Shaping children through genetic and environmental means.

In 'Parental Genetic Shaping and Parental Environmental Shaping', Anca Gheaus argues there is a normative difference between parents using genetic means to influence the development of their child, and parents using environmental means to achieve the same ends. Genetic shaping but not environmental shaping, it is claimed, introduces a negative asymmetry in the child-caregiver relationship. In this paper, we argue that Gheaus' argument fails as a critique of genetic shaping, and does not establish a moral difference between genetic and environmental shaping. Contrary to Gheaus' arguments in both 'Parental Genetic Shaping and Parental Environmental Shaping' and 'Parental Enhancement and Symmetry of Power in the Parent-Child Relationship', we also argue that even if genetic or prebirth shaping introduces further inequality in the parent-child relationship, this is not necessarily a bad thing, and it is not clear how a parent refraining from taking up the availability of such technology leaves the child better off.

Bioconservatism, bioenhancement and backfiring.

The prospect of enhancing ourselves through the use of new biotechnologies is for the most part, hypothetical. Nevertheless, the question of whether we should undertake such enhancement is worthy of discussion as it may become possible in the future. In this article, we consider one form of argument that conservative opponents of biotechnological means of enhancement (bioconservatives) deploy in opposition to the use of enhancement technologies-the backfiring objection. This is the objection that the use of such technologies is liable to go wrong and lead to outcomes that are inferior to the outcomes intended. We will argue that the objection is not nearly as significant as bioconservatives suppose it to be. Bioconservatives sometimes supplement the backfiring objection by arguing that change will be irreversible, that the new (or the unconventional) is especially liable to backfire and that humans possess severe and permanent limitations which cannot be overcome. We consider these ways of supplementing the backfiring objection and argue that each of them, when properly understood, is of limited value to the bioconservative. We also consider how traditional approaches to moral education can be supplemented by bioenhancement.

Is 'gender disappointment' a unique mental illness?

'Gender disappointment' is the feeling of sadness when a parent's strong desire for a child of a certain sex is not realised. It is frequently mentioned as a reason behind parents' pursuit of sex selection for social reasons. It also tends to be framed as a mental disorder on a range of platforms including the media, sex selection forums and among parents who have been interviewed about sex selection. Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether 'gender disappointment' represents a unique diagnosis. We argue that 'gender disappointment' does not account for a unique, distinct category of mental illness, with distinct symptoms or therapy. That said, we recognise that parents' distress is real and requires psychological treatment. We observe that this distress is rooted in gender essentialism, which can be addressed at both the individual and societal level.

How should we understand family-centred care?

What is family-centred care of a hospitalized child? A critical understanding of the concept of family-centred care is necessary if this widely preferred model is to be differentiated from other health care ideals and properly evaluated as appropriate to the care of hospitalized children. The article identifies distinguishable interpretations of family-centred care that can pull health professionals in different, sometimes conflicting directions. Some of these interpretations are not qualitatively different from robust interpretations of the ideals of parental participation, care-by-parent and partnership in care that are said to be the precursors of family-centred care. A prominent interpretation that regards the child and his or her family collectively as the 'unit of care' arguably arises from ambiguity and is significantly problematic as a model for the care of hospitalized children. Clinical practice driven by this interpretation can include courses of action that do not aim to do what will best promote a hospitalized child's welfare, and such cases will not be unusual. More broadly, this interpretation raises challenging questions about the responsibilities and authority of health professionals in relation to the interests of hospitalized children and their families.

How Sex Selection Undermines Reproductive Autonomy.

Non-medical sex selection is premised on the notion that the sexes are not interchangeable. Studies of individuals who undergo sex selection for non-medical reasons, or who have a preference for a son or daughter, show that they assume their child will conform to the stereotypical roles and norms associated with their sex. However, the evidence currently available has not succeeded in showing that the gender traits and inclinations sought are caused by a "male brain" or a "female brain". Therefore, as far as we know, there is no biological reason why parents cannot have the kind of parenting experience they seek with a child of any sex. Yet gender essentialism, a set of unfounded assumptions about the sexes which pervade society and underpin sexism, prevents parents from realising this freedom. In other words, unfounded assumptions about gender constrain not only a child's autonomy, but also the parent's. To date, reproductive autonomy in relation to sex selection has predominantly been regarded merely as the freedom to choose the sex of one's child. This paper points to at least two interpretations of reproductive autonomy and argues that sex selection, by being premised on gender essentialism and/or the social pressure on parents to ensure their children conform to gender norms, undermines reproductive autonomy on both accounts.

