Controversies between regulations of research ethics and protection of personal data: informed consent at a cross-road.

This paper explores some key discrepancies between two sets of normative requirements applicable to the research use of personal data and human biological materials: (a) the data protection regime which follows the application of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and (b) the Declaration of Helsinki, CIOMS guidelines and other research ethics regulations. One source of this controversy is that the GDPR requires consent to process personal data to be clear, concise, specific and granular, freely given and revocable and therefore has challenged the concept of 'broad consent', which has been widely applied in the context of biobanking. Another source of controversy is the interplay between regulations of research ethics and protection of personal data related to the secondary use of personal data and biological materials. In this case, the GDPR 'research condition' provides an alternative to re-consent for the use of previously collected personal data and biological materials. Although the mentioned controversies have been raised in the legal literature, they have not been explicitly addressed from the research ethics perspective. Should consent be regarded as a priority legal basis for personal data processing in health data research? Can broad consent still be a suitable legal ground for biobanking? What should be the role of research ethics provisions that differ from the GDPR standards, and what should be the role and function of research ethics committees in the changing environment of health data research? These are the ongoing controversies to be explored in the paper.

Should Europe follow the US and declare obesity a disease?: a discussion of the so-called utilitarian argument.

In 2013, the American Medical Association (AMA) decided to recognize obesity as a disease. One of the main arguments presented in favor of this was broadly 'utilitarian': the disease label would, it was claimed, provide more benefits than harms and thereby serve the general good. Several individuals and groups have argued that this reasoning is just as powerful in the European context. Drawing mainly on a review of relevant social science research, we discuss the validity of this argument. Our conclusion is that in a Western European welfare state, defining obesity as a disease will not on balance serve the general good, and that it is therefore more appropriate to continue to treat obesity as a risk factor. The main reasons presented in favor of this conclusion are: It is debatable whether a disease label would lead to better access to care and preventive measures and provide better legal protection in Europe. Medicalization and overtreatment are possible negative effects of a disease label. There is no evidence to support the claim that declaring obesity a disease would reduce discrimination or stigmatization. In fact, the contrary is more likely, since a disease label would categorically define the obese body as deviant.