Why neuroscience changes some things but not everything for the law.

Neuroenthusiasts and neuroskeptics both exaggerate the strength of their positions. Neuroscience is already having a significant impact in the courts in many jurisdictions and as knowledge from the cognitive sciences expands, that knowledge, wherever relevant, should continue to inform legal systems. However, neuroscience will only ever be one influence among many. In certain areas, for example, our understanding of fear responses or the reliability of memory evidence, the cognitive sciences may help challenge errors of folk psychology and assist the law to adopt better approaches. In other areas such as juvenile responsibility, developmental neuroscience may prove decisive in reinforcing messages from educational psychology and the behavioral sciences both in persuading legislators and judges but also importantly in altering public attitudes. Drawing on examples from a range of countries including Argentina, Australia, Canada, England, the Netherlands, Scotland, Slovenia, and the United States, we argue that legal systems must be open to and learn from science and must not be afraid to engage with science even where there is no clear scientific consensus.

Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'.

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

End-of-life Decisions for Patients with Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness in England and Wales: Time for Neuroscience-informed Improvements.

This article explores how the law of England and Wales1 has responded thus far to medical and clinical advances that have enabled patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness to survive. The authors argue that, although the courts have taken account of much of the science, they are now lagging behind, with the result that some patients are being denied their legal rights under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The article further argues that English law does not comply with the United Kingdom's commitments under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Stressing the need for the law to keep in step with advances in science, the article concludes with robust recommendations for improvements, based on the latest research in neuroscience, to the way in which life-sustaining treatment decisions are made. This would mean that the wishes of patients, including those with covert awareness, can be better reflected in best interests assessments.

The use of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom by those accused of criminal offenses in England and Wales.

This examination of the extent of the use of neuroscientific evidence in England and Wales identifies 204 reported cases in which such evidence has been used by those accused of criminal offenses during the eight-year period from 2005-12. Based on the number of reported cases found, the use of such evidence appears well established with those accused of criminal offenses utilizing such evidence in approximately 1 per cent of cases in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Neuroscientific evidence is used to quash convictions, to lead to convictions for lesser offenses and to lead to reduced sentences. In addition, cases are identified where neuroscientific evidence is used to avoid extradition, to challenge bail conditions and to resist prosecution appeals against unduly lenient sentences. The range of uses identified is wide: including challenging prosecution evidence as to the cause of death or injury, challenging the credibility of witnesses and arguing that those convicted were unfit to plead, lacked mens rea or were entitled to mental condition defenses. The acceptance of such evidence reflects the willingness of the courts in England and Wales to hear novel scientific argument, where it is valid and directly relevant to the issue(s) to be decided. Indeed, in some of the cases the courts expressed an expectation that structural brain scan evidence should have been presented to support the argument being made.