Does inconsistency always lead to negative affect? The influence of need for closure on affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency.

We present an experiment showing that need for closure (NFC)-defined as the epistemic desire for certainty-can moderate individuals' affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency. Informed by Kruglanski and colleagues' new theory, that cognitive inconsistency elicits negative affect particularly under certain circumstances, we find that NFC (i.e. the desire for certain, stable and unambiguous knowledge) influences the strength of consistency effects and resulting negative affect. More specifically, we find that individuals who are high on NFC experience more negative affect upon encountering an inconsistent (vs. consistent) cognition. However, when individuals are low on NFC, inconsistency is irrelevant, and their affect depends on whether the ultimate outcome of the cognition is positive or negative. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research.

Who Is Most Likely to Wear Rose-Colored Glasses? How Regulatory Mode Moderates Self-Flattery.

In general, people prefer to view themselves positively. But some individuals are more prone to self-flattery than others, that is, holding an unjustifiably high opinion of oneself. Applying regulatory mode theory, we identify motivational factors that predict which individuals are and are not prone to self-flattery. In four studies, using both chronic (Studies 1-3) and experimental (Study 4) conditions, we found that those with high locomotion concerns about effecting change (control) are more inclined to flatter themselves, whereas those with high assessment concerns about making the right choices (truth) are less inclined to flatter themselves. The relation between stronger locomotion and greater self-flattery, and stronger assessment and lesser self-flattery, was mediated by locomotors' low self-criticism and assessors' high self-criticism. These results shed light on how locomotion and assessment differ in the motivation to flatter oneself.

Retrieval-Induced Forgetting as Motivated Cognition.

Recalling information from a particular category can reduce one's memory capability for related, non-retrieved information. This is known as the retrieval-induced forgetting effect (RIF; Anderson et al., 1994). The present paper reviews studies that show that the RIF effect is motivated. More specifically, we describe research showing that the need for closure (NFC; the motivation to attain epistemic certainty; Kruglanski and Webster, 1996) generally enhances the RIF, because this prevents uncertainty and confusion from the intrusion of unwanted memories during selective-retrieval. However, when the content of the to-be-forgotten information serves the retriever's goals, NFC reduces RIF. Overall, the present findings are consistent with the view that motivation can affect the magnitude of RIF effects which, in turn, can serve as a mechanism for reaching preferred conclusions.

A structural model of intrinsic motivation: On the psychology of means-ends fusion.

The term intrinsic motivation refers to an activity being seen as its own end. Accordingly, we conceptualize intrinsic motivation (IM) as (perceived) means-ends fusion and define an intrinsicality continuum reflecting the degree to which such fusion is experienced. Our means-ends fusion (MEF) theory assumes four major antecedents of activity-goal fusion: (a) repeated pairing of the activity and the goal, (b) uniqueness of the activity-goal connection, (c) perceived similarity between the activity and its goal, and (d) temporal immediacy of goal attainment following the activity. MEF theory further identifies two major consequences of the activity-goal fusion (i.e., manifestations of intrinsic motivation): (a) perceived instrumentality of the activity to goal attainment and consequent activity engagement, and (b) goal-related affective experience of the activity. Empirical evidence for MEF theory comes from diverse fields of psychological inquiry, including animal learning, brain research, and social cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record

Evidence for arrogance: On the relative importance of expertise, outcome, and manner.

Arrogant behavior is as old as human nature. Nonetheless, the factors that cause people to be perceived as arrogant have received very little research attention. In this paper, we focused on a typical manifestation of arrogance: dismissive behavior. In particular, we explored the conditions under which a person who dismissed advice would be perceived as arrogant. We examined two factors: the advisee's competence, and the manner in which he or she dismissed the advice. The effect of the advisee's competence was tested by manipulating two competence cues: relative expertise, and the outcome of the advice dismissal (i.e., whether the advisee was right or wrong). In six studies (N = 1304), participants made arrogance judgments about protagonists who dismissed the advice of another person while the advisees' relative expertise (compared to the advisor), their eventual correctness, and the manner of their dismissal were manipulated in between-participant designs. Across various types of decisions and advisee-advisor relationships, the results show that less expert, less correct, and ruder advisees are perceived as more arrogant. We also find that outcome trumps expertise, and manner trumps both expertise and outcomes. In two additional studies (N = 101), we examined people's naïve theories about the relative importance of the aforementioned arrogance cues. These studies showed that people overestimate the role of expertise information as compared to the role of interpersonal manner and outcomes. Thus, our results suggest that people may commit arrogant faux pas because they erroneously expect that their expertise will justify their dismissive behavior.

To the fringe and back: Violent extremism and the psychology of deviance.

We outline a general psychological theory of extremism and apply it to the special case of violent extremism (VE). Extremism is defined as motivated deviance from general behavioral norms and is assumed to stem from a shift from a balanced satisfaction of basic human needs afforded by moderation to a motivational imbalance wherein a given need dominates the others. Because motivational imbalance is difficult to sustain, only few individuals do, rendering extreme behavior relatively rare, hence deviant. Thus, individual dynamics translate into social patterns wherein majorities of individuals practice moderation, whereas extremism is the province of the few. Both extremism and moderation require the ability to successfully carry out the activities that these demand. Ability is partially determined by the activities' difficulty, controllable in part by external agents who promote or oppose extremism. Application of this general framework to VE identifies the specific need that animates it and offers broad guidelines for addressing this pernicious phenomenon. (PsycINFO Database Record

The rocky road from attitudes to behaviors: Charting the goal systemic course of actions.

The issue of attitude-behavior relations is revisited in light of recent work on motivation and the psychology of goals. It is suggested that for object-attitudes to drive a specific behavior, a chain of contingencies must be realized: Liking must be transmuted into wanting, wanting must evolve into a goal, the goal must be momentarily dominant, and the specific behavior must be chosen as means of goal pursuit. Our model thus specifies a set of mediating processes that transpire between attitudes and behavior. Prior theories of attitude-behavior relations are examined from the present perspective, and its conceptual and empirical implications are noted.

On motivational readiness.

The construct of motivational readiness is introduced and explored. Motivational readiness is the willingness or inclination, whether or not ultimately realized, to act in the service of a desire. Building on prior relevant conceptions that include, among others, animal learning models (Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956; Tolman, 1955) and personality approaches (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Lewin, 1935), a general theory of motivational readiness is presented. Major parameters of this theory include the magnitude of a Want state (i.e., individual's desire of some sort) and the Expectancy of being able to satisfy it. The Want is assumed to be the essential driver of readiness: Whereas some degree of readiness may exist in the absence of Expectancy, all readiness is abolished in the absence of desire (Want). The concept of incentive is conceptualized in terms of a Match between the contents of the Want and perceived situational affordances. Whereas in classic models incentive was portrayed as a first-order determinant of motivational readiness, it is depicted here as a second-order factor that affects readiness via its impact on the Want and/or the Expectancy. A heterogeneous body of evidence for the present theory is reviewed, converging from different domains of psychological research. The theory's relation to its predecessors and its unique implications for new research hypotheses are also discussed.