Estimating the effect of focused donor registration efforts on the number of organ donors.

Waiting times for organs in the United States are long and vary widely across regions. Donor registration can increase the number of potential donors, but its effect on the actual number of organ transplants depends upon several factors. First among these factors is that deceased donor organ donation requires both that death occur in a way making recovery possible and that authorization to recover organs is obtained. We estimate the potential donor death rate and donor authorization rate conditional on potential donor death by donor registration status for each state and for key demographic groups. With this information, we then develop a simple measure of the value of a new donor registration. This combined measure using information on donor authorization rates and potential death rates varies widely across states and groups, suggesting that focusing registration efforts on high-value groups and locations can significantly increase the overall number of donors. Targeting high-value states raises 26.7 percent more donors than a uniform, nationwide registration effort. Our estimates can also be used to assess alternative, but complementary, policies such as protocols to improve authorization rates for non-registered potential donors.

Interacting circadian and homeostatic processes with opportunity cost: A mathematical model of sleep with application to two mammalian species.

This paper introduces a new model of sleep for mammals. It extends the classic 'two-process' model of sleep to account for differences in external circumstances. We apply this model to previously-collected data on elephants and sloths, comparing sleep patterns in the wild with sleep patterns in captivity. We find that the model does very well in explaining sleeping patterns for both types of animals, in both the captive state and in the wild state.

The Distributional Effects of Health Reform Limits on Flexible Spending Accounts.

Flexible spending accounts (FSAs) are a widely used arrangement that allow employees to pay for qualified out-of-pocket health expenses with pre-tax dollars. The tax preference given to FSAs has been controversial and recent health care law (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act) limits the tax exclusion to an inflation-adjusted value of $2,500 (2013 $s). The limit is estimated to increase federal payroll and income tax receipts by $13 billion between 2013 and 2019. But the welfare implications of this change are unclear.This paper uses a unique panel dataset to explore the demographic profile of households likely to be affected by the tax increase. We use a sample of 19,322 households observed over the period 1998-2008. The data include FSA expenditures, insurance claim information for covered medical and dental expenditures, and household demographic information. We explore patterns of FSA usage by income and health status.We find that households likely to be affected by the tax increase disproportionately tend to be households experiencing one or more chronic health conditions. The existence of chronic illness is associated with relatively high and persistent medical expenses and also with relatively older and wealthier households. We estimate an average tax increase of $101 in 2013 for 13.9 million households with an FSA.

Insurance choice and tax-preferred health savings accounts.

We develop an infinite horizon utility maximization model of the interaction between insurance choice and tax-preferred health savings accounts. The model can be used to examine a wide range of policy options, including flexible spending accounts, health savings accounts, and health reimbursement accounts. We also develop a 2-period model to simulate various implications of the model. Key results from the simulation analysis include the following: (1) with no adverse selection, use of unrestricted health savings accounts leads to modest welfare gains, after accounting for the tax revenue loss; (2) with adverse selection and an initial pooling equilibrium comprised of "sick" and "healthy" consumers, introducing HSAs can, but does not necessarily, lead to a new pooling equilibrium. The new equilibrium results in a higher coinsurance rate, an increase in expected utility for healthy consumers, and a decrease in expected utility for sick consumers; (3) with adverse selection and a separating equilibrium, both sick and healthy consumers are better off with a health savings account; (4) efficiency gains are possible when insurance contracts are explicitly linked to tax-preferred health savings accounts.