ABSTRACT
From a basic terminological clarification, we seek to examine briefly what can be acknowledged as the two biggest attempts of foundation in the Biolaw contemporary area, that of the Kantian tradition and that of the anthropological and metaphysical realism. Through a critical examination of the first one, we attempt to show that only from a freedom or an autonomy assumed from the anthropological and metaphysical realism, is possible to hold a Biolaw as a true impervious limit against the technological power regarding human life and human procreation.
Subject(s)
Bioethical Issues , Ethics , Human Rights , Metaphysics , Human Characteristics , Humans , Personal Autonomy , Personhood , PhilosophyABSTRACT
A partir de una clarificación terminológica básica, se pretende examinar brevemente lo que puede entenderse como los dos intentos de fundamentación de mayores pretensiones en el ámbito de la biojurídica contemporánea, el de raigambre o filiación kantiana y el de perfil antropológico-metafísico. A través del examen crítico del primero, se intenta evidenciar que sólo desde una libertad o autonomía asumida desde una antropología realista o metafísica es posible defender un bioderecho como un límite verdaderamente infranqueable frente al poder tecnológico respecto de la vida y la procreación humanas
From a basic terminological clarification, we seek to examine briefly what can be acknowledged as the two biggest attempts of foundation in the Biolaw contemporary area, that of the Kantian tradition and that of the anthropological and metaphysical realism. Through a critical examination of the first one, we attempt to show that only from a freedom or an autonomy assumed from the anthropological and metaphysical realism, is possible to hold a Biolaw as a true impervious limit against the technological power regarding human life and human procreation
