Cognitive-psychology expertise and the calculation of the probability of a wrongful conviction.

Cognitive psychologists are familiar with how their expertise in understanding human perception, memory, and decision-making is applicable to the justice system. They may be less familiar with how their expertise in statistical decision-making and their comfort working in noisy real-world environments is just as applicable. Here we show how this expertise in ideal-observer models may be leveraged to calculate the probability of guilt of Gary Leiterman, a man convicted of murder on the basis of DNA evidence. We show by common probability theory that Leiterman is likely a victim of a tragic contamination event rather than a murderer. Making any calculation of the probability of guilt necessarily relies on subjective assumptions. The conclusion about Leiterman's innocence is not overly sensitive to the assumptions-the probability of innocence remains high for a wide range of reasonable assumptions. We note that cognitive psychologists may be well suited to make these calculations because as working scientists they may be comfortable with the role a reasonable degree of subjectivity plays in analysis.

Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination.

There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies (N = 968), we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn influence moral judgments. Our findings demonstrate that intuitive likelihoods are one critical factor in moral judgment, one that is not suspended even in moral dilemmas that explicitly stipulate outcomes. Features thought to underlie moral reasoning, such as intention, may operate, in part, by affecting the intuitive likelihood of outcomes, and, problematically, moral differences between scenarios may be confounded with non-moral intuitive probabilities.

Major memory for microblogs.

Online social networking is vastly popular and permits its members to post their thoughts as microblogs, an opportunity that people exploit, on Facebook alone, over 30 million times an hour. Such trivial ephemera, one might think, should vanish quickly from memory; conversely, they may comprise the sort of information that our memories are tuned to recognize, if that which we readily generate, we also readily store. In the first two experiments, participants' memory for Facebook posts was found to be strikingly stronger than their memory for human faces or sentences from books-a magnitude comparable to the difference in memory strength between amnesics and healthy controls. The second experiment suggested that this difference is not due to Facebook posts spontaneously generating social elaboration, because memory for posts is enhanced as much by adding social elaboration as is memory for book sentences. Our final experiment, using headlines, sentences, and reader comments from articles, suggested that the remarkable memory for microblogs is also not due to their completeness or simply their topic, but may be a more general phenomenon of their being the largely spontaneous and natural emanations of the human mind.

Actors, observers, and the estimation of task duration.

People are often wrong in estimating both how long tasks have taken in the past and how long they will take in the future. Bias could be due to factors such as task involvement, an individual's engagement or motivation in completing the task, or aspects of the task such as its relative duration or memory storage size associated with it. We examined time estimation bias in actors (likely to experience high levels of task involvement) and observers (likely to experience low levels of task involvement) for both predictions of and memory of task duration. Results suggest that bias appears to be due to memory storage size rather than to involvement with the task.

The immediate and delayed cardiovascular benefits of forgiving.

BACKGROUND: The putative health benefits of forgiveness may include long-term buffering against cardiovascular reactivity associated with rumination. Although studies show short-term benefits of adopting a forgiving perspective, it is uncertain whether this perspective protects against repeated future rumination on offenses, which may be necessary for long-term health benefits. Also unclear is whether forgiveness offers unique benefits beyond simple distraction. METHODS: Cardiovascular parameters (systolic blood pressure [SBP], diastolic blood pressure [DBP], and heart rate) were measured while 202 participants thought about a previous offense from an angry or forgiving perspective or were distracted. All participants were then distracted for 5 minutes, after which they freely ruminated on the offense. RESULTS: Angry rumination initially yielded the greatest increase in blood pressure from baseline (mean [M] [standard deviation {SD}]: SBP = 9.24 [11.16]; M [SD]: DBP = 4.69 [7.48]) compared with forgiveness (M [SD]: SBP = 3.30 [6.48]; M [SD]: DBP = 1.51 [4.94]) and distraction (M [SD]: SBP = 4.81 [6.28]; M [SD]: DBP = 1.75 [3.80]), which did not differ from each other (p > .30). During free rumination, however, those who had previously focused on forgiveness showed less reactivity (M [SD]: SBP = 7.33 [9.61]; M [SD]: DBP = 4.73 [7.33]) than those who had been distracted (M [SD]: SBP = 10.50 [7.77]; M [SD]: DBP = 7.71 [6.83]) and those who previously focused on angry rumination (M [SD]: SBP = 12.04 [11.74]; M [SD]: DBP = 8.64 [12.63]). There were no differences for heart rate. CONCLUSIONS: Forgiveness seems to lower reactivity both during the initial cognitive process and, more importantly, during mental recreations of an offense soon thereafter, potentially offering sustained protection, whereas effects of distraction appear transient.

