Cognitive dissonance resolution depends on executive functions and frontal lobe integrity.

The free choice paradigm constitutes one of the most explored paradigms of cognitive dissonance research. Typically, once asked to choose between two similarly rated items, subjects subsequently exhibit an increased preference for chosen items and a decreased preference for rejected ones. Recent studies have demonstrated that such choice-induced preference change (CIPC) occur exclusively for remembered choices, suggesting a mechanism that ensures subjective coherence across time. In the present work we predicted that in order for CIPC to occur, not only must past choices be remembered, but executive networks responsible for detecting and solving conflicts must also be functioning. We confirmed this prediction in a group of patients with frontal lobe lesions. While non-dysexecutive (NODYS) patients behaved as their matched controls did, dysexecutive (DYS) patients failed to change their subjective preferences even when they could remember their previous choices. We have therefore demonstrated the crucial role of executive functions mediated by the frontal lobe in cognitive dissonance resolution.

Suggestion of self-(in)coherence modulates cognitive dissonance.

While cognitive dissonance is an influential concept of social psychology, its relations with consciousness and episodic memory remain strongly debated. We recently used the free-choice paradigm (FCP) to demonstrate the crucial role of conscious memory of previous choices on choice-induced preference change (CIPC). After choosing between two similarly rated items, subjects reevaluated chosen items as more attractive, and rejected items as less attractive. However such a CIPC was present exclusively for items that were correctly remembered as chosen or rejected during the choice stage, both in healthy controls and in amnesic patients. In the present work, we show that CIPC can be modulated by suggestive quotes promoting self-coherence or self-incoherence. In addition to the crucial role of memory of previous choices, we discovered that memory of the suggestive quotes was correlated to the modulation of CIPC. Taken together these results suggest that CIPC reflects a dynamic homeostatic regulation of self-coherence.

Cognitive dissonance resolution depends on episodic memory.

The notion that past choices affect preferences is one of the most influential concepts of social psychology since its first report in the 50 s, and its theorization within the cognitive dissonance framework. In the free-choice paradigm (FCP) after choosing between two similarly rated items, subjects reevaluate chosen items as more attractive and rejected items as less attractive. However the relations prevailing between episodic memory and choice-induced preference change (CIPC) remain highly debated: is this phenomenon dependent or independent from memory of past choices? We solve this theoretical debate by demonstrating that CIPC occurs exclusively for items which were correctly remembered as chosen or rejected during the choice stage. We used a combination of fMRI and intra-cranial electrophysiological recordings to reveal a modulation of left hippocampus activity, a hub of episodic memory retrieval, immediately before the occurrence of CIPC during item reevaluation. Finally, we show that contrarily to a previous influential report flawed by a statistical artifact, this phenomenon is absent in amnesic patients for forgotten items. These results demonstrate the dependence of cognitive dissonance on conscious episodic memory. This link between current preferences and previous choices suggests a homeostatic function of this regulative process, aiming at preserving subjective coherence.

[How our subjective coherence is built? The model of cognitive dissonance]. / Comment notre cohérence subjective se construit-elle? Le modèle de la dissonance cognitive.

Our conscious, subjective discourse, demonstrates a temporal coherence that distinguishes it from the many unconscious cognitive representations explored by cognitive neuroscience. This subjective coherence, --particularly its dynamics--can be modified in certain psychiatric syndromes including a " dissociative state " (e.g. schizophrenia), or in several neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g. frontal lobe syndrome). The medical and environmental consequences of these changes are significant. However, the psychological and neural mechanisms of this fundamental property remain largely unknown. We explored the dynamics of subjective coherence in an experimental paradigm (the "free choice "paradigm) originating for the field of cognitive dissonance. Using a series of behavioral experiments, conducted in healthy volunteers, we have discovered a key role for the episodic memory in the preference change process when simply making a choice. These results highlight the importance of conscious memory in the construction of subjective consistency, of which the subjects do not yet seem to be the conscious agents.

ERP evidence for an early emotional bias towards happy faces in trait anxiety.

The present study examined the influence of trait anxiety on the early stages of emotional face processing. In order to test if such early effect of anxiety could appear in response to positive as well as to negative stimuli, we recorded event-related potentials in response to both happy and fearful faces - contrasted with neutral faces - during a task where attention was explicitly directed to the emotion, in two groups differing by their anxiety level. We observed an amplification of the occipital P1 peak (90-120 ms) in response to happy compared to neutral faces in high trait anxious participants but not in the low trait anxious ones. Additionally, the N170 and EPN components were enhanced for the negative (fearful) faces, with no impact of trait anxiety. Our results provide evidence for an early bias towards positive stimuli in trait anxiety.

Reading sadness beyond human faces.

Human faces are the main emotion displayers. Knowing that emotional compared to neutral stimuli elicit enlarged ERPs components at the perceptual level, one may wonder whether this has led to an emotional facilitation bias toward human faces. To contribute to this question, we measured the P1 and N170 components of the ERPs elicited by human facial compared to artificial stimuli, namely non-humanoid robots. Fifteen healthy young adults were shown sad and neutral, upright and inverted expressions of human versus robotic displays. An increase in P1 amplitude in response to sad displays compared to neutral ones evidenced an early perceptual amplification for sadness information. P1 and N170 latencies were delayed in response to robotic stimuli compared to human ones, while N170 amplitude was not affected by media. Inverted human stimuli elicited a longer latency of P1 and a larger N170 amplitude while inverted robotic stimuli did not. As a whole, our results show that emotion facilitation is not biased to human faces but rather extend to non-human displays, thus suggesting our capacity to read emotion beyond faces.