Nucleus accumbens dopamine release reflects Bayesian inference during instrumental learning.

Dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens has been hypothesized to signal reward prediction error, the difference between observed and predicted reward, suggesting a biological implementation for reinforcement learning. Rigorous tests of this hypothesis require assumptions about how the brain maps sensory signals to reward predictions, yet this mapping is still poorly understood. In particular, the mapping is non-trivial when sensory signals provide ambiguous information about the hidden state of the environment. Previous work using classical conditioning tasks has suggested that reward predictions are generated conditional on probabilistic beliefs about the hidden state, such that dopamine implicitly reflects these beliefs. Here we test this hypothesis in the context of an instrumental task (a two-armed bandit), where the hidden state switches repeatedly. We measured choice behavior and recorded dLight signals reflecting dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens core. Model comparison based on the behavioral data favored models that used Bayesian updating of probabilistic beliefs. These same models also quantitatively matched the dopamine measurements better than non-Bayesian alternatives. We conclude that probabilistic belief computation plays a fundamental role in instrumental performance and associated mesolimbic dopamine signaling.

Activation, but not inhibition, of the indirect pathway disrupts choice rejection in a freely moving, multiple-choice foraging task.

The dorsomedial striatum (DMS) plays a key role in action selection, but less is known about how direct and indirect pathway spiny projection neurons (dSPNs and iSPNs, respectively) contribute to choice rejection in freely moving animals. Here, we use pathway-specific chemogenetic manipulation during a serial choice foraging task to test the role of dSPNs and iSPNs in learned choice rejection. We find that chemogenetic activation, but not inhibition, of iSPNs disrupts rejection of nonrewarded choices, contrary to predictions of a simple "select/suppress" heuristic. Our findings suggest that iSPNs' role in stopping and freezing does not extend in a simple fashion to choice rejection in an ethological, freely moving context. These data may provide insights critical for the successful design of interventions for addiction or other conditions in which it is desirable to strengthen choice rejection.