Infants differentiate between successful and failed communication in a false-belief context.

Communication is based on social interaction, that is, interlocutors sharing attention to the intentions that they communicate about. In this study, we asked whether infants are aware of the fact that for information to be transferred, both interlocutors need to be present and share attention. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm created to test infants' understanding of others' false beliefs, we asked whether 18-month-olds (n = 84) understood that correcting an agent's false belief via communication requires that the agent discerns the verbal statement. Participants saw how an agent put a toy into a box and left. An assistant then moved the toy into a cup. The intervention phase varied between three conditions: The agent and the assistant communicated about the actual location of the toy (full-communication), the agent was absent during the assistant's statement (incomplete-communication) or no communication took place (no-communication). At test, the agent reached into either the box or the cup. When no communication took place, infants expected the agent to search the toy at the original location. Full communication resulted in infants' expectations that the recipient's actions were altered, that is, the infants expected her to search the toy at the actual location. In contrast, incomplete communication did not yield clear expectations. Eighteen-month-olds thus seem to understand that for information to be transferred, it is a precondition that the recipient of the communicative act must be present and share attention during the communicator's statement. Only then communication can change a recipient's mental state.

A meta-analytic approach to the association between inhibitory control and parent-reported behavioral adjustment in typically-developing children: Differentiating externalizing and internalizing behavior problems.

Impairments in inhibitory control (IC) are traditionally seen as a vital aspect in the emergence and course of maladaptive behavior across early childhood. However, it is currently unclear whether this view applies to both the externalizing and internalizing domain of parent-reported behavioral adjustment. Furthermore, past (meta-analytic) developmental research and theory characterizing this association have largely neglected the vast heterogeneity of IC measures and conceptualizations. The present meta-analyses examined the association of IC with parent-reported externalizing (N = 3160, 21 studies) and internalizing (N = 1758, 12 studies) behavior problems, assessed with the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL), in non-clinical populations of children aged 2-8 years. They further investigated the moderating effects of a priori IC categorization, according to a recently proposed two-factor model of IC ("Strength/Endurance" account, Simpson & Carroll, 2019). In line with previous research in the clinical domain, the current results corroborate the notion of a robust, but small association between IC and externalizing behavior problems (r = -0.11) in early childhood. However, although frequently proposed in the literature, no significant linear association could be identified with internalizing behavior problems. Furthermore, in both meta-analyses, no significant moderating effects of IC categorization could be revealed. These findings enhance our knowledge about the cognitive underpinnings of early-emerging maladaptive behavior, indicating that different subtypes of IC are statistically related with externalizing, but not internalizing behavior problems. Overall, the small association of IC ability with behavior problems in non-clinical populations provokes broader questions about the role of IC in behavioral adjustment.

Children understand communication intuitively, but indirect communication makes them think twice-Evidence from pupillometry and looking patterns.

Interpreting a speaker's communicative acts is a challenge children face permanently in everyday life. In doing so, they seem to understand direct communicative acts more easily than indirect communicative acts. The current study investigated which step in the processing of communicative acts might cause difficulties in understanding indirect communication. To assess the developmental trajectory of this phenomenon, we tested 3- and 5-year-old children (N = 105) using eye tracking and an object-choice task. The children watched videos that showed puppets during their everyday activities (e.g., pet care). For every activity, the puppets were asked which of two objects (e.g., rabbit or dog) they would rather have. The puppets responded either directly (e.g., "I want the rabbit") or indirectly (e.g., "I have a carrot"). Results showed that children chose the object intended by the puppets more often in the direct communication condition than in the indirect communication condition and that 5-year-olds chose correctly more than 3-year-olds. However, even though we found that children's pupil size increased while hearing the utterances, we found no effect for communication type before children had already decided on the correct object during object selection by looking at it. Only after this point-that is, only in children's further fixation patterns and reaction times-did differences for communication type occur. Thus, although children's object-choice performance suggests that indirect communication is harder to understand than direct communication, the cognitive demands during processing of both communication types seem similar. We discuss theoretical implications of these findings for developmental pragmatics in terms of a dual-process account of communication comprehension.

