Identifying Incidents of Public Health Significance Using the National Poison Data System, 2013-2018.

Data System. The American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) jointly monitor the National Poison Data System (NPDS) for incidents of public health significance (IPHSs).Data Collection/Processing. NPDS is the data repository for US poison centers, which together cover all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and multiple territories. Information from calls to poison centers is uploaded to NPDS in near real time and continuously monitored for specific exposures and anomalies relative to historic data.Data Analysis/Dissemination. AAPCC and CDC toxicologists analyze NPDS-generated anomalies for evidence of public health significance. Presumptive results are confirmed with the receiving poison center to correctly identify IPHSs. Once verified, CDC notifies the state public health department.Implications. During 2013 to 2018, 3.7% of all NPDS-generated anomalies represented IPHSs. NPDS surveillance findings may be the first alert to state epidemiologists of IPHSs. Data are used locally and nationally to enhance situational awareness during a suspected or known public health threat. NPDS improves CDC's national surveillance capacity by identifying early markers of IPHSs.

National surveillance for radiological exposures and intentional potassium iodide and iodine product ingestions in the United States associated with the 2011 Japan radiological incident.

BACKGROUND: In March of 2011, an earthquake struck Japan causing a tsunami that resulted in a radiological release from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Surveillance for potential radiological and any iodine/iodide product exposures was initiated on the National Poison Data System (NPDS) to target public health messaging needs within the United States (US). Our objectives are to describe self-reported exposures to radiation, potassium iodide (KI) and other iodine/iodide products which occurred during the US federal response and discuss its public health impact. METHODS: All calls to poison centers associated with the Japan incident were identified from March 11, 2011 to April 18, 2011 in NPDS. Exposure, demographic and health outcome information were collected. Calls about reported radiation exposures and KI or other iodine/iodide product ingestions were then categorized with regard to exposure likelihood based on follow-up information obtained from the PC where each call originated. Reported exposures were subsequently classified as probable exposures (high likelihood of exposure), probable non-exposures (low likelihood of exposure), and suspect exposure (unknown likelihood of exposure). RESULTS: We identified 400 calls to PCs associated with the incident, with 340 information requests (no exposure reported) and 60 reported exposures. The majority (n = 194; 57%) of the information requests mentioned one or more substances. Radiation was inquired about most frequently (n = 88; 45%), followed by KI (n = 86; 44%) and other iodine/iodide products (n = 47; 24%). Of the 60 reported exposures, KI was reported most frequently (n = 25; 42%), followed by radiation (n = 22; 37%) and other iodine/iodide products (n = 13; 22%). Among reported KI exposures, most were classified as probable exposures (n = 24; 96%); one was a probable non-exposure. Among reported other iodine/iodide product exposures, most were probable exposures (n = 10, 77%) and the rest were suspect exposures (n = 3; 23%). The reported radiation exposures were classified as suspect exposures (n = 16, 73%) or probable non-exposures (n = 6; 27%). No radiation exposures were classified as probable exposures. A small number of the probable exposures to KI and other iodide/iodine products reported adverse signs or symptoms (n = 9; 26%). The majority of probable exposures had no adverse outcomes (n = 28; 82%). These data identified a potential public health information gap regarding KI and other iodine/iodide products which was then addressed through public health messaging activities. CONCLUSION: During the Japan incident response, surveillance activities using NPDS identified KI and other iodine/iodide products as potential public health concerns within the US, which guided CDC's public health messaging and communication activities. Regional PCs can provide timely and additional information during a public health emergency to enhance data collected from surveillance activities, which in turn can be used to inform public health decision-making.

Medical planning and response for a nuclear detonation: a practical guide.

This article summarizes major points from a newly released guide published online by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR). The article reviews basic principles about radiation and its measurement, short-term and long-term effects of radiation, and medical countermeasures as well as essential information about how to prepare for and respond to a nuclear detonation. A link is provided to the manual itself, which in turn is heavily referenced for readers who wish to have more detail.

Randomized controlled study on the use of multiple-dose activated charcoal in patients with supratherapeutic phenytoin levels.

