Subject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , Global Health , Female , Healthcare Disparities , Humans , Male , Pandemics/prevention & control , SARS-CoV-2Subject(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2/isolation & purification , Science , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/transmission , HumansSubject(s)
Betacoronavirus , Coronavirus Infections , Information Dissemination , Pneumonia, Viral , Biomedical Research , COVID-19 , China , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Health Personnel , Humans , Interprofessional Relations , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Public Health , SARS-CoV-2 , Science , Truth DisclosureSubject(s)
Communicable Diseases, Emerging/prevention & control , Communicable Diseases, Emerging/virology , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Pandemics/prevention & control , Virus Diseases/prevention & control , Virus Diseases/virology , Viruses/isolation & purification , Animals , Biomedical Research/economics , Chiroptera/virology , Communicable Diseases, Emerging/epidemiology , Host-Pathogen Interactions , Humans , Pilot Projects , Virus Diseases/epidemiology , Viruses/genetics , Zoonoses/transmission , Zoonoses/virologyABSTRACT
Tiffany Bogich and colleagues find that breakdown or absence of public health infrastructure is most often the driver in pandemic outbreaks, whose prevention requires mainstream development funding rather than emergency funding.
Subject(s)
Capacity Building/methods , Pandemics/prevention & control , Public Health Administration , Systems Theory , Capacity Building/economics , Global Health , Government Agencies , Humans , International Agencies , International Cooperation , Organizations, Nonprofit , Public Health Administration/economicsABSTRACT
Most pandemics--eg, HIV/AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome, pandemic influenza--originate in animals, are caused by viruses, and are driven to emerge by ecological, behavioural, or socioeconomic changes. Despite their substantial effects on global public health and growing understanding of the process by which they emerge, no pandemic has been predicted before infecting human beings. We review what is known about the pathogens that emerge, the hosts that they originate in, and the factors that drive their emergence. We discuss challenges to their control and new efforts to predict pandemics, target surveillance to the most crucial interfaces, and identify prevention strategies. New mathematical modelling, diagnostic, communications, and informatics technologies can identify and report hitherto unknown microbes in other species, and thus new risk assessment approaches are needed to identify microbes most likely to cause human disease. We lay out a series of research and surveillance opportunities and goals that could help to overcome these challenges and move the global pandemic strategy from response to pre-emption.
Subject(s)
Pandemics/prevention & control , Zoonoses/epidemiology , Animals , Blood-Borne Pathogens , Communicable Diseases, Emerging/epidemiology , Communicable Diseases, Emerging/prevention & control , Environmental Monitoring , Global Health , Health Policy , Humans , International Cooperation , Travel , Virus Diseases/epidemiology , Virus Diseases/prevention & controlABSTRACT
Global cooperation is essential for coordinated planning and response to public health emergencies, as well as for building sufficient capacity around the world to detect, assess and respond to health events. The United States is committed to, and actively engaged in, supporting disease surveillance capacity building around the world. We recognize that there are many agencies involved in this effort, which can become confusing to partner countries and other public health entities. This paper aims to describe the agencies and offices working directly on global disease surveillance capacity building in order to clarify the United States Government interagency efforts in this space.