Fourteen-month-olds' imitation is influenced more strongly by a model's competence than by a model's certainty.

Research has shown that infants are more likely to learn from certain and competent models than from uncertain and incompetent models. However, it is unknown which of these cues to a model's reliability infants consider more important. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether 14-month-old infants (n = 35) imitate and adopt tool choices selectively from an uncertain but competent compared to a certain but incompetent model. Infants watched videos in which an adult expressed either uncertainty but acted competently or expressed certainty but acted incompetently with familiar objects. In tool-choice tasks, the adult then chose one of two objects to operate an apparatus, and in imitation tasks, the adult then demonstrated a novel action. Infants did not adopt the model's choice in the tool-choice tasks but they imitated the uncertain but competent model more often than the certain but incompetent model in the imitation tasks. In Experiment 2, 14-month-olds (n = 33) watched videos in which an adult expressed only either certainty or uncertainty in order to test whether infants at this age are sensitive to a model's certainty. Infants imitated and adopted the tool choice from a certain model more than from an uncertain model. These results suggest that 14-month-olds acknowledge both a model's competence and certainty when learning novel actions. However, they rely more on a model's competence than on his certainty when both cues are in conflict. The ability to detect reliable models when learning how to handle cultural artifacts helps infants to become well-integrated members of their culture.

12- to 14-month-olds expect unconstrained agents to act efficiently: Event-related potential (ERP) evidence from the head-touch paradigm.

Behavioral research has shown that 12- but not 9-month-olds imitate an unusual and inefficient action (turning on a lamp with one's forehead) more when the model's hands are free. Rational-imitation accounts suggest that infants evaluate actions based on the rationality principle, that is, they expect people to choose efficient means to achieve a goal. Accordingly, infants' expectations should be violated when observing inefficient actions. However, this has yet to be clearly tested. Here, we conducted three electrophysiological experiments to assess infants' neural indices of violation of expectation (VOE) when observing hand- and head-touch actions. We presented infants with video sequences showing a model whose hands were either free (Experiments 1 and 3) or restrained (Experiment 2). Subsequent images depicted a person turning on a lamp or a toy soundbox using her hand or head. We analyzed the Negative central (Nc) component, associated with the amount of attentional engagement, and the N400 component, reflecting semantic violations. In line with rational-imitation accounts, results revealed that 12- to 14-month-olds (Experiment 1) but not 9-month-olds (Experiment 3) were surprised while observing an inefficient, hands-free, head touch, as indicated by an increased Nc amplitude and an N400-like component. In contrast, infants did not show differences in our measures of VOE between head- and hand-touch outcomes when the model's hands were restrained (Experiment 2). Thus, we suggest that 12- to 14-month-olds incorporate the action context when evaluating action outcomes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

A model's natural group membership affects over-imitation in 6-year-olds.

The phenomenon of "over-imitation"-the copying of causally irrelevant actions-has influenced research of the past decade. Yet, the mechanisms underlying and factors affecting over-imitation are still under debate. This study aimed to contribute to this debate by investigating the role of the model's natural group membership in children's tendency to imitate irrelevant actions using a two-phase design. In Phase 1, 6-year-olds (N = 64) observed either an in-group model or an out-group model presenting a sequence of irrelevant actions, with only the last action bringing about the goal (target action) and retrieving a token. In Phase 2, the alternative model-the one that children had not seen in Phase 1-retrieved the token by performing the target action only. After the presentation in each phase, children were given the chance to retrieve the token themselves. Results indicated that children imitated the irrelevant actions to comparable levels from both models in Phase 1. In Phase 2, in contrast, over-imitation declined in children who observed the in-group model being successful with the target action only but not in children who observed the out-group model do so. Thus, children adapted their imitative behavior after observing the model of their own cultural group demonstrating a more efficient strategy. These findings speak for an integration of both social and instrumental accounts to explain the phenomenon of over-imitation.

