The neural correlates of value representation: From single items to bundles.

One of the core questions in Neuro-economics is to determine where value is represented. To date, most studies have focused on simple options and identified the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) as the common value region. We report the findings of an fMRI study in which we asked participants to make pairwise comparisons involving options of varying complexity: single items (Control condition), bundles made of the same two single items (Scaling condition) and bundles made of two different single items (Bundling condition). We construct a measure of choice consistency to capture how coherent the choices of a participant are with one another. We also record brain activity while participants make these choices. We find that a common core of regions involving the left VMPFC, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), regions associated with complex visual processing and the left cerebellum track value across all conditions. Also, regions in the DLPFC, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and the cerebellum are differentially recruited across conditions. Last, variations in activity in VMPFC and DLPFC value-tracking regions are associated with variations in choice consistency. This suggests that value based decision-making recruits a core set of regions as well as specific regions based on task demands. Further, correlations between consistency and the magnitude of signal change with lateral portions of the PFC suggest the possibility that activity in these regions may play a causal role in decision quality.

A Neuroeconomic Theory of Mental Time Travel.

We propose a theoretical model that places attention at the center of mental time travel (MTT) ability. This theory predicts that attention promotes a memory-based process that encodes memories of unexpected events, facilitates accurate recollection of information of such events during MTT, and optimizes subsequent decision-making. This process coexists with a habitual process that governs all other events and treats them equally. Our theory demonstrates that the memory-based process is useful when the environment features novel experiences that are likely to be relevant in future decision-making, hence worth remembering accurately. By contrast, the habitual process is optimal in environments that either do not change significantly, or have a small chance of being repeated in the future. This may explain why the ability to mentally travel in time has developed differently in humans than in other species. Implications are discussed in the context of decision-making.

The determinants of strategic thinking in preschool children.

Strategic thinking is an essential component of rational decision-making. However, little is known about its developmental aspects. Here we show that preschoolers can reason strategically in simple individual decisions that require anticipating a limited number of future decisions. This ability is transferred only partially to solve more complex individual decision problems and to efficiently interact with others. This ability is also more developed among older children in the classroom. Results indicate that while preschoolers potentially have the capacity to think strategically, it does not always translate into the ability to behave strategically.

Stress Induces Contextual Blindness in Lotteries and Coordination Games.

In this paper, we study how stress affects risk taking in three tasks: individual lotteries, Stag Hunt (coordination) games, and Hawk-Dove (anti-coordination) games. Both control and stressed subjects take more risks in all three tasks when the value of the safe option is decreased and in lotteries when the expected gain is increased. Also, subjects take longer to take decisions when stakes are high, when the safe option is less attractive and in the conceptually more difficult Hawk-Dove game. Stress (weakly) increases reaction times in those cases. Finally, our main result is that the behavior of stressed subjects in lotteries, Stag Hunt and Hawk-Dove are all highly predictive of each other (p-value < 0.001 for all three pairwise correlations). Such strong relationship is not present in our control group. Our results illustrate a "contextual blindness" caused by stress. The mathematical and behavioral tensions of Stag Hunt and Hawk-Dove games are axiomatically different, and we should expect different behavior across these games, and also with respect to the individual task. A possible explanation for the highly significant connection across tasks in the stress condition is that stressed subjects habitually rely on one mechanism to make a decision in all contexts whereas unstressed subjects utilize a more cognitively flexible approach.