Applying Behavioral Economics to Public Health Policy: Illustrative Examples and Promising Directions.

Behavioral economics provides an empirically informed perspective on how individuals make decisions, including the important realization that even subtle features of the environment can have meaningful impacts on behavior. This commentary provides examples from the literature and recent government initiatives that incorporate concepts from behavioral economics in order to improve health, decision making, and government efficiency. The examples highlight the potential for behavioral economics to improve the effectiveness of public health policy at low cost. Although incorporating insights from behavioral economics into public health policy has the potential to improve population health, its integration into government public health programs and policies requires careful design and continual evaluation of such interventions. Limitations and drawbacks of the approach are discussed.

Patchy progress on obesity prevention: emerging examples, entrenched barriers, and new thinking.

Despite isolated areas of improvement, no country to date has reversed its obesity epidemic. Governments, together with a broad range of stakeholders, need to act urgently to decrease the prevalence of obesity. In this Series paper, we review several regulatory and non-regulatory actions taken around the world to address obesity and discuss some of the reasons for the scarce and fitful progress. Additionally, we preview the papers in this Lancet Series, which each identify high-priority actions on key obesity issues and challenge some of the entrenched dichotomies that dominate the thinking about obesity and its solutions. Although obesity is acknowledged as a complex issue, many debates about its causes and solutions are centred around overly simple dichotomies that present seemingly competing perspectives. Examples of such dichotomies explored in this Series include personal versus collective responsibilities for actions, supply versus demand-type explanations for consumption of unhealthy food, government regulation versus industry self-regulation, top-down versus bottom-up drivers for change, treatment versus prevention priorities, and a focus on undernutrition versus overnutrition. We also explore the dichotomy of individual versus environmental drivers of obesity and conclude that people bear some personal responsibility for their health, but environmental factors can readily support or undermine the ability of people to act in their own self-interest. We propose a reframing of obesity that emphasises the reciprocal nature of the interaction between the environment and the individual. Today's food environments exploit people's biological, psychological, social, and economic vulnerabilities, making it easier for them to eat unhealthy foods. This reinforces preferences and demands for foods of poor nutritional quality, furthering the unhealthy food environments. Regulatory actions from governments and increased efforts from industry and civil society will be necessary to break these vicious cycles.

Mobilisation of public support for policy actions to prevent obesity.

Public mobilisation is needed to enact obesity-prevention policies and to mitigate reaction against their implementation. However, approaches in public health focus mainly on dialogue between public health professionals and political leaders. Strategies to increase popular demand for obesity-prevention policies include refinement and streamlining of public information, identification of effective obesity frames for each population, strengthening of media advocacy, building of citizen protest and engagement, and development of a receptive political environment with change agents embedded across organisations and sectors. Long-term support and investment in collaboration between diverse stakeholders to create shared value is also important. Each actor in an expanded coalition for obesity prevention can make specific contributions to engaging, mobilising, and coalescing the public. The shift from a top-down to a combined and integrated bottom-up and top-down approach would need an overhaul of current strategies and reprioritisation of resources.

Improving the design of competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage.

In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, which required that in 2006 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implement a system of competitive bids to set payments for the Medicare Advantage program. Managed care plans now bid for the right to enroll Medicare beneficiaries. Data from the first year of bidding suggest that imperfect competition is limiting the success of the bidding system. This article offers suggestions to improve this system based on findings from auction theory and previous government-run auctions. In particular, CMS can benefit by adjusting its system of competitive bids in four ways: credibly committing to regulations governing bidding; limiting the scope for collusion, entry deterrence, and predatory behavior among bidders; adjusting how benchmark reimbursement rates are set; and accounting for asymmetric information among bidders.