The role of executive functions in kindergarteners' persistent and non-persistent behaviour.

The aim of the study was to examine whether cognitive skills are related to persistence. Thus, children's (N = 157, mean age: 5.9 years) persistent and non-persistent behaviours (i.e., cheating and off-task) were assessed in an unsolvable task. Additionally, we assessed children's executive functions and temperament. Analysis for persistence showed that cognitive inhibition and cognitive flexibility predicted children's persistent behaviour, beyond age and temperament. Analyses for non-persistent behaviours revealed that temperament and weak executive functions predicted cheating, while age predicted off-task behaviour. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? So far, persistence has been conceptualized as a temperamental sub-dimension of self-regulation. What does this study add? A child's persistence depends not only on temperament but also on cognitive inhibition and cognitive flexibility. There are qualitative differences between the two non-persistent behaviours cheating and off-task. While cheating is related to weaker cognitive skills, off-task behaviour seems mainly age-related.

Rational imitation declines within the second year of life: Changes in the function of imitation.

Cultural learning plays a crucial role in enabling children to fit into their social community by mastering culture-specific habits. Infants learn actions via imitation, and they seem to be sensitive to the context in which a model demonstrates these. They imitate rationally by copying unusual means to achieve a goal more when the model chooses this means voluntarily compared with when some constraints force the model to do so. We investigated the development of rational imitation. In a within-participants design, 18-, 24-, and 36-month-olds (N = 293) observed two unusual actions: Instead of using her hands, a model operated an apparatus by using her head or by sitting on the apparatus. The model did so once with her hands being occupied and once with her hands being free. Besides measuring participants' imitative responses, we analyzed the gaze behavior directed at the model during the response phase of the current study and of 14-month-olds (N = 82) from Gellén and Buttelmann's study (Child Development Research, Vol. 2017, art. 8080649 [2017]). Increasing age was accompanied by an increasing rate of overall imitation across conditions. None of the three older age groups selectively imitated the unusual actions significantly more often in the hands-free condition than in the hands-occupied condition. Thus, rational imitation seems to disappear during the second year of life. Furthermore, there was a significant increase between 14 and 24 months of age and beyond in children's tendency to gaze at the model after reenacting the observed action. Children's gaze behavior indicates that this pattern might be due to a growing underlying social component in early cultural learning.

Feedback Enhances Preschoolers' Performance in an Inhibitory Control Task.

Accomplishing inhibition tasks requires not only inhibitory skills but also goal maintenance. The present study aimed to disentangle goal maintenance from inhibition. Therefore, we experimentally manipulated goal-maintenance demands by means of feedback. Three-year-old (n = 84) and 4-year-old (n = 75) preschoolers were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. Results revealed an age-dependent pattern: three-year-olds that were assigned to one of the conditions with feedback outperformed those assigned to the control condition without feedback. It seems that especially performance-related feedback reduced goal-maintenance demands in 3-year-olds, resulting in enhanced inhibitory performance. Four-year-olds, in contrast, showed high performance across all conditions. Age-differences between the 3- and 4-year-olds were only significant for the control condition. Thus, with feedback, performance of the 3-year-olds was similar to that of the 4-year-olds. The present results seem to indicate that in an inhibition task, 3-year-olds' struggle not only with inhibiting a prepotent response but also with adhering to the task goal.

Corrigendum: Reduced Mu Power in Response to Unusual Actions Is Context-Dependent in 1-Year-Olds.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00036.].

Inventing a new measurement for inhibitory control in preschoolers.

