ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: The 2014 Ebola outbreak reminded us of the importance of preparedness for addressing health security threats. Learning from this experience, we aim to (1) enhance the understanding of preparedness by policy and decision makers, (2) discuss opportunities for Africa to invest in the prevention of health security threats, (3) highlight the value of investing in preventing health security threats, and (4) propose innovations to enhance investments for the prevention or containment of health security threats at the source. METHODS: We used observations of governments' attitudes towards investing in preparedness for health security prevention or containment at the source. We conducted a literature review through PubMed, the World Wide Web, and Mendeley using the keywords: "health emergency financing", "investing in health threats prevention", and "stopping outbreaks at the source". RESULTS: Countries in sub-Saharan Africa invest inadequately towards building and maintaining critical capacities for preventing, detecting, and containing outbreaks at the source. Global health security emergency funding schemes target responses to outbreaks but neglect their prevention. Governments are not absorbing and maintaining adequately capacity built through GHS, World Bank, and development aid projects - a lost opportunity for building and retaining outbreak prevention capacity. RECOMMENDATIONS: Governments should (1) allocate adequate national budgets for health honouring the Abuja and related commitments; (2) own and maintain capacities developed through International Development Aids, OH networks, research consortia and projects; (3) establish a regional health security threats prevention fund. The global community and scientists should (1) consider broadening existing health emergency funds to finance the prevention and containment outbreaks at the source and (2) Strengthen economic analyses and case studies as incentives for governments' budget allocations to prevent health security threats.
ABSTRACT
In May 2016, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus of the subtype A/H5N1 was detected in Cameroon in an industrial poultry farm at Mvog-Betsi, Yaoundé (Centre region), with a recorded sudden increase of deaths among chickens, and an overall mortality rate of 75%. The virus spread further and caused new outbreaks in some parts of the country. In total, 21 outbreaks were confirmed from May 2016 to March 2017 (six in the Centre, six in the West, eight in the South and one in the Adamaoua regions). This resulted in an estimated total loss of 138,252 birds (44,451 deaths due to infection and 93,801 stamped out). Only domestic birds (chickens, ducks and geese) were affected in farms as well as in poultry markets. The outbreaks occurred in three waves, the first from May to June 2016, the second in September 2016 and the last wave in March 2017. The topology of the phylogeny based on the haemagglutinin gene segment indicated that the causative H5N1 viruses fall within the genetic clade 2.3.2.1c, within the same group as the A/H5N1 viruses collected in Niger in 2015 and 2016. More importantly, the gene constellation of four representative viruses showed evidence of H5N1/H9N2 intra-clade reassortment. Additional epidemiological and genetic data from affected countries in West Africa are needed to better trace the origin, spread and evolution of A/H5N1 in Cameroon. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS HPAI A/H5N1 was detected in May 2016 in domestic chickens in Yaoundé-Cameroon. Twenty-one outbreaks in total were confirmed from May 2016 to March 2017. The causative H5N1 viruses fall within the genetic clade 2.3.2.1c. The viral gene constellation showed evidence of H5N1/H9N2 intra-clade reassortment.