Rumination as a mediator of chronic stress effects on hypertension: a causal model.

Chronic stress has been linked to hypertension, but the underlying mechanisms remain poorly specified. We suggest that chronic stress poses a risk for hypertension through repeated occurrence of acute stressors (often stemming from the chronic stress context) that cause activation of stress-mediating physiological systems. Previous models have often focused on the magnitude of the acute physiological response as a risk factor; we attempt to extend this to address the issue of duration of exposure. Key to our model is the notion that these acute stressors can emerge not only in response to stressors present in the environment, but also to mental representations of those (or other) stressors. Consequently, although the experience of any given stressor may be brief, a stressor often results in a constellation of negative cognitions and emotions that form a mental representation of the stressor. Ruminating about this mental representation of the stressful event can cause autonomic activation similar to that observed in response to the original incident, and may occur and persist long after the event itself has ended. Thus, rumination helps explain how chronic stress causes repeated (acute) activation of one's stress-mediating physiological systems, the effects of which accumulate over time, resulting in hypertension risk.

Who's funny: gender stereotypes, humor production, and memory bias.

It has often been asserted, by both men and women, that men are funnier. We explored two possible explanations for such a view, first testing whether men, when instructed to be as funny as possible, write funnier cartoon captions than do women, and second examining whether there is a tendency to falsely remember funny things as having been produced by men. A total of 32 participants, half from each gender, wrote captions for 20 cartoons. Raters then indicated the humor success of these captions. Raters of both genders found the captions written by males funnier, though this preference was significantly stronger among the male raters. In the second experiment, male and female participants were presented with the funniest and least funny captions from the first experiment, along with the caption author's gender. On a memory test, both females and males disproportionately misattributed the humorous captions to males and the nonhumorous captions to females. Men might think men are funnier because they actually find them so, but though women rated the captions written by males slightly higher, our data suggest that they may regard men as funnier more because they falsely attribute funny things to them.

Cognitive distancing, cognitive restructuring, and cardiovascular recovery from stress.

Research suggests that phasic changes in cardiovascular reactivity can increase the risk of heart disease, yet much of this research has focused on the magnitude rather than the duration of reactivity. In recent years, studies have confirmed that recovery time is also a significant predictor of future heart cardiovascular disorders. Here we review these studies, as well as the cognitions and behaviors that have been found to influence recovery. We suggest that a useful distinction is that some utilize cognitive distancing while others seem to be based on cognitive restructuring. These different approaches have implications for the immediacy and permanence of the recovery effects. Finally, we outline the questions that have yet to be answered about recovery and how it could influence long-term health.

Cardiovascular disease and psychiatric comorbidity: the potential role of perseverative cognition.

The high comorbidity between psychiatric disorders and cardiovascular disease has received increasing attention, yet little is known about the processes linking the two. One plausible contributing mechanism is the tendency of those with psychiatric disorders to ruminate on stressful events. This phenomenon, sometimes called perseverative cognition, can extend the psychological and physiological effects of stress, which could contribute to cardiovascular disease etiology. In this paper, we discuss the potential role of perseverative cognition in mediating the relationship between psychiatric illness and cardiovascular disease. Rumination can delay physiological recovery from acute stress, which in turn has been found to predict future cardiovascular health. This delayed recovery could act as a mechanism in the longitudinal link between worry and cardiovascular health. The cognitive inflexibility that characterizes mood and anxiety disorders may then contribute to disease not by producing greater reactivity, but instead through extending activation, increasing the risks for cardiovascular damage.

Correcting memory improves accuracy of predicted task duration.

People are often inaccurate in predicting task duration. The memory bias explanation holds that this error is due to people having incorrect memories of how long previous tasks have taken, and these biased memories cause biased predictions. Therefore, the authors examined the effect on increasing predictive accuracy of correcting memory through supplying feedback for actual task duration. For Experiments 1 (paper-counting task) and 2 (essay-writing task), college students were supplied with duration information about their previous performance on a similar task before predicting task duration. For Experiment 3, participants were recruited at various locations, such as fast food restaurants and video arcades, and supplied with average task duration for others before predicting how long the task would take. In all 3 experiments, supplying feedback increased predictive accuracy. Overall, results indicate that, when predicting duration, people do well when they rely not on memory of past task duration but instead on measures of actual duration, whether their own or that of others.

Effect of task length on remembered and predicted duration.

