CONCLUSION: The findings confirm the importance of using a mirror to assess visual pursuit in patients in MCS and of initiating testing using the horizontal plane, specifically in patients in MCS- and those in chronic setting. Assessment should then be done on the vertical plane if visual pursuit is not detected on the horizontal plane.

Recognition memory for colored and black-and-white scenes in normal and color deficient observers (dichromats).

Color deficient (dichromat) and normal observers' recognition memory for colored and black-and-white natural scenes was evaluated through several parameters: the rate of recognition, discrimination (A'), response bias (B"D), response confidence, and the proportion of conscious recollections (Remember responses) among hits. At the encoding phase, 36 images of natural scenes were each presented for 1 sec. Half of the images were shown in color and half in black-and-white. At the recognition phase, these 36 pictures were intermixed with 36 new images. The participants' task was to indicate whether an image had been presented or not at the encoding phase, to rate their level of confidence in his her/his response, and in the case of a positive response, to classify the response as a Remember, a Know or a Guess response. Results indicated that accuracy, response discrimination, response bias and confidence ratings were higher for colored than for black-and-white images; this advantage for colored images was similar in both groups of participants. Rates of Remember responses were not higher for colored images than for black-and-white ones, whatever the group. However, interestingly, Remember responses were significantly more often based on color information for colored than for black-and-white images in normal observers only, not in dichromats.

Evidence for an own-age bias in age estimation from voices in older persons.

Previous studies have investigated the effect of ageing on age estimation from faces as well as the occurrence of an own-age bias in such age estimation from faces. To the best of our knowledge, the occurrence of an own age effect on age estimation from voices has never been examined earlier using an experimental design in which the age of participants (young vs. old) and the age of voice stimuli (young vs. old) were crossed. Results revealed an own-age bias in older adults only. In comparison with younger adults, older participants showed age estimation abilities that are preserved for voices from their own age group and impaired for younger voices. This own age bias was absent in younger participants.

Looking for the self in pathological unconsciousness.

There is an intimate relationship between consciousness and the notion of self. By studying patients with disorders of consciousness, we are offered with a unique lesion approach to tackle the neural correlates of self in the absence of subjective reports. Studies employing neuroimaging techniques point to the critical involvement of midline anterior and posterior cortices in response to the passive presentation of self-referential stimuli, such as the patient's own name and own face. Also, resting state studies show that these midline regions are severely impaired as a function of the level of consciousness. Theoretical frameworks combining all this progress surpass the functional localization of self-related cognition and suggest a dynamic system-level approach to the phenomenological complexity of subjectivity. Importantly for non-communicating patients suffering from disorders of consciousness, the clinical translation of these technologies will allow medical professionals and families to better comprehend these disorders and plan efficient medical management for these patients.

Characteristics of near-death experiences memories as compared to real and imagined events memories.

Since the dawn of time, Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) have intrigued and, nowadays, are still not fully explained. Since reports of NDEs are proposed to be imagined events, and since memories of imagined events have, on average, fewer phenomenological characteristics than real events memories, we here compared phenomenological characteristics of NDEs reports with memories of imagined and real events. We included three groups of coma survivors (8 patients with NDE as defined by the Greyson NDE scale, 6 patients without NDE but with memories of their coma, 7 patients without memories of their coma) and a group of 18 age-matched healthy volunteers. Five types of memories were assessed using Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ--Johnson et al., 1988): target memories (NDE for NDE memory group, coma memory for coma memory group, and first childhood memory for no memory and control groups), old and recent real event memories and old and recent imagined event memories. Since NDEs are known to have high emotional content, participants were requested to choose the most emotionally salient memories for both real and imagined recent and old event memories. Results showed that, in NDE memories group, NDE memories have more characteristics than memories of imagined and real events (p<0.02). NDE memories contain more self-referential and emotional information and have better clarity than memories of coma (all ps<0.02). The present study showed that NDE memories contained more characteristics than real event memories and coma memories. Thus, this suggests that they cannot be considered as imagined event memories. On the contrary, their physiological origins could lead them to be really perceived although not lived in the reality. Further work is needed to better understand this phenomenon.

Verbal overshadowing of face memory does occur in children too!

Verbal descriptions of unfamiliar faces have been found to impair later identification of these faces in adults, a phenomenon known as the "verbal overshadowing effect" (VOE). Although determining whether children are good at describing unfamiliar individuals and whether these descriptions impair their recognition performance is critical to gaining a better understanding children's eyewitness ability, only a couple of studies have examined this dual issue in children and these found no evidence of VOE. However, as there are some methodological criticisms of these studies, we decided to conduct two further experiments in 7-8, 10-11, and 13-14-year-old children and in adults using a more optimal method for the VOE to be observed. Evidence of the VOE on face identification was found in both children and adults. Moreover, neither the accuracy of descriptions, nor delay nor target presence in the lineup was found to be associated with identification accuracy. The theoretical and developmental implications of these findings are discussed.

Recalling semantic information about newly learned faces and voices.

Several findings showed that semantic information is more likely to be retrieved from recognised faces than from recognised voices. Earlier experiments, which investigated the recall of biographical information following person recognition, used stimuli that were pre-experimentally familiar to the participants, such as famous people's voices and faces. We propose an alternative method to compare the participants' ability to associate semantic information with faces and voices. The present experiments allowed a very strict control of frequency of exposure to pre-experimentally unfamiliar faces and voices and ensured the absence of identity clues in the spoken extracts. In Experiment 1 semantic information was retrieved from the presentation of a name. In Experiment 2 semantic and lexical information was retrieved from faces and/or voices. A memory advantage for faces over voices was again observed.

Two distinct neuronal networks mediate the awareness of environment and of self.

Evidence from functional neuroimaging studies on resting state suggests that there are two distinct anticorrelated cortical systems that mediate conscious awareness: an "extrinsic" system that encompasses lateral fronto-parietal areas and has been linked with processes of external input (external awareness), and an "intrinsic" system which encompasses mainly medial brain areas and has been associated with internal processes (internal awareness). The aim of our study was to explore the neural correlates of resting state by providing behavioral and neuroimaging data from healthy volunteers. With no a priori assumptions, we first determined behaviorally the relationship between external and internal awareness in 31 subjects. We found a significant anticorrelation between external and internal awareness with a mean switching frequency of 0.05 Hz (range: 0.01-0.1 Hz). Interestingly, this frequency is similar to BOLD fMRI slow oscillations. We then evaluated 22 healthy volunteers in an fMRI paradigm looking for brain areas where BOLD activity correlated with "internal" and "external" scores. Activation of precuneus/posterior cingulate, anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal cortices, and parahippocampal areas ("intrinsic system") was linearly linked to intensity of internal awareness, whereas activation of lateral fronto-parietal cortices ("extrinsic system") was linearly associated with intensity of external awareness.

The neural correlates of visual self-recognition.

This paper presents a review of studies that were aimed at determining which brain regions are recruited during visual self-recognition, with a particular focus on self-face recognition. A complex bilateral network, involving frontal, parietal and occipital areas, appears to be associated with self-face recognition, with a particularly high implication of the right hemisphere. Results indicate that it remains difficult to determine which specific cognitive operation is reflected by each recruited brain area, in part due to the variability of used control stimuli and experimental tasks. A synthesis of the interpretations provided by previous studies is presented. The relevance of using self-recognition as an indicator of self-awareness is discussed. We argue that a major aim of future research in the field should be to identify more clearly the cognitive operations induced by the perception of the self-face, and search for dissociations between neural correlates and cognitive components.