Impaired perception of temporal contiguity between action and effect is associated with disorders of agency in schizophrenia.

Delusions of control in schizophrenia are characterized by the striking feeling that one's actions are controlled by external forces. We here tested qualitative predictions inspired by Bayesian causal inference models, which suggest that such misattributions of agency should lead to decreased intentional binding. Intentional binding refers to the phenomenon that subjects perceive a compression of time between their intentional actions and consequent sensory events. We demonstrate that patients with delusions of control perceived less self-agency in our intentional binding task. This effect was accompanied by significant reductions of intentional binding as compared to healthy controls and patients without delusions. Furthermore, the strength of delusions of control tightly correlated with decreases in intentional binding. Our study validated a critical prediction of Bayesian accounts of intentional binding, namely that a pathological reduction of the prior likelihood of a causal relation between one's actions and consequent sensory events-here captured by delusions of control-should lead to lesser intentional binding. Moreover, our study highlights the import of an intact perception of temporal contiguity between actions and their effects for the sense of agency.

Human Vision Reconstructs Time to Satisfy Causal Constraints.

The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, because the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here, we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: In three experiments (N = 607), the experienced event timings were determined by causality in real time. Adult participants viewed a simple three-item sequence, ACB, which is typically remembered as ABC in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, participants' points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite participants' full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by postperceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades.

Temporal Binding, Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework.

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective "sense of agency." However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause-effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.

The developmental profile of temporal binding: From childhood to adulthood.

Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6-7, 7-8, and 9-10 years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgements about the time interval between (a) their button press and a rocket launch, and (b) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made judgements about the interval between an experimenter's button press and the launch of a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. In addition, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves were the cause of an outcome compared with when they were mere spectators. This suggests that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from childhood into adulthood.

Causing time: Evaluating causal changes to the when rather than the whether of an outcome.

Studies of human causal learning typically conceptualize an effect as the presence or absence of an outcome or event in a given trial following a cause. However, causes may exert their influence in other ways, notably, by advancing or postponing the time at which an outcome occurs. Prior research has not examined how humans evaluate causal changes where the change in timing itself is the effect of interest. This research took a first step in this direction by investigating whether participants can accurately judge cause-effect contingencies when the effect is a change in outcome timing, as distinct from outcome occurrence: A change to the when of the outcome rather than to the whether. Three experiments presented scenarios where a candidate cause could either advance or postpone an inevitable outcome by a given amount of time and with a given probability. Consistent with previous research on judgments about event occurrence, participants gave higher ratings to scenarios with greater contingency. These effects were generally consistent for actions that advanced or postponed the outcome. Overall, our findings demonstrate that people are sensitive to probabilistic contrasts involving causal changes in event timing.

Causality influences children's and adults' experience of temporal order.

Although it has long been known that time is a cue to causation, recent work with adults has demonstrated that causality can also influence the experience of time. In causal reordering (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013, 2016) adults tend to report the causally consistent order of events rather than the correct temporal order. However, the effect has yet to be demonstrated in children. Across four preregistered experiments, 4- to 10-year-old children (N = 813) and adults (N = 178) watched a 3-object Michotte-style "pseudocollision." While in the canonical version of the clip, object A collided with B, which then collided with object C (order: ABC), the pseudocollision involved the same spatial array of objects but featured object C moving before object B (order: ACB), with no collision between B and C. Participants were asked to judge the temporal order of events and whether object B collided with C. Across all age groups, participants were significantly more likely to judge that B collided with C in the 3-object pseudocollision than in a 2-object control clip (where clear causal direction was lacking), despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two clips (Experiments 1-3). Collision judgments and temporal order judgments were not entirely consistent, with some participants-particularly in the younger age range-basing their temporal order judgments on spatial rather than temporal information (Experiment 4). We conclude that in both children and adults, rather than causal impressions being determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object movement, schemata are used in a top-down manner when interpreting perceptual displays. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The role of time perception in temporal binding: Impaired temporal resolution in causal sequences.

Causality affects our perception of time; events that appear as causally related are perceived as closer together in time than unrelated events. This effect is known as temporal binding. One potential explanation of this effect is that causality slows an "internal clock" that is used in interval estimation. To explore this hypothesis, we first examined participants' perceived duration of a range of intervals between a causal action and an effect, or between two unrelated events. If (apparent) causality slows the internal clock, then plotting perceived duration against actual duration should reveal a shallower slope in the causality condition (a relative compression of perceived time). This pattern was found. We then examined an interesting corollary: that a slower rate during causal sequences would result in reduced temporal acuity. This is what we found: Duration discrimination thresholds were higher for causal compared to non-causal sequences. These results are compatible with a clock-slowing account of temporal binding. Implications for sensory recalibration accounts of binding are discussed.

When causality shapes the experience of time: Evidence for temporal binding in young children.

