Comparison of semantic and phonological false memories in short- and long-term tests.

The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm has been at the centre of false memory research. Whereas most work with this paradigm has examined memory at the long term and with semantically associated lists, the present study examines phonological and semantic false memories at both short- and long-term delays. In two experiments, participants studied short lists containing six (Experiment 1) or four (Experiment 2) items, either semantically or phonologically related to the same non-studied critical items (CI). Following each list, participants completed 36 trials of an immediate recognition task (short-term memory [STM]-only condition) only or they also completed a surprise recognition test after a 1-min delay after all 36 STM trials (STM + long-term memory [LTM] condition). In STM, false alarms were higher in phonological lists, whereas after the delay, false alarms were higher in semantic lists, reflecting differential sensitivity to the type of association as a function of delay. A third experiment examined LTM performance after controlling for prior testing and yielded highly similar results. Both the activation-monitoring framework (AMF) and fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) can explain the majority of the findings, with some remaining issues. These results confirm that information from the knowledge base (LTM) does influence accuracy in an STM task, albeit less so than perceptual level similarity.

The influence of general knowledge test performance on self-ratings of and perceived relationships between intelligence, knowledge, and memory.

The present study examined how taking a general knowledge (GK) test affects perceptions of one's intelligence, memory, and knowledge and the relationship between these three constructs. Participants rated their abilities on each construct and the strength of the relationships between them before and after completing an easy or hard GK test or control task. In Experiment 1, participants were (mis)informed that GK questions were correctly answered by 50% of the population; in Experiment 2, no such information was provided. Regardless of (mis)information about others' performance, participants in the Hard condition believed they had a worse memory, were less knowledgeable, and were less intelligent post-task. However, the strength of the perceived relationship between GK and intelligence decreased only when participants were misled. Judgments of one's intelligence, memory, and knowledge can be manipulated by taking a GK test, and individuals engage in self-protective behavior to reduce the potential threat to one's self-concept.

Is practice good enough? Retrieval benefits students with ADHD but does not compensate for poor encoding in unmedicated students.

Introduction: A significant proportion of currently enrolled college students receive support for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and these students are often at risk of academic failure. Retrieval practice or self-testing is an effective, accessible, and affordable tool for improving academic performance. Three recent studies found conflicting results with regards to the effