On the (un)reliability of common behavioral and electrophysiological measures from the stop signal task: Measures of inhibition lack stability over time.

Response inhibition, the intentional stopping of planned or initiated actions, is often considered a key facet of control, impulsivity, and self-regulation. The stop signal task is argued to be the purest inhibition task we have, and it is thus central to much work investigating the role of inhibition in areas like development and psychopathology. Most of this work quantifies stopping behavior by calculating the stop signal reaction time as a measure of individual stopping latency. Individual difference studies aiming to investigate why and how stopping latencies differ between people often do this under the assumption that the stop signal reaction time indexes a stable, dispositional trait. However, empirical support for this assumption is lacking, as common measures of inhibition and control tend to show low test-retest reliability and thus appear unstable over time. The reasons for this could be methodological, where low stability is driven by measurement noise, or substantive, where low stability is driven by a larger influence of state-like and situational factors. To investigate this, we characterized the split-half and test-retest reliability of a range of common behavioral and electrophysiological measures derived from the stop signal task. Across three independent studies, different measurement modalities, and a systematic review of the literature, we found a pattern of low temporal stability for inhibition measures and higher stability for measures of manifest behavior and non-inhibitory processing. This pattern could not be explained by measurement noise and low internal consistency. Consequently, response inhibition appears to have mostly state-like and situational determinants, and there is little support for the validity of conceptualizing common inhibition measures as reflecting stable traits.

Corticospinal excitability reductions during action preparation and action stopping in humans: Different sides of the same inhibitory coin?

Motor functions and cognitive processes are closely associated with each other. In humans, this linkage is reflected in motor system state changes both when an action must be prepared and stopped. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation showed that both action preparation and action stopping are accompanied by a reduction of corticospinal excitability, referred to as preparatory and response inhibition, respectively. While previous efforts have been made to describe both phenomena extensively, an updated and comprehensive comparison of the two phenomena is lacking. To ameliorate such deficit, this review focuses on the role and interpretation of single-coil (single-pulse and paired-pulse) and dual-coil TMS outcome measures during action preparation and action stopping in humans. To that effect, it aims to identify commonalities and differences, detailing how TMS-based outcome measures are affected by states, traits, and psychopathologies in both processes. Eventually, findings will be compared, and open questions will be addressed to aid future research.

Reward does not modulate corticospinal excitability in anticipation of a Stroop trial.

Action preparation is associated with a transient decrease of corticospinal excitability just before target onset. We have previously shown that the prospect of reward modulates preparatory corticospinal excitability in a Simon task. While the conflict in the Simon task strongly implicates the motor system, it is unknown whether reward prospect modulates preparatory corticospinal excitability in tasks that implicate the motor system less directly. To that effect, we examined reward-modulated preparatory corticospinal excitability in the Stroop task. We administered a rewarded cue-target delay paradigm using Stroop stimuli that afforded a left or right index finger response. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was administered over the left primary motor cortex and electromyography was obtained from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle. In line with previous findings, there was a preparatory decrease in corticospinal excitability during the delay period. In contrast to our previous study using the Simon task, preparatory corticospinal excitability was not modulated by reward. Our results indicate that reward-modulated changes in the motor system depend on specific task-demands, possibly related to varying degrees of motor conflict.

Are all behavioral reward benefits created equally? An EEG-fMRI study.

Reward consistently boosts performance in cognitive tasks. Although many different reward manipulations exist, systematic comparisons are lacking. Reward effects on cognitive control are usually studied using monetary incentive delay (MID; cue-related reward information) or stimulus-reward association (SRA; target-related reward information) tasks. While for MID tasks, evidence clearly implicates reward-triggered global increases in proactive control, it is unclear how reward effects arise in SRA tasks, and in how far such mechanisms overlap during task preparation and target processing. Here, we address these questions with simultaneous EEG-fMRI using a Stroop task with four different block types. In addition to MID and SRA blocks, we used an SRA-task modification with reward-irrelevant cues (C-SRA) and regular reward-neutral Stroop-task blocks. Behaviorally, we observed superior performance for all reward conditions compared to Neutral, and more pronounced reward effects in the SRA and C-SRA blocks, compared to MID blocks. The fMRI data showed similar reward effects in value-related areas for events that signaled reward availability (MID cues and (C-)SRA targets), and comparable reward modulations in cognitive-control regions for all targets regardless of block type. This result pattern was echoed by the EEG data, showing clear markers of valuation and cognitive control, which only differed during task preparation, whereas reward-related modulations during target processing were again comparable across block types. Yet, considering only cue-related fMRI data, C-SRA cues triggered preparatory control processes beyond reward-unrelated MID cues, without simultaneous modulations in typical reward areas, implicating enhanced task preparation that is not directly driven by a concurrent neural reward-anticipation response.

Open Up - the Mission Statement of the Control of Impulsive Action (Ctrl-ImpAct) Lab on Open Science.

The present paper is the mission statement of the Control of Impulsive Action (Ctrl-ImpAct) Lab regarding Open Science. As early-career researchers (ECRs) in the lab, we first state our personal motivation to conduct research based on the principles of Open Science. We then describe how we incorporate four specific Open Science practices (i.e., Open Methodology, Open Data, Open Source, and Open Access) into our scientific workflow. In more detail, we explain how Open Science practices are embedded into the so-called 'co-pilot' system in our lab. The 'co-pilot' researcher is involved in all tasks of the 'pilot' researcher, that is designing a study, double-checking experimental and data analysis scripts, as well as writing the manuscript. The lab has set up this co-pilot system to increase transparency, reduce potential errors that could occur during the entire workflow, and to intensify collaborations between lab members. Finally, we discuss potential solutions for general problems that could arise when practicing Open Science.

Reward anticipation changes corticospinal excitability during task preparation depending on response requirements and time pressure.

The preparation of an action is accompanied by transient corticospinal (CS) excitability changes. Motivation can modulate these changes. Specifically, when a cue indicates that a reward can be obtained, CS excitability initially increases, followed by a pronounced decrease. This dynamic could reflect processes related to reward expectancy, processes related to action preparation, or a combination of both. Here we set up two experiments to dissociate these accounts. A rewarded choice reaction time task was used in which individuals were cued at the beginning of each trial whether or not a response would be required at target onset and whether or not a reward could be obtained. We used single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (spTMS) over the left primary motor cortex (M1) early (shortly after cue onset) or late (shortly before target onset) preceding target onset to examine CS excitability during motivated action preparation. Electromyography (EMG) was obtained from the right first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle. In the first experiment, we used a lenient response deadline, whereas a strict response time-out procedure was employed in the second experiment. Reward modulated CS excitability differentially only in the second experiment: CS excitability was highest during reward anticipation for the early stimulation epoch and was reduced for the late stimulation epoch when individuals were required to prepare a response, while CS excitability remained unchanged during non-reward anticipation. Our findings suggest that the reward effect on CS excitability is dependent on the actual implementation of effort to attain reward (i.e., the preparation of an actual action), as well as on temporal requirements (i.e., time pressure) invoked by the task.

Early and late indications of item-specific control in a Stroop mouse tracking study.

Previous studies indicated that cognitive conflict continues to bias actions even after a movement has been initiated. The present paper examined whether cognitive control also biases actions after movement initiation. To this end, we had participants perform a Stroop task in which we manipulated the item-specific proportion of (in)congruent trials (80% congruent vs. 20% congruent). Importantly, participants responded via mouse movements, allowing us to evaluate various movement parameters: initiation times, movement times, and movement accuracy. Results showed that mouse movements were faster and more accurate during congruent trials compared to incongruent trials. Moreover, we observed that this congruency effect was larger for 80% congruent compared to 20% congruent items, which reflects item-specific cognitive control. Notably, when responses were initiated very fast - rendering virtually no time for stimulus processing before movement onset - this item-specific control was observed only in movement times. However, for relatively slow initiated responses, item specific control was observed both in initiation and in movement times. These findings demonstrate that item-specific cognitive control biases actions before and after movement initiation.

Reward anticipation modulates primary motor cortex excitability during task preparation.

Task preparation has been associated with a transient suppression of corticospinal excitability (CSE) before target onset, but it is an open question to what extent CSE suppression during task preparation is susceptible to motivational factors. Here, we examined whether CSE suppression is modulated by reward anticipation, and, if so, how this modulation develops over time. We administered a cue-target delay paradigm in which 1000ms before target onset a cue was presented indicating whether or not reward could be obtained for fast and accurate responses in a Simon task. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied over left primary motor cortex (M1) during the delay period (400, 600, or 800ms after cue onset) or 200ms after target onset, and electromyography was obtained from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle. Behaviorally, the anticipation of reward improved performance (i.e. faster reaction times). Most importantly, during reward anticipation we observed a linear decrease of motor evoked potential amplitudes that was absent when no reward was anticipated. This suggests that reward anticipation modulates CSE during task preparation.

It wasn't me! Motor activation from irrelevant spatial information in the absence of a response.

Embodied cognition postulates that perceptual and motor processes serve higher-order cognitive faculties like language. A major challenge for embodied cognition concerns the grounding of abstract concepts. Here we zoom in on abstract spatial concepts and ask the question to what extent the sensorimotor system is involved in processing these. Most of the empirical support in favor of an embodied perspective on (abstract) spatial information has derived from so-called compatibility effects in which a task-irrelevant feature either facilitates (for compatible trials) or hinders (in incompatible trials) responding to the task-relevant feature. This type of effect has been interpreted in terms of (task-irrelevant) feature-induced response activation. The problem with such approach is that incompatible features generate an array of task-relevant and -irrelevant activations [e.g., in primary motor cortex (M1)], and lateral hemispheric interactions render it difficult to assign credit to the task-irrelevant feature per se in driving these activations. Here, we aim to obtain a cleaner indication of response activation on the basis of abstract spatial information. We employed transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to probe response activation of effectors in response to semantic, task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., the words left and right) that did not require an overt response. Results revealed larger motor evoked potentials (MEPs) for the right (left) index finger when the word right (left) was presented. Our findings provide support for the grounding of abstract spatial concepts in the sensorimotor system.

Eliminating mirror responses by instructions.

The observation of an action leads to the activation of the corresponding motor plan in the observer. This phenomenon of motor resonance has an important role in social interaction, promoting imitation, learning and action understanding. However, mirror responses not always have a positive impact on our behavior. An automatic tendency to imitate others can introduce interference in action execution and non-imitative or opposite responses have an advantage in some contexts. Previous studies suggest that mirror tendencies can be suppressed after extensive practice or in complementary joint action situations revealing that mirror responses are more flexible than previously thought. The aim of the present study was to gain insight into the mechanisms that allow response flexibility of motor mirroring. Here we show that the mere instruction of a counter-imitative mapping changes mirror responses as indexed by motor evoked potentials (MEPs) enhancement induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Importantly, mirror activation was measured while participants were passively watching finger movements, without having the opportunity to execute the task. This result suggests that the implementation of task instructions activates stimulus-response association that can overwrite the mirror representations. Our outcome reveals one of the crucial mechanisms that might allow flexible adjustments of mirror responses in different contexts. The implications of this outcome are discussed.

A survey of substance use for cognitive enhancement by university students in the Netherlands.

BACKGROUND: Pharmacological cognitive enhancement, using chemicals to change cellular processes in the brain in order to enhance one's cognitive capacities, is an often discussed phenomenon. The prevalence among Dutch university students is unknown. METHODS: The study set out to achieve the following goals: (1) give an overview of different methods in order to assess the prevalence of use of prescription, illicit and lifestyle drugs for cognitive enhancement (2) investigate whether polydrug use and stress have a relationship with cognitive enhancement substance use (3) assessing opinions about cognitive enhancement prescription drug use. A nationwide survey was conducted among 1572 student respondents of all government supported Dutch universities. RESULTS: The most detailed level of analysis-use of specific substances without a prescription and with the intention of cognitive enhancement-shows that prescription drugs, illicit drugs and lifestyle drugs are respectively used by 1.7, 1.3, and 45.6% of the sample. The use of prescription drugs and illicit drugs is low compared to other countries. We have found evidence of polydrug use in relation to cognitive enhancement. A relation between stress and the use of lifestyle drugs for cognitive enhancement was observed. We report the findings of several operationalizations of cognitive enhancement drug use to enable comparison with a wider variety of previous and upcoming research. CONCLUSIONS: RESULTS of this first study among university students in the Netherlands revealed a low prevalence of cognitive enhancement drug use compared to other countries. Multiple explanations, such as a difference in awareness of pharmacological cognitive enhancement among students, accessibility of drugs in the student population and inclusion criteria of enhancement substances are discussed. We urge enhancement researchers to take the different operationalizations and their effects on the prevalence numbers into account.

Internal and external spatial attention examined with lateralized EEG power spectra.

Several authors argued that retrieval of an item from visual short term memory (internal spatial attention) and focusing attention on an externally presented item (external spatial attention) are similar. Part of the neuroimaging support for this view may be due to the employed experimental procedures. Furthermore, as internal spatial attention may have a more induced than evoked nature some effects may not have been visible in event related analyses of the electroencephalogram (EEG), which limits the possibility to demonstrate differences. In the current study, a colored frame cued which stimulus, one out of four presented in separate quadrants, required a response, which depended on the form of the cued stimulus (circle or square). Importantly, the frame occurred either before (precue), simultaneously with (simultaneous cue), or after the stimuli (postcue). The precue and simultaneous cue condition both concern external attention, while the postcue condition implies the involvement of internal spatial attention. Event-related lateralizations (ERLs), reflecting evoked effects, and lateralized power spectra (LPS), reflecting both evoked and induced effects, were determined. ERLs revealed a posterior contralateral negativity (PCN) only in the precue condition. LPS analyses on the raw EEG showed early increased contralateral theta power at posterior sites and later increased ipsilateral alpha power at occipito-temporal sites in all cue conditions. Responses were faster when the internally or externally attended location corresponded with the required response side than when not. These findings provide further support for the view that internal and external spatial attention share their underlying mechanism.