Assessing health care leadership and management for resilience and performance during crisis: The HERO-36.

BACKGROUND: Whereas organizational literature has provided much insight into the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of organizational leadership and management during emergencies, measures to operationalize related effective practices during crises remain sparse. PURPOSE: To address this need, we developed the Healthcare Emergency Response Optimization survey, which set out to examine the leadership and management practices in health care organizations that support resilience and performance during crisis. METHODOLOGY: We administered an online survey in April to May 2022 to health care administrators and frontline staff intimately involved in their hospital's emergency response during the COVID-19 pandemic, which included a sample of 379 respondents across nine rural and urban hospitals (response rate: 44.4%). We used confirmatory factor analysis and quantile regressions to examine the results. RESULTS: Applying confirmatory factor analysis, we retained 36 items in our survey that comprised eight measures for formal and informal practices to assess crisis leadership and management. To test effectiveness of the specified practices, we regressed self-reported resilience and performance measures on the formality and informality scores. Findings show that informal practices mattered most for resilience, whereas formal practices mattered most for performance. We also identified specific practices (anticipation, transactional and relational interactions, and ad hoc collaborations) for resilience and performance. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: These validated measures of organizational practices assess emergency response during crisis, with an emphasis on the actions and decisions of leadership as well as the management of organizational structures and processes. Organizations using these measures may subsequently modify preparedness and planning approaches to better manage future crises.

Moving Forward from COVID-19: Organizational Dimensions of Effective Hospital Emergency Management.

Federal investment in emergency preparedness has increased notably since the 9/11 attacks, yet it is unclear if and how US hospital readiness has changed in the 20 years since then. In particular, understanding effective aspects of hospital emergency management programs is essential to improve healthcare systems' readiness for future disasters. The authors of this article examined the state of US hospital emergency management, focusing on the following question: During the COVID-19 pandemic, what aspects of hospital emergency management, including program components and organizational characteristics, were most effective in supporting and improving emergency preparedness and response? We conducted semistructured interviews of emergency managers and leaders at 12 urban and rural hospitals across the country. Through qualitative analysis of content derived from examination of transcripts from our interviews, we identified 7 dimensions of effective healthcare emergency management: (1) identify capable leaders; (2) assure robust institutional support; (3) design effective, tiered communications systems; (4) embrace the hospital incident command system to delineate roles and responsibilities; (5) actively promote collaboration and team building; (6) appreciate the necessity of training and exercises; and (7) balance structure and flexibility. These dimensions represent the unique and critical intersection of organizational factors and emergency management program characteristics at the core of hospital emergency preparedness and response. Extending these findings, we provide several recommendations for hospitals to better develop and sustain what we call a response culture in supporting effective emergency management.

Ready or Not, Patients Will Present: Improving Urban Pandemic Preparedness.

Over the past century, society has achieved great gains in medicine, public health, and health-care infrastructure, particularly in the areas of vaccines, antibiotics, sanitation, intensive care and medical technology. Still, despite these developments, infectious diseases are emerging at unprecedented rates around the globe. Large urban centers are particularly vulnerable to communicable disease events, and must have well-prepared response systems, including on the front-line level. In November 2018, the United States' largest municipal health-care delivery system, New York City Health + Hospitals, hosted a half-day executive-level pandemic response workshop, which sought to illustrate the complexity of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from modern-day infectious diseases impacting urban environments. Attendees were subjected to a condensed, plausible, pandemic influenza scenario and asked to simulate the high-level strategic decisions made by leaders by internal (eg, Chief Medical Officer, Chief Nursing Officer, and Legal Affairs) and external (eg, city, state, and federal public health and emergency management entities) partners across an integrated system of acute, postacute, and ambulatory sites, challenging players to question their assumptions about managing the consequences of a highly pathogenic pandemic.

Zika Virus Preparedness and Response Efforts Through the Collaboration Between a Health Care Delivery System and a Local Public Health Department.