Vierordt's (1868) law states that when estimating the duration of a previous task, people overestimate short durations and underestimate long ones. We examine whether this same pattern holds for remembered and predicted duration for tasks lasting between 1 and 15 min. In support of Vierordt's law and its extension to future duration estimates, task duration tended to be overestimated for short tasks (less than 2 min) and underestimated for long tasks for both remembered and predicted duration.

Bias in memory predicts bias in estimation of future task duration.

Both anecdotal accounts and experimental evidence suggest that people underestimate how long it will take them to complete future tasks. A possible reason for this tendency is that people remember tasks as taking less time than they actually did, with these biased memories causing a corresponding bias in prediction. Two experiments were performed to determine whether or not a systematic bias in memory could explain a similar systematic bias in prediction. In support, it was found that (1) the tendency to underestimate future duration disappears when the task is novel, (2) there is similar bias in estimation of both past and future durations, and (3) variables that affect memory of duration, such as level of experience with the task and duration of delay before estimation, affect prediction of duration in the same way. It appears that, at least in part, people underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.

Positive and negative opinion modeling: the influence of another's similarity and dissimilarity.

Modeling research that has focused on the effects of observing similar others appears to have underestimated the influence of observing dissimilar others. Two experiments demonstrated that observing a model express liking for a piece of music induced more favorable opinions of the music (positive modeling) when the model was similar to the participant observer in relevant opinions, and more negative opinions (negative modeling) when the model was dissimilar to the participant in relevant opinions. Of note, this pattern was more pronounced when participants also believed their general backgrounds were dissimilar rather than similar to that of the model. Underlying social comparison processes and the mediational role of participants' liking of the model are considered.

The role of angry rumination and distraction in blood pressure recovery from emotional arousal.

OBJECTIVE: Cardiovascular recovery of prestress baseline blood pressure has been implicated as a possible additional determinant of sustained blood pressure elevation. We hypothesize that angry ruminations may slow the recovery process. METHOD: A within-subjects design was used in which resting baseline blood pressure and heart rate measurements were assessed on 60 subjects, who then took part in two anger-recall tasks. After each task, subjects sat quietly and alone during a 12-minute recovery period randomized to with or without distractions. During baseline, task, and recovery, blood pressure was continuously monitored; during recovery, subjects reported their thoughts at five fixed intervals. RESULTS: Fewer angry thoughts were reported in the distraction condition (17%) compared with no distraction (31%; p = .002); an interaction showed that this effect was largely the result of the two intervals immediately after the anger-recall task. Trait rumination interacted with distraction condition such that high ruminators in the no-distraction condition evidenced the poorest blood pressure recovery, assessed as area under the curve (p = .044 [systolic blood pressure] and p = .046 [diastolic pressure]). CONCLUSIONS: People who have a tendency to ruminate about past anger-provoking events may be at greater risk for target organ damage as a result of sustained blood pressure elevations; the effect is exacerbated when distractions are not available to interrupt the ruminative process.

Underestimating the duration of future events: memory incorrectly used or memory bias?

People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their memories of how long past events have taken, but these memories are systematic underestimates of past duration. People appear to underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.

The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005).

People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to out-predict their own account, theirs actually makes no prediction at all. However, the present authors did not suggest that only 1 theory is right but that theirs is consistent with data that prior theories, including their own, cannot explain. Ignoring memories of past tasks is not a complete explanation for the phenomenon if the memories people could consult are themselves biased. Nonetheless, underestimating future task duration is almost certainly multiply determined, and thus our account and theirs can coexist.

Risk factors, confounding, and the illusion of statistical control.

When experimental designs are premature, impractical, or impossible, researchers must rely on statistical methods to adjust for potentially confounding effects. Such procedures, however, are quite fallible. We examine several errors that often follow the use of statistical adjustment. The first is inferring a factor is causal because it predicts an outcome even after "statistical control" for other factors. This inference is fallacious when (as usual) such control involves removing the linear contribution of imperfectly measured variables, or when some confounders remain unmeasured. The converse fallacy is inferring a factor is not causally important because its association with the outcome is attenuated or eliminated by the inclusion of covariates in the adjustment process. This attenuation may only reflect that the covariates treated as confounders are actually mediators (intermediates) and critical to the causal chain from the study factor to the study outcome. Other problems arise due to mismeasurement of the study factor or outcome, or because these study variables are only proxies for underlying constructs. Statistical adjustment serves a useful function, but it cannot transform observational studies into natural experiments, and involves far more subjective judgment than many users realize.