Determinants of life expectancy at birth: a longitudinal study on OECD countries.

This paper analyses the influence of several determinants on life expectancy at birth in 36 OECD countries over the 1999-2018 period. We utilized a cross-country fixed-effects multiple regression analysis with year and country dummies and used dynamic models, backward stepwise selection, and Arellano-Bond estimators to treat potential endogeneity issues. The results show the influence of per capita health-care expenditure, incidence of out-of-pocket expenditure, physician density, hospital bed density, social spending, GDP level, participation ratio to labour, prevalence of chronic respiratory diseases, temperature, and total size of the population on life expectancy at birth. In line with previous studies, this analysis confirms the relevance of both health care expenditure and health care system (physicians and hospital beds in our analysis) in influencing a country's population life expectancy. It also outlines the importance of other factors related to population behaviour and social spending jointly considered on this outcome. Policy makers should carefully consider these mutual influences when allocating public funds, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic period.

Purchasing medical devices: The role of buyer competence and discretion.

This paper investigates the price variability of standardized medical devices purchased by Italian Public Buyers (PBs). A semiparametric approach is used to recover the marginal cost of each device. Average prices vary substantially between PBs; we show that most of the difference between the purchase prices and estimated costs is associated with a PB fixed effect, which, in turn, is related to the institutional characteristics and size of the PB. Repeating the main estimation using device fixed effects yields similar results. Finally, an exogenous policy change, i.e. the termination of the mandatory reference price regime, is used to assess how discretion affects medical device procurement given the skills of each PB. Our results show that less PB discretion - i.e. when mandatory reference prices apply - determines efficiency gains and losses for low- and high-skilled PBs, respectively.

Job sick leave: Detecting opportunistic behavior.

We utilize a large administrative dataset of sickness leave in Italy (a) to investigate whether private firms are more effective than the public insurer in choosing who to monitor and (b) to study the correlation between potentially opportunistic behavior and the observable characteristics of the employee. We find that private employers are more likely to select into monitoring employees who are fit for work despite being on sick leave, if the public insurer is not supported by any data-driven tool. However, the use of a scoring mechanism, based on past records, allows the public insurer to be as effective as the employer. This result suggests that the application of machine learning to appropriate databases may improve the targeting of public monitoring to detect opportunistic behavior. Concerning the association between observable characteristics and potentially opportunistic behavior, we find that males, employees younger than 50, those on short leaves, or without a history of illness are more likely to be found fit for work.

Pay dispersion and performance in teams.

Extant research offers conflicting predictions about the effect of pay dispersion on team performance. We collected a unique dataset from the Italian soccer league to study the effect of intra-firm pay dispersion on team performance, under different definitions of what constitutes a "team". This peculiarity of our dataset can explain the conflicting evidence. Indeed, we also find positive, null, and negative effects of pay dispersion on team performance, using the same data but different definitions of team. Our results show that when the team is considered to consist of only the members who directly contribute to the outcome, high pay dispersion has a detrimental impact on team performance. Enlarging the definition of the team causes this effect to disappear or even change direction. Finally, we find that the detrimental effect of pay dispersion is due to worse individual performance, rather than a reduction of team cooperation.

Temptation at work.

To encourage worker productivity, companies routinely adopt policies requiring employees to delay gratification. For example, offices might prohibit use of the internet for personal purposes during regular business hours. Recent work in social psychology, however, suggests that using willpower to delay gratification can negatively impact performance. We report data from an experiment where subjects in a Willpower Treatment are asked to resist the temptation to join others in watching a humorous video for 10 minutes. In relation to a baseline treatment that does not require willpower, we show that resisting this temptation detrimentally impacts economic productivity on a subsequent task.