ABSTRACTThe Zika virus was largely unknown to many health care systems before the outbreak of 2015. The unique public health threat posed by the Zika virus and the evolving understanding of its pathology required continuous communication between a health care delivery system and a local public health department. By leveraging an existing relationship, NYC Health+Hospitals worked closely with New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to ensure that Zika-related processes and procedures within NYC Health+Hospitals facilities aligned with the most current Zika virus guidance. Support given by the public health department included prenatal clinical and laboratory support and the sharing of data on NYC Health+Hospitals Zika virus screening and testing rates, thus enabling this health care delivery system to make informed decisions and practices. The close coordination, collaboration, and communication between the health care delivery system and the local public health department examined in this article demonstrate the importance of working together to combat a complex public health emergency and how this relationship can serve as a guide for other jurisdictions to optimize collaboration between external partners during major outbreaks, emerging threats, and disasters that affect public health. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2018;12:689-691).

The National Ebola Training and Education Center: Preparing the United States for Ebola and Other Special Pathogens.

The National Ebola Training and Education Center (NETEC) was established in 2015 in response to the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa. The US Department of Health and Human Services office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention sought to increase the competency of healthcare and public health workers, as well as the capability of healthcare facilities in the United States, to deliver safe, efficient, and effective care to patients infected with Ebola and other special pathogens nationwide. NYC Health + Hospitals/Bellevue, Emory University, and the University of Nebraska Medical Center/Nebraska Medicine were awarded this cooperative agreement, based in part on their experience in safely and successfully evaluating and treating patients with Ebola virus disease in the United States. In 2016, NETEC received a supplemental award to expand on 3 initial primary tasks: (1) develop metrics and conduct peer review assessments; (2) develop and provide educational materials, resources, and tools, including exercise design templates; (3) provide expert training and technical assistance; and, to add a fourth task, create a special pathogens clinical research network.

Preparing the Health System to Respond to Ebola Virus Disease in New York City, 2014.

The world's largest outbreak of Ebola virus disease began in West Africa in 2014. Although few cases were identified in the United States, the possibility of imported cases led US public health systems and health care facilities to focus on preparing the health care system to quickly and safely identify and respond to emerging infectious diseases. In New York City, early, coordinated planning among city and state agencies and the health care delivery system led to a successful response to a single case diagnosed in a returned health care worker. In this article we describe public health and health care system preparedness efforts in New York City to respond to Ebola and conclude that coordinated public health emergency response relies on joint planning and sustained resources for public health emergency response, epidemiology and laboratory capacity, and health care emergency management. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2017;11:370-374).

Preparedness for Zika Virus Disease - New York City, 2016.

The rapid spread of Zika virus across the World Health Organization's Region of the Americas has had a direct effect on the U.S. health care delivery system. Hospitals in New York City (NYC) have been implementing prevention and response efforts consistent with CDC guidance. As of September 21, 2016, a total of 715 cases of laboratory-confirmed Zika virus disease had been diagnosed in New York state among travelers who returned from affected areas, their sexual contacts, or infants infected in utero. This represents the highest number of reported cases in any state to date, and underscores the importance of health care systems preparing to care for patients with possible Zika virus disease (1). Building upon a framework that was established in 2014 to screen patients for possible exposure to Ebola virus disease (Ebola), NYC Health + Hospitals,* the largest municipal health care delivery system in the United States, implemented a Zika Preparedness and Response Action Plan† (Zika Action Plan) to address the threat from Zika and ensure appropriate patient care. The plan developed by NYC Health + Hospitals includes universal travel screening, signage depicting areas with active Zika virus transmission, clinical and epidemiologic evaluation for possible Zika virus exposure, diagnostic testing for Zika virus infection and linking of infected patients to appropriate specialists, and education on Zika virus disease and preventive measures (e.g., avoiding travel to areas with active Zika virus transmission).

Stakeholders' experiences with US hospital emergency preparedness: Part 1.