It is well established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time-the so-called temporal binding effect. Here, we examined the developmental origins of temporal binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or preceded by a non-causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate for the first time that children as young as 4 years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in causal knowledge. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQC_MqjxZQQ.

Temporal binding and internal clocks: No evidence for general pacemaker slowing.

The perception of time is distorted by many factors (e.g., arousal, temperature, age etc.), but is it possible that causality would affect our perception of time? We investigate timing changes in the temporal binding effect, which refers to a subjective shortening of the interval between actions and their outcomes. Four experiments investigated whether binding may be due to variations in the rate of an internal clock. Specifically, we asked whether binding reflects changes to a general timing system, or a dedicated clock unique to causal sequences. We developed a novel experimental paradigm (embedded interval estimation procedure) in which participants made temporal judgments of either causal or noncausal intervals, or the duration of an event embedded within that interval. Stimuli and modality were combined factorially, with interval markers and embedded events being either visual or auditory. Although we replicated the temporal binding effect, we found no evidence for commensurate changes to time perception of the embedded event, which suggests that temporal binding is effected by changes to a specific and dedicated, rather than a general clock system. (PsycINFO Database Record

Temporal predictability enhances judgements of causality in elemental causal induction from both observation and intervention.

When the temporal interval or delay separating cause and effect is consistent over repeated instances, it becomes possible to predict when the effect will follow from the cause, hence temporal predictability serves as an appropriate term for describing consistent cause-effect delays. It has been demonstrated that in instrumental action-outcome learning tasks, enhancing temporal predictability by holding the cause-effect interval constant elicits higher judgements of causality compared to conditions involving variable temporal intervals. Here, we examine whether temporal predictability exerts a similar influence when causal learning takes place through observation rather than intervention through instrumental action. Four experiments demonstrated that judgements of causality were higher when the temporal interval was constant than when it was variable, and that judgements declined with increasing variability. We further found that this beneficial effect of predictability was stronger in situations where the effect base-rate was zero (Experiments 1 and 3). The results therefore clearly indicate that temporal predictability enhances impressions of causality, and that this effect is robust and general. Factors that could mediate this effect are discussed.

Structural awareness mitigates the effect of delay in human causal learning.

Many studies have demonstrated that reinforcement delays exert a detrimental influence on human judgments of causality. In a free-operant procedure, the trial structure is usually only implicit, and delays are typically manipulated via trial duration, with longer trials tending to produce both longer experienced delays and also lower objective contingencies. If, however, a learner can become aware of this trial structure, this may mitigate the effects of delay on causal judgments. Here we tested this "structural-awareness" hypothesis by manipulating whether response-outcome contingencies were clearly identifiable as such, providing structural information in real time using an auditory tone to delineate consecutive trials. A first experiment demonstrated that providing cues to indicate trial structure, but without an explicit indication of their meaning, significantly increased the accuracy of causal judgments in the presence of delays. This effect was not mediated by changes in response frequency or timing, and a second experiment demonstrated that it cannot be attributed to the alternative explanation of enhanced outcome salience. In a third experiment, making trial structure explicit and unambiguous, by telling participants that the tones indicated trial structure, completely abolished the effect of delays. We concluded that, with sufficient information, a continuous stream of causes and effects can be perceived as a series of discrete trials, the contingency nature of the input may be exploited, and the effects of delay may be eliminated. These results have important implications for human contingency learning and in the characterization of temporal influences on causal inference.

Smokers discount their drug of abuse in the same way as other consumable rewards.

Recent research shows that drug abusers discount delayed monetary rewards more than nonabusers do, and they discount delayed substances of abuse (e.g., drugs) more than delayed money. Furthermore, non-drug-abusers discount food and substances of abuse (e.g., alcohol), more than money. Here, we compare the delay and probability discounting of money with that of a directly consumable reward (chocolate) and with that of a substance of abuse (cigarettes), in a drug-using population (smokers). In line with previous research, we found in two experiments that delay discounting differentiated between smokers and nonsmokers, and between money and a nonabused directly consumable reward (chocolate). In addition, our results show that there appears to be no difference in the extent to which smokers discount their abused substance compared to another directly consumable reward. These findings support the contention that drugs and food are part of the same category of primary reinforcers, whereas money is discounted differently, as a conditioned reinforcer.

The gut chooses faster than the mind: a latency advantage of affective over cognitive decisions.

Dual-process theories often cite that affective processing occurs more rapidly than cognitive processing. A wide range of evidence seems to support this notion; however, little research exists in the context of decision making. We tested the hypothesis that affective decisions would be performed faster than cognitive decisions. Forty-nine students completed a series of forced-choice tasks involving well-known consumer brands, focusing on either emotionally or cognitively relevant aspects of the products. The results revealed a significant latency advantage for affective processing compared to cognitive processing.

Assessing evidence for a common function of delay in causal learning and reward discounting.