INTRODUCTION: We conducted a prospective randomized controlled study on the influence of multiple doses of activated charcoal (MDAC) in patients with supratherapeutic serum phenytoin levels; METHODS: Patients with serum phenytoin levels greater than 30 mg/L upon presentation to the ED were recruited from two urban teaching hospitals. Patients enrolled were older than 18, nonpregnant, able to tolerate activated charcoal by mouth and able to give written consent. They were randomized to receive 50 g activated charcoal by mouth every 4 hours or no activated charcoal. They continued in the study until the patient was discharged or the serum level was <25 mg/L. Serum levels were drawn every 6 hours initially, then every 24 hours after the 1st day. The presence of gait abnormalities and nystagmus was recorded and mini-mental status exam (MMSE) scores were collected from each patient enrolled. Time to reach subtoxic levels was recorded; RESULTS: Seventeen patients were enrolled in the study. Seven patients received MDAC, eight patients served as controls and two patients who were initially enrolled as controls inadvertently received one dose of activated charcoal and were excluded from the analysis. Both groups were comparable in age and all were male. The median time to reach a subtoxic level was 41.1 hours (range, 11.6-196) and 19.3 hours (range, 13-33) in the control and charcoal groups, respectively (p = 0.049). The median and range peak serum levels were 40.0 hours (range, 32.0-47.6) and 35.6 hours (range, 32.5-40.0) in the control and charcoal groups, respectively (p = 0.082). The median and range MMSE scores were 20 points (range, 12-30) and 19.5 points (range, 16-29) in the control and charcoal groups, respectively; CONCLUSION: Further study is needed to determine if MDAC decreases the time to reach a subtoxic level of phenytoin in patients with supratherapeutic phenytoin levels.

Review of multi-person exposure calls to a regional poison control center.

OBJECTIVE: Poisoning events, including exposures to hazardous materials, can involve multiple victims. Regional poison centers often are contacted in such events involving multiple victims. METHODS: We searched our poison center database over a nine-year time period for all calls involving a poisoning event in which more than two people were exposed to the same substance. We then matched each product to the generic category used by the National Poison Data System. We analyzed this data to find the most frequent substances reported as primary substances in the multiple exposures. RESULTS: We identified 6,695 calls between 2000 and 2008 that had more than two people exposed to the same substance. In these calls, 25,926 people were exposed (3.6% of the 715,701 human exposure calls for this period). These calls involved 64 of the 67 NPDS substance group codes. Some substances were much more commonly involved than others. The top three categories causing the most exposures were Fumes/Gases/Vapors, Food Products/Food Poisoning and Pesticides. Of the patients exposed, 69.4 % were not followed due to minimal effects possible or judged as nontoxic, 0.3% had major effects, 8.6% had no effects, and 9.3% had minimal to moderate effects. Eight people expired. CONCLUSION: Fumes, gases, and vapors make up the majority of multi-exposure calls. The overall mortality from multi-exposures, based on our data, is low. Analysis of these calls can help poison centers better understand these events and direct training.

Acute radiation syndrome: assessment and management.

Primary care physicians may be unprepared to diagnose and treat rare, yet potentially fatal, illnesses such as acute radiation syndrome (ARS). ARS, also known as radiation sickness, is caused by exposure to a high dose of penetrating, ionizing radiation over a short period of time. The time to onset of ARS is dependent on the dose received, but even at the lowest doses capable of causing illness, this will occur within a matter of hours to days. This article describes the clinical manifestations of ARS, provides guidelines for assessing its severity, and makes recommendations for managing ARS victims.

Transportation-related hazardous materials incidents and the role of poison control centers.

BACKGROUND: Department of Transportation (DOT) mandates reporting of all serious hazardous materials incidents. Hazardous material exposures may result in secondary contamination of emergency departments, or delayed clinical effects. Poison control centers specialize in the management of patients exposed to toxic substances; however, poison control center notification is not required. PURPOSE: The objective is to determine the frequency of poison control center notification after serious hazardous materials incidents when patients were transported to a hospital. METHODS: A retrospective analysis was conducted of serious hazardous materials incidents as reported by DOT, matched with data from the American Association of Poison Control Centers from 2002 through 2006 that involved patient transport. Incidents were divided into four groups: those reported to a poison control center within 0-360 minutes of the incident; those reported within 361-1440 minutes of the incident; those reported within 1441-4320 minutes of the incident; and no poison control center notification. Analyses were performed on variables including date, time, substance, and time to notification. Data were received in January 2008. RESULTS: One hundred fifty-four serious incidents met inclusion criteria. One hundred thirty-four incidents (87%) occurred without poison control center notification. Poison control centers were notified in 20 incidents (12.9%); 15 incidents (9.7%) were reported within 0-360 minutes of the incident (M=115 minutes, range=5-359 minutes); four incidents (2.6%) were reported within 361-1440 minutes of the incident (M=652 minutes, range=566-750 minutes); and one incident (0.7%) was reported after 4320 minutes following the incident. CONCLUSIONS: Most serious hazardous materials incidents involving patient transport are not reported to poison control centers. Opportunities exist to increase utilization of poison control center resources without increasing financial burdens of the hazardous materials incident.