This study examined, via qualitative pheno-menology, important stakeholders' experiences with US hospital emergency preparedness, finding that their experiences varied from positive and effective to frustrating, time-consuming and inefficient. The findings centred on four themes: the importance of funding; collaboration, communication and coordination; the government's role; and hospital leadership buy-in. Together, these findings suggest that issues such as a lack of performance metrics, insufficient funding, inadequate surge capacity, confusing federal guidelines and accreditation requirements and an overall lack of coordination in hospitals' abilities to manage emergency incidents continue to plague the US healthcare system. Exploring and understanding these experiences can support the field in maintaining elements that work and recognising and applying solutions to its shortcomings. This is the first of two papers on the subject, providing background on the topic, the study's purpose, research design and a review of salient literature. The second paper, in a forthcoming issue of this journal, will examine the study's methodological approach, data analysis, main results and implications for practice.

Stakeholders' experiences with US hospital emergency preparedness--Part 2.

This study examined, via qualitative phenomenology, important stakeholders' experiences with US hospital emergency preparedness, finding that their experiences varied from positive and effective to frustrating, time-consuming and inefficient. The findings centred on four themes: the importance of funding; collaboration, communication and coordination; the role of government; and hospital leadership buy-in. Together, these findings suggest that issues such as a lack of performance metrics, insufficient funding, inadequate surge capacity, confusing federal guidelines and accreditation requirements and an overall lack of coordination in hospitals' abilities to manage emergency incidents continue to plague the US healthcare system. Exploring, and now understanding, these experiences can support the field in maintaining elements that work and recognising and applying solutions to its short-comings. This is the second of two papers on the subject, the first of which appeared in a previous issue of this journal, examining the study's methodological approach, data analysis, main results and implications for practice.

Are we ready and how do we know? The urgent need for performance metrics in hospital emergency management.

An extraordinary number of health care quality and patient safety indicators have been developed for hospitals and other health care institutions; however, few meaningful indicators exist for comprehensive assessment of hospital emergency management. Although health care institutions have invested considerable resources in emergency management preparedness, the need for universally accepted, evidence-based performance metrics to measure these efforts remains largely unfulfilled. We suggest that this can be remediated through the application of traditional health care quality paradigms, coupled with novel analytic approaches to develop meaningful performance data in hospital emergency management.

Burn disaster response planning: an urban region's approach.

The objective of this study was to describe a draft response plan for the tiered triage, treatment, or transportation of 400 adult and pediatric victims (50/million population) of a burn disaster for the first 3 to 5 days after injury using regional resources. Review of meeting minutes and the 11 deliverables of the draft response plan was performed. The draft burn disaster response plan developed for NYC recommended: 1) City hospitals or regional burn centers within a 60-mile distance be designated as tiered Burn Disaster Receiving Hospitals (BDRH); 2) these hospitals be divided into a four-tier system, based on clinical resources; and 3) burn care supplies be provided to Tier 3 nonburn centers. Existing burn center referral guidelines were modified into a hierarchical BDRH matrix, which would vector certain patients to local or regional burn centers for initial care until capacity is reached; the remainder would be cared for in nonburn center facilities for up to 3 to 5 days until a city, regional, or national burn bed becomes available. Interfacility triage would be coordinated by a central team. Although recommendations for patient transportation, educational initiatives for prehospital and hospital providers, city-wide, interfacility or interagency communication strategies and coordination at the State or Federal levels were outlined, future initiatives will expound on these issues. An incident resulting in critically injured burn victims exceeding the capacity of local and regional burn center beds may be a reality within any community and warrants a planned response. To address this possibility within New York City, an initial draft of a burn disaster response has been created. A scaleable plan using local, state, regional, or federal health care and governmental institutions was developed.

Hospital "self-prophylaxis": strategies for efficient protection of the workforce in the face of infectious disease threats.

Hospital preparedness for nosocomial or community-wide outbreaks of communicable disease includes the capability for rapid, self-reliant administration of prophylaxis to its workforce, with the goal of minimal disruption of patient care, here called hospital "self-prophylaxis." We created a new discrete-event simulation model of a hypothetical hospital wing to compare the operational charateristics of standard single-line, "first-come, first-served" dispensing clinics with those of 2 staff management strategies that can dramatically reduce staff waiting time while centralizing dispensing around existing pharmacy-distribution points.