One of the most prominent tasks to measure spatial-conflict inhibitory control in preschoolers is the windows task (Russell et al., 1991, Br. J. Dev. Psychol., 9, 331). However, this task has been criticized given its high demands on abilities other than inhibition. The aim of the current set of studies was to establish the 'car task' as a novel instrument to assess conflict inhibition in children. In this task, children are asked to point at the current location of an occluded object. To do so, they have to inhibit a misleading colour cue in front of the locations in critical trials. In Study 1, we demonstrated that 3- to 6-year-old children's (N = 88) performance in the car task correlated positively with that in the windows task (even after controlling for age). Study 2 investigated whether children's failure in the car task might be caused by their inability to master the basic processes involved in the task rather than a lack of inhibition. We presented a new group of preschoolers (N = 85) with a modified version of the task without any misleading colour cues. Performance significantly improved, indicating that the difficulty of the car task lies in the necessity to inhibit the misleading colour cue leading towards the incorrect location. These findings suggest that the car task is a valid measurement of spatial-conflict inhibition in children. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Inhibitory control (IC) is important for action planning and execution. One of the most prominent measurements of spatial-conflict IC is the windows task. This task has been criticized for additionally requiring rule inference to succeed. What does this study adds? Performance in the novel car task correlates with that in the windows task. Study 2 controls for demands other than IC such as memory or task difficulty. This task can thus be used to measure IC more purely without demanding rule inference.

Fourteen-month-olds selectively search for and use information depending on the familiarity of the informant in both laboratory and home contexts.

Infants are selective in their learning from others. However, there is only very limited research on the possible factors that shape this selectivity, especially when it comes to the impact of infants' familiarity with the informant and the context. The current study investigated whether 14-month-olds preferred to receive and use information provided by an unfamiliar informant (experimenter) compared with a familiar informant (parent) and whether this pattern depended on the context (home vs. laboratory). We tested infants either in the laboratory (n = 67) or in their home (n = 70). When both informants presented a novel object with positive or negative emotions, we measured infants' gaze behavior as an indicator for information search. When infants acted on the novel object themselves, we measured their exploratory behavior as an indicator of information use. Results revealed no effect of context on infants' information search and use. Rather, we found that the familiarity of informant had distinct effects on infant attention and object exploration. Namely, infants looked longer at the unfamiliar informant across contexts, but they explored more when the familiar informant presented the object compared with when the unfamiliar informant did so. Thus, during information search, 14-month-olds paid most attention to an unfamiliar source of information. However, participants explored the objects more when they came from a familiar source than when they came from an unfamiliar one. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.

Reduced Mu Power in Response to Unusual Actions Is Context-Dependent in 1-Year-Olds.

During social interactions infants predict and evaluate other people's actions. Previous behavioral research found that infants' imitation of others' actions depends on these evaluations and is context-dependent: 1-year-olds predominantly imitated an unusual action (turning on a lamp with one's forehead) when the model's hands were free compared to when the model's hands were occupied or restrained. In the present study, we adapted this behavioral paradigm to a neurophysiological study measuring infants' brain activity while observing usual and unusual actions via electroencephalography. In particular, we measured differences in mu power (6 - 8 Hz) associated with motor activation. In a between-subjects design, 12- to 14-month-old infants watched videos of adult models demonstrating that their hands were either free or restrained. Subsequent test frames showed the models turning on a lamp or a soundbox by using their head or their hand. Results in the hands-free condition revealed that 12- to 14-month-olds displayed a reduction of mu power in frontal regions in response to unusual and thus unexpected actions (head touch) compared to usual and expected actions (hand touch). This may be explained by increased motor activation required for updating prior action predictions in response to unusual actions though alternative explanations in terms of general attention or cognitive control processes may also be considered. In the hands-restrained condition, responses in mu frequency band did not differ between action outcomes. This implies that unusual head-touch actions compared to hand-touch actions do not necessarily evoke a reduction of mu power. Thus, we conclude that reduction of mu frequency power is context-dependent during infants' action perception. Our results are interpreted in terms of motor system activity measured via changes in mu frequency band as being one important neural mechanism involved in action prediction and evaluation from early on.

The impact of resource valence on children's other-regarding preferences.

