ABSTRACT
According to a familiar distinction, neuroethics incorporates the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics of neuroscience. Within neuroethics, these two parts have provoked distinct and separate lines of inquiry, and there has been little discussion of how the two parts overlap. In the present article, I try to draw a connection between these two parts by considering the implications that are raised for ethics by scientific findings about the way we make moral decisions. The main argument of the article is that although neuroscience is "stretching" ethics by revealing the empirical basis of our moral decisions and, thereby, challenging our present understanding of the dominant ethical theories, substantial further questions remain regarding the impact that neuroscience will have on ethics more broadly.
Subject(s)
Bioethical Issues , Morals , Neurosciences/ethics , HumansABSTRACT
Although advance directives have become a familiar instrument within the context of treatment, there has been minimal support for their expansion into the context of research. In this paper I argue that the principle of precedent autonomy that grants a competent person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment when later incompetent, also grants a competent person the right to consent to research that is greater than minimal risk. An examination of the principle of precedent autonomy reveals that a future-binding research decision is within the scope of a competent person's critical interests, if the decision is consistent with what the person believes gives her life intrinsic value.
Subject(s)
Advance Directives/ethics , Dementia/psychology , Informed Consent/ethics , Terminal Care/ethics , Advance Directives/psychology , Decision Making/ethics , Dementia/complications , Ethics, Research , Humans , Informed Consent/psychology , Mental Competency/psychology , Patient Rights , Personal Autonomy , Terminal Care/psychologySubject(s)
Animal Experimentation/ethics , Animal Welfare/ethics , Crowding , Humanism , Livestock , Moral Obligations , Neuroimaging/ethics , Neurosciences/ethics , Psychotropic Drugs/administration & dosage , Aggression , Animal Welfare/trends , Animals , Anxiety/drug therapy , Anxiety/etiology , Crowding/psychology , Disease Models, Animal , Drug Therapy/ethics , Ethics, Research , Fear , Humans , Movement , Nootropic Agents/administration & dosage , Pain/etiology , Pain/prevention & control , Pets , Primates/psychology , Self-Injurious Behavior/etiology , Self-Injurious Behavior/prevention & control , Stress, Psychological/etiology , Stress, Psychological/prevention & controlABSTRACT
As Colin Allen has argued, discussions between science and ethics about the mentality and moral status of nonhuman animals often stall on account of the fact that the properties that ethics presents as evidence of animal mentality and moral status, namely consciousness and sentience, are not observable "scientifically respectable" properties. In order to further discussion between science and ethics, it seems, therefore, that we need to identify properties that would satisfy both domains. In this article I examine the mentality and moral status of nonhuman animals from the perspective of neuroethics. By adopting this perspective, we can see how advances in neuroimaging regarding (1) research into the neurobiology of pain, (2) "brain reading," and (3) the minimally conscious state may enable us to identify properties that help bridge the gap between science and ethics, and hence help further the debate about the mentality and moral status of nonhuman animals.
