Shining the "Light" on Moral Foundations: Light Versus Dark Personality Relates More Strongly to Moral Foundations.

Endorsement of the moral foundations specified by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) can sometimes fail to relate negatively to certain dispositions indicative of bad moral character. This evidence has fueled some concerns over whether the moral foundations in MFT are "moral." To increase understanding of how moral foundations relate to moral character, we proposed the "asymmetry hypothesis." This hypothesis states that "good" character is a more powerful predictor of each moral foundation than "bad" character. Put differently, there is an asymmetry in the strength (not merely direction) with which the moral foundations relate to encompassing indicators of good versus bad character. This is important because it suggests that links between the moral foundations and moral character will be somewhat concealed by focusing on bad character and/or not considering encompassing indicators of good character. A sample of college participants (N = 514) rated their endorsement of moral foundations and completed two sets of measures that represented encompassing indicators of both good and bad character. The data supported the asymmetry hypothesis: Each encompassing good-character assessment was a stronger predictor of each moral foundation than its corresponding encompassing bad-character assessment. Furthermore, variance unique to any good-character assessment had about moderate relations with each moral foundation, but variance unique to any bad-character assessment had no more than small relations with each moral foundation. The study provides a more nuanced understanding of how moral character relates to moral foundations and highlights utility in considering moral character as multidimensional.

Antagonistic but holier than thou: Antagonistic people think they are (way) better-than-average on moral character.

Although clinical psychologists have long speculated that antagonistic individuals may lack insight into their moral deficits, some evidence has shown that more (vs. less) antagonistic people view moral traits as somewhat desirable and rate themselves as lower on moral characteristics (suggestive of some insight). But, we suggest that antagonistic people's struggles with insight can be detected as part of a basic social-cognitive bias that entails believing the self is better-than-average on socially desirable characteristics (i.e., the "better-than-average effect" [BTAE]). Specifically, although antagonistic people may rate themselves lower on moral characteristics than less antagonistic people, they may still believe that their relative standing on moral characteristics compares favorably to others. Participants (N = 515) completed indicators of the Dark Tetrad (D4) constructs (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism) and rated themselves in relation to others on moral and immoral character traits. Overall, participants exhibited very large BTAEs (i.e., rated the self as "better-than-average" on moral character traits); only psychopathy and sadism consistently related negatively to BTAEs, but people with elevations in each D4 construct (or any D4 facet) still exhibited large-to-very-large BTAEs. Such antagonistic participants viewed themselves as possessing substantially greater amounts of moral than immoral character traits but viewed average others as possessing an equal mix of these traits. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Revisiting the ego-syntonic assumption: Investigating neuroticism and harmony with thoughts of negative emotions.

It has been assumed that personality disorders or constituent traits are ego-syntonic, but studies that have addressed this claim have revealed ego-dystonicity. Across three studies (two preregistered), we addressed some methodological weaknesses in these past studies that may conceal ego-syntonicity. Participants (total N = 1,331) completed measures of neuroticism and then imagined experiences that predominantly induced either fear, sadness, or anger (Studies 1 and 2) or recalled past experiences that predominantly elicited each emotion (Study 3). Subsequently, participants judged their emotional reactions on the two ego-syntonicity dimensions of (a) consonance with the self and (b) acceptance (evaluation). Across the studies, neuroticism generally had positive and about moderate-sized relations to consonance judgments and between trivial-sized and small-sized relations to acceptance judgments that were most often positive (Studies 1 and 2) but sometimes negative (Study 3); mean-level analyses suggested that people with relatively higher neuroticism indicated their emotional experiences were, most often, somewhat consonant with the self and acceptable. Regardless, in Study 3, the sample, including those relatively higher in neuroticism, indicated their recalled emotions were too extreme. Broadly, the data suggest that people relatively higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism may regard their contextualized negative emotion as more consonant with the self but not necessarily as more acceptable. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Is "sadistic pleasure" a contrived process of signaling one's antagonism?

OBJECTIVE: Sadistic pleasure presumably incorporates processes that support an authentic enjoyment of others' pain. However, antagonism confirmation theory, grounded in social-psychological theorizing on identity maintenance and the notion of ego-syntonicity, suggests that individuals higher in sadism report greater pleasure in response to others' pain because such reports are immoral responses that confirm their self-views. This alternative conception has yet to be tested. METHOD: In two preregistered experiments (total N = 968), participants completed measures of sadism, read about situations involving others' pain, and rated their pleasure. We manipulated the extent to which pleasure from others' pain could be used to signal morality or antagonism. RESULTS: We found that relatively sadistic people indicated greater pleasure across the studies but, like relatively non-sadistic people, they altered their pleasure ratings to signal greater morality or less antagonism. CONCLUSIONS: The findings fail to support antagonism confirmation theory, but they support recent perspectives on sadism that suggest that sadistic people may occasionally care about seeming moral (or not seeming antagonistic) and that sadism may be somewhat ego-dystonic in this respect.