Bizarreness of size and shape in dream images.

Bizarreness in dreams is defined as an unusual combination of features in the phenomenal unified consciousness, that is, an incoherent simulation of the waking world. The present study investigated the specific mechanisms underlying dream image production and the phenomenal unity of consciousness by focusing on size and shape bizarreness. Data were derived from a Dream Data Bank of experimental dream studies. Analyses revealed that feature distortion was quite infrequent. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive processes proposed in a dream production model. Theoretical cognitive constructs, such as Kosslyn's imagery model, memory systems functioning, and binding, were used to speculate about these two specific types of bizarreness.

Renal artery aneurysm in hand-assisted laparoscopic donor nephrectomy: case report.

We report a living donor who underwent laparoscopic nephrectomy using a hand-assisted device (HALD). At preoperative arteriography the donor showed a renal artery aneurysm. The patient was a 37-year-old female, 166 cm height, white, weighing 87 kg, HLA identical to the recipient. HALD was indicated due to the better visualization of renal pedicle and greater security in an obese patient. Renal artery aneurysm is a rare condition, with many possible complications. The method proved to be adequate and safe for donor nephrectomy, despite a renal artery aneurysm.

Consciousness during dreams.

Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes.

Slow wave and REM sleep mentation.

The aim of this experiment was to compare the characteristics of mental activity during REM and Slow Wave Sleep (SWS). Forty dream reports and their mnemonic associations were collected from twenty subjects. The reports were analyzed for structure (number of temporal units, number of report multi-units, and narrative continuity), awareness (reality testing, subjective time), and content (self, setting, laboratory references, number of non-self characters, implausibility, body feelings, number and intensity of emotions, vividness). Associations were classified as episodic and semantic memories. Results showed that REM reports were significantly longer than SWS reports. Minor content SWS-REM differences were also detected, which were more quantitative than qualitative. The collected observations might support the tentative hypothesis that dreaming is a continuous process, which is not unique to REM sleep. Different levels of engagement of the cognitive system are responsible for the SWS-REM differences that were detected.

A comparison of mental activity during sleep onset and morning awakening.

The aims of the experiment were: (1) to establish the proportion of sleep stages in morning spontaneous awakening and to observe whether any stage-dependent differences can be found in the mentation reports; and (2) to compare the characteristics of mental activity during sleep onset (SO) and during the latest sleep period. One hundred forty-four dream reports and their association reports were collected from 36 subjects in a lab experimental design. Dream reports were analyzed as to structure (length, narrative continuity), content (self, setting, lab references, nonself characters, dimensional distortions, body feelings, bizarreness and emotions), and awareness (reality testing). Associations were classified as episodic, abstract self-referred, and semantic memories. The morning awakenings results were not affected by the stage of sleep during which dreaming occurs. SO reports prevalently show a lifelike nature, while sleep-offset reports are prevalently dreamlike. On the other hand, there seems to be a similar availability of mnemonic systems in the two sleep conditions.

Dreaming during sleep onset and awakening.

The aim of the present work was to investigate the characteristics of the dreaming during the beginning and the end of sleep, both phases being transitional between different states of consciousness (wakefulness vs sleep and vice versa). The hypothesis of an adaptive function of the mental activity in the two sleep phases is put forward to ensure a continuity of self-experience in the passage from one state of vigilance to another. 40 dream reports collected at sleep onset and at spontaneous morning awakening, when analysed, supported the hypothesis. Independently of the physiological sleep stage during which dreaming occurs, the results seem to highlight similarities rather than differences in dreaming which occurs during sleep onset and morning awakening.

Spontaneous regression of subcutaneous metastasis of cutaneous melanoma.

A case is presented of a 44-year-old Caucasian man who was operated on in October of 1988 for a cutaneous melanoma in his trunk and who in the space of 1 year manifested a single subcutaneous nodule compatible with a metastasis of melanoma by fine-needle aspiration biopsy. No other abnormal findings were revealed by physical and instrumental examinations. During the subsequent hospitalization, we witnessed (in conjunction with the occurrence of painful symptoms in the hands of an inflammatory nature) the total, progressive, spontaneous regression of the metastasis, which was confirmed by the clinic and the tests. After 15 months of follow-up, the patient has not shown any further signs of illness.

