Large, old trees define the vertical, horizontal, and seasonal distributions of a poison frog.

In tropical forests, large, old trees (LOTs) can be considered keystone structures for provisioning unique habitats such as decaying wood, roots, cavities, and epiphytes, including those that hold water (phytotelmata). These habitats may also be stratified in vertical space, for example, root structures occur at ground level and below, whereas epiphytes occur above-ground. Canopy habitat is utilized by a diversity of amphibians, but canopy habitat may only be viable in the wet season when epiphytes and surfaces are sufficiently saturated. Here, we examine how the provisioning of microhabitats and structures by LOTs influence the horizontal, vertical, and seasonal distribution patterns of phytotelmata-breeding poison frogs. We conducted ground-to-canopy surveys over 4 years, constituting 6 seasons, in Panama and used mark-recapture techniques on a population of the yellow-bellied poison frog, Andinobates fulguritus. We found that A. fulguritus migrated vertically, tracking seasonal rainfall, and displayed strong philopatry to individual trees. Furthermore, A. fulguritus almost exclusively inhabited the largest trees at the study location, which provided disproportionately high-quality microhabitats and epiphytes compared to other trees. LOTs, and specifically Anacardium excelsum at our site, appear to serve as keystone structures with high conservation value due to their provisioning of unique habitats. We conclude that the distribution of A. fulguritus is defined vertically by the stratification of arboreal microhabitat resources, horizontally by the presence of LOTs providing the resources, and temporally by the seasonal viability of the resources.

Preference for realistic art predicts support for Brexit.

Following the UK's EU referendum in June 2016, there has been considerable interest from scholars in understanding the characteristics that differentiate Leave supporters from Remain supporters. Since Leave supporters score higher on conscientiousness but lower on neuroticism and openness, and given their general proclivity toward conservatism, we hypothesized that preference for realistic art would predict support for Brexit. Data on a large nationally representative sample of the British population were obtained, and preference for realistic art was measured using a four-item binary choice test. Controlling for a range of personal characteristics, we found that respondents who preferred all four realistic paintings were 15-20 percentage points more likely to support Leave than those who preferred zero or one realistic paintings. This effect was comparable to the difference in support between those with a degree and those with no education, and was robust to controlling for the respondent's party identity.

Larregue's Critique of Cofnas et al. (2017): A Rejoinder.

Data from the General Social Survey indicate that conservatives' self-reported trust in scientists has steadily decreased since 1974. In Cofnas et al. (The American Sociologist, 2017), we suggested that this trend may have been partly driven by the increasing tendency of scientific institutions, and the representatives of such institutions, to distort social science for the sake of liberal activism. Larregue (The American Sociologist, 2017) makes three opposing arguments: (1) It is "very hard" to establish the charge of bias, especially since we did "not state what [we] mean by 'bias.'" (2) We did not establish a causal relationship between scientists' (alleged) liberal activism and conservatives' distrust of science, and we ignored activism by conservative scientists. (3) We were wrong to advocate "affirmative action" for conservatives in academia. We address these arguments in turn: (1) Larregue does not engage with our main arguments that liberal bias exists in social science. (2) In recent years, prominent scientific organizations have, with great publicity, intervened in policy debates, always supporting the liberal side without exception. It is not unreasonable to assume that this would diminish conservatives' trust in these organizations. Contra Larregue, in Cofnas et al. (The American Sociologist, 2017) we explicitly acknowledged that conservative scientists can also be biased. (3) We never advocated "affirmative action" for conservatives, and in fact we object to such a proposal.

IQ AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACROSS REGIONS OF THE UK.

Cross-regional correlations between average IQ and socioeconomic development have been documented in many different countries. This paper presents new IQ estimates for the twelve regions of the UK. These are weakly correlated (r=0.24) with the regional IQs assembled by Lynn (1979). Assuming the two sets of estimates are accurate and comparable, this finding suggests that the relative IQs of different UK regions have changed since the 1950s, most likely due to differentials in the magnitude of the Flynn effect, the selectivity of external migration, the selectivity of internal migration or the strength of the relationship between IQ and fertility. The paper provides evidence for the validity of the regional IQs by showing that IQ estimates for UK nations (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) derived from the same data are strongly correlated with national PISA scores (r=0.99). It finds that regional IQ is positively related to income, longevity and technological accomplishment; and is negatively related to poverty, deprivation and unemployment. A general factor of socioeconomic development is correlated with regional IQ at r=0.72.

Generalized trust and intelligence in the United States.

Generalized trust refers to trust in other members of society; it may be distinguished from particularized trust, which corresponds to trust in the family and close friends. An extensive empirical literature has established that generalized trust is an important aspect of civic culture. It has been linked to a variety of positive outcomes at the individual level, such as entrepreneurship, volunteering, self-rated health, and happiness. However, two recent studies have found that it is highly correlated with intelligence, which raises the possibility that the other relationships in which it has been implicated may be spurious. Here we replicate the association between intelligence and generalized trust in a large, nationally representative sample of U.S. adults. We also show that, after adjusting for intelligence, generalized trust continues to be strongly associated with both self-rated health and happiness. In the context of substantial variation across countries, these results bolster the view that generalized trust is a valuable social resource, not only for the individual but for the wider society as well.