Why parents should not be told the sex of their fetus.

A new technique called non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has been developed, which can detect a range of genetic and chromosomal diseases, as well as fetal sex earlier, more easily and more reliably. NIPT, therefore, potentially expands the market for sex determination and sex selective abortion. This paper argues that both practices should be prevented by not including fetal sex in prenatal test reports. This is because there is a discrepancy between what parents are concerned with (gender) and what the prenatal test can provide (sex). The paper first presents arguments, which indicate a difference between sex and gender before presenting parental motivations for sex selection and sex determination to show that parents are not concerned with their child's sex chromosomes, or even their genitalia, but the gender role that their child will espouse. That, however, is not something that a prenatal test can provide. We are thus left with a situation in which what parents are told, and what they think they are being told, are two different things. In other words, as the conflation of sex with gender is implicit in the disclosure of fetal sex, it may be more accurate to refer to it as misinformation. This misinformation promotes sexism via gender essentialism, which is neither in the interests of the future child nor society.

A Relational Approach to Genetic Counseling for Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer.

Ethical issues arise for genetic counselors when a client fails to disclose a genetic diagnosis of hereditary disease to family: they must consider the rights of the individual client to privacy and confidentiality as well as the rights of the family to know their genetic risk. Although considerable work has addressed issues of non-disclosure from the client's perspective, there is a lack of qualitative research into how genetic counselors address this issue in practice. In this study, a qualitative approach was taken to investigate whether genetic counselors in Australia use a relational approach to encourage the disclosure of genetic information from hereditary breast and ovarian cancer (HBOC) clients among family members; and if so, how they use it. Semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with 16 genetic counselors from selected states across Australia. Data collection and analysis were guided by a basic iterative approach incorporating a hybrid methodology to thematic analysis. The findings provide indicative evidence of genetic counselors employing a relational approach in three escalating stages--covert, overt and authoritative--to encourage the disclosure of genetic information. The findings lend credence to the notion that genetic counselors envision a form of relational autonomy for their clients in the context of sharing genetic information, and they depart from individualistic conceptions of care/solely client-centered counseling when addressing the needs of other family members to know their genetic status.

Is premenstrual dysphoric disorder really a disorder?

Premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD) was recently moved to a full category in the DSM-5 (the latest edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). It also appears set for inclusion as a separate disorder in the ICD-11 (the upcoming edition of the World Health Organization's International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems). This paper argues that PMDD should not be listed in the DSM or the ICD at all, adding to the call to recognise PMDD as a socially constructed disorder. I first present the argument that PMDD pathologises understandable anger/distress and that to do so is potentially dangerous. I then present evidence that PMDD is a culture-bound phenomenon, not a universal one. I also argue that even if (1) medication produces a desired effect, (2) there are biological correlates with premenstrual anger/distress, (3) such anger/distress seems to occur monthly, and (4) women are more likely than men to be diagnosed with affective disorders, none of these factors substantiates that premenstrual anger/distress is caused by a mental disorder. I argue that to assume they do is to ignore the now accepted role that one's environment and psychology play in illness development, as well as arguments concerning the social construction of mental illness. In doing so, I do not claim that there are no women who experience premenstrual distress or that their distress is not a lived experience. My point is that such distress can be recognised and considered significant without being pathologised and that it is unethical to describe premenstrual anger/distress as a mental disorder. Further, if the credibility of women's suffering is subject to doubt without a clinical diagnosis, then the way to address this problem is to change societal attitudes towards women's suffering, not to label women as mentally ill. The paper concludes with some broader implications for women and society of the change in status of PMDD in the DSM-5 as well as a sketch of critical policy suggestions to address these implications.