Slow wave sleep dreaming.

Fifty volunteers slept two nonconsecutive nights in a sleep laboratory under electropolygraphic control. They were awakened for one report per night. Awakenings were made, in counterbalanced order, from slow wave sleep (SWS--stage 3-4 and stage 4) and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. Following dream reporting, subjects were asked to identify memory sources of their dream imagery. Two independent judges reliably rated mentation reports for temporal units and for several content and structural dimensions. The same judges also categorized memory sources as autobiographical episodes, abstract self-references, or semantic knowledge. We found that REM reports were significantly longer than SWS reports. Minor content SWS-REM differences were also detected. Moreover, semantic knowledge was more frequently mentioned as a dream source for REM than for SWS dream reports. These findings are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that dreaming is a continuous process that is not unique to REM sleep. Different levels of engagement of the cognitive system are responsible for the few SWS-REM differences that have been detected.

Cognitive aspects of mental activity during sleep.

Upon nighttime experimental awakening of 27 subjects in four sleep conditions (sleep onset early; sleep onset late; Stage 2; and rapid eye movement, REM, sleep), 108 dream reports and their association reports were collected. Dream reports were analyzed for length (temporal units) and content categories (continuity; implausibility; presence of the dreamer [i.e., "the self"], a setting, characters). Associations were classified as episodic, abstract self-referred, and semantic memories. The two sets of results tend to show a basic homogeneity among mentation reports in the four sleep conditions considered. These findings are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that the same cognitive mechanisms operate, at different levels of engagement, in dream generation rather than the hypothesis of multiple dream-generation systems dependent upon the physiological characteristics of the various sleep stages.

Differential access to memory traces in the production of mental experience.

Two experiments were performed to determine the nature of the memory traces used in the production of mental experiences (dreams, daydreams). Free associations with dreams, collected upon experimental awakenings in Sleep Onset and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, were classified as strict episodes, abstract self-references, or semantic traces, adapting Tulving's model (Experiment 1). Results showed that associations with Sleep Onset dreams were mainly strict episodes while REM associations were evenly distributed: that represents a psychophysiological state-dependency of the access to memory traces. A comparison of free associations with dream, daydreams, and films (Experiment 2) showed a similarity between access to memory traces in daydreaming and Sleep Onset dreaming. Physiological condition was not a discriminating factor. This homogeneity suggests that cognitive processes involved in the creation of original narrative sequences may be similar in sleep and waking. These findings and their interpretation tend to support a unitary theory of the mind rather than dichotomous models which, in dream research, have often been misleading.

Self-representation in dream experiences during sleep onset and REM sleep.

The Scoring System for Latent Structure (SSLS) was used to test three hypotheses regarding the degree of self-participation in dreams reported during sleep onset (SO) and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. These hypotheses were that (a) the ratio of interactive to associative sentences would be significantly greater in REM than in SO; (b) the level of Ego activity would be significantly greater in REM than in SO; and (c) the ratio between interactive sentences with Ego not present and interactive sentences with Ego present would be significantly different in REM and in SO. None of these hypotheses was confirmed. However, the following significant differences were found: (a) the ratio between sentences with Ego substituted and the total number of interactive sentences was greater in REM than in SO (p less than 0.05); (b) the ratio between sentences with Ego substituted and sentences with Ego present was greater (p less than 0.05) in REM than in SO; (c) the ratio between sentences with Ego inserted and sentences with Ego substituted was greater in SO than in REM (p less than 0.01); and (d) the relative incidence of defective Ego was greater (p less than 0.01) in SO than in REM. These data were interpreted in terms of psychodynamic models of dream formation.

Epileptic seizures during card games and draughts.

This paper presents a case of epileptic seizures occurring during card games and draughts. The patient was a 26-year-old man who complained of "arrests of thought" while playing cards or draughts or solving mathematical problems. The attacks, which were very rare in other situations, had begun at the age of 14. Between the ages of 14 and 21 he had had occasional tonic-clonic seizures. Protracted EEG recording showed bursts of 3 Hz spike-wave discharges during the day. Such discharges were very much more frequent when the patient was playing cards of draughts and only these circumstances were subjectively experienced as lapses of consciousness. Various explanations can be advanced for this case.