Time occupies a central role in both the induction of causal relationships and determining the subjective value of rewards. Delays devalue rewards and also impair learning of relationships between events. The mathematical relation between the time until a delayed reward and its present value has been characterized as a hyperbola-like function, and increasing delays of reinforcement tend to elicit judgments or response rates that similarly show a negatively accelerated decay pattern. Furthermore, neurological research implicates both the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex in both these processes. Since both processes are broadly concerned with the concepts of reward, value, and time, involve a similar functional form, and have been identified as involving the same specific brain regions, it seems tempting to assume that the two processes are underpinned by the same cognitive or neural mechanisms. We set out to determine experimentally whether a common cognitive mechanism underlies these processes, by contrasting individual performances on causal judgment and delay discounting tasks. Results from each task corresponded with previous findings in the literature, but no relation was found between the two tasks. The task was replicated and extended by including two further measures, the Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), and a causal attribution task. Performance on this latter task was correlated with results on the causal judgment task, and also with the non-planning component of the BIS, but the results from the delay discounting task was not correlated with either causal learning task nor the BIS. Implications for current theories of learning are considered.

Understanding the past, predicting the future: causation, not intentional action, is the root of temporal binding.

Temporal binding refers to a subjective shortening of elapsed time between actions and their resultant consequences. Originally, it was thought that temporal binding is specific to motor learning and arises as a consequence of either sensory adaptation or the associative principles of the forward model of motor command. Both of these interpretations assume that the binding effect is rooted in the motor system and, critically, that it is driven by intentional action planning. The research reported here demonstrates that both intentional actions and mechanical causes result in temporal binding, which suggests that intentional action is not necessary for temporal binding and that binding results from the causal relation linking actions with their consequences. Intentional binding is thus a special case of more general causal binding, which can be explained by a theory of Bayesian ambiguity reduction.

Small samples do not cause greater accuracy--but clear data may cause small samples: comment on Fiedler and Kareev (2006).

Fiedler and Kareev (2006) have claimed that taking a small sample of information (as opposed to a large one) can, in certain specific situations, lead to greater accuracy--beyond that gained by avoiding fatigue or overload. Specifically, they have argued that the propensity of small samples to provide more extreme evidence is sufficient to create an accuracy advantage in situations of high caution and uncertainty. However, a close examination of Fiedler and Kareev's experimental results does not reveal any strong reason to conclude that small samples can cause greater accuracy. We argue that the negative correlation between sample size and accuracy that they reported (found only for the second half of Experiment 1) is also consistent with mental fatigue and that their data in general are consistent with the causal structure opposite to the one they suggest: Rather than small samples causing clear data, early clear data may cause participants to stop sampling. More importantly, Experiment 2 provides unequivocal evidence that large samples result in greater accuracy; Fiedler and Kareev only found a small sample advantage here when they artificially reduced the data set. Finally, we examine the model that Fiedler and Kareev used; they surmised that decision makers operate with a fixed threshold independent of sample size. We discuss evidence for an alternative (better performing) model that incorporates a dynamic threshold that lowers with sample size. We conclude that there is no evidence currently to suggest that humans benefit from taking a small sample, other than as a tactic for avoiding fatigue, overload, and/or opportunity cost-that is, there is no accuracy advantage inherent to small samples.

Temporal predictability facilitates causal learning.

Temporal predictability refers to the regularity or consistency of the time interval separating events. When encountering repeated instances of causes and effects, we also experience multiple cause-effect temporal intervals. Where this interval is constant it becomes possible to predict when the effect will follow from the cause. In contrast, interval variability entails unpredictability. Three experiments investigated the extent to which temporal predictability contributes to the inductive processes of human causal learning. The authors demonstrated that (a) causal relations with fixed temporal intervals are consistently judged as stronger than those with variable temporal intervals, (b) that causal judgments decline as a function of temporal uncertainty, and (c) that this effect remains undiminished with increased learning time. The results therefore clearly indicate that temporal predictability facilitates causal discovery. The authors considered the implications of their findings for various theoretical perspectives, including associative learning theory, the attribution shift hypothesis, and causal structure models.

Temporal binding of action and effect in interval reproduction.

We report two experiments demonstrating temporal binding between action and outcome (Haggard et al. 2002a) as measured in a temporal reproduction paradigm. Our results show that the effect is empirically robust, does not rely on repeated presentation of fixed intervals, truly affects time perception, and persists across intervals much longer than in earlier demonstrations with the Libet Clock paradigm (Libet et al. 1983).

Causal contraction: spatial binding in the perception of collision events.

Causality is a higher-level mental construct derived from low-level percepts such as contiguity in space-time. We show that low-level spatial perception is distorted by the presence of a causal connection, such that two objects appear closer in space when they are causally linked than when they are not. This finding parallels recent demonstrations of temporal causal binding and suggests that causality is at the root of a general ambiguity-resolution process operating on the human perceptual system.