Given its importance for the emergence of intergroup conflict, the development of other-regarding preferences toward in-group and out-group members has received increasing attention from various disciplines. The present study investigates children's other-regarding preferences toward in-group and out-group members when allocating resources with positive and negative valence. The 6- and 8-year-olds' (N = 92) task was to allocate resources to themselves versus to an in-group or an out-group member. They demonstrated prosociality more frequently toward in-group than toward out-group recipients and more frequently when positive rather than negative resources were involved. Whereas the importance of the recipient's group membership increased with participants' age, the importance of resource valence decreased. Furthermore, older children, but not younger ones, were more prosocial toward in-group than out-group members in the allocation of negative resources. These findings help to understand the psychological determinants and the ontogenetic origins of other-regarding preferences toward in-group versus out-group members and, hence, individual engagement in intergroup conflict. (PsycINFO Database Record

Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task.

Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of circumstances requires an understanding of their psychological states. Humans' nearest primate relatives, the great apes, understand many psychological states of others, for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so far there is little evidence that they possess the key marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human 1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may possess at least some basic understanding that an agent's actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such understanding might not be the exclusive province of the human species.

Infants' and adults' looking behavior does not indicate perceptual distraction for constrained modelled actions - An eye-tracking study.

When observing a novel action, infants pay attention to the model's constraints when deciding whether to imitate this action or not. Gergely et al. (2002) found that more 14-month-olds copied a model's use of her head to operate a lamp when she used her head while her hands were free than when she had to use this means because it was the only means available to her (i.e., her hands were occupied). The perceptional distraction account (Beisert et al., 2012) claims that differences between conditions in terms of the amount of attention infants paid to the modeled action caused the differences in infants' performance between conditions. In order to investigate this assumption we presented 14-month-olds (N=34) with an eye-tracking paradigm and analyzed their looking behavior when observing the head-touch demonstration in the two original conditions. Subsequently, they had the chance to operate the apparatus themselves, and we measured their imitative responses. In order to explore the perceptional processes taking place in this paradigm in adulthood, we also presented adults (N=31) with the same task. Apart from the fact that we did not replicate the findings in imitation with our participants, the eye-tracking results do not support the perceptional distraction account: infants did not statistically differ - not even tendentially - in their amount of looking at the modeled action in both conditions. Adults also did not statistically differ in their looking at the relevant action components. However, both groups predominantly observed the relevant head action. Consequently, infants and adults do not seem to attend differently to constrained and unconstrained modelled actions.

The influence of a bystander agent's beliefs on children's and adults' decision-making process.

The ability to attribute and represent others' mental states (e.g., beliefs; so-called "theory of mind") is essential for participation in human social interaction. Despite a considerable body of research using tasks in which protagonists in the participants' attentional focus held false or true beliefs, the question of automatic belief attribution to bystander agents has received little attention. In the current study, we presented adults and 6-year-olds (N=92) with an implicit computer-based avoidance false-belief task in which participants were asked to place an object into one of three boxes. While doing so, we manipulated the beliefs of an irrelevant human-like or non-human-like bystander agent who was visible on the screen. Importantly, the bystander agent's beliefs were irrelevant for solving the task. Still, children's decision making was significantly influenced by the bystander agent's beliefs even if this was a non-human-like self-propelled object. Such an influence did not become obvious in adults' deliberate decisions but occurred only in their reaction times, which suggests that they also processed the bystander agent's beliefs but were able to suppress the influence of such beliefs on their behavior regulation. The results of a control study (N=53) ruled out low-level explanations and confirmed that self-propelledness of agents is a necessary factor for belief attribution to occur. Thus, not only do humans spontaneously ascribe beliefs to self-propelled bystander agents, but those beliefs even influence meaningful decisions in children.

Children's understanding of first- and third-person perspectives in complement clauses and false-belief tasks.

De Villiers (Lingua, 2007, Vol. 117, pp. 1858-1878) and others have claimed that children come to understand false belief as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker's epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children of 3 and 4years of age (N=64) were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first- or third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., "I think the sticker is in the red box" or "The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box", respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others' false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own false beliefs than of others' false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children's comprehension of their own false beliefs was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children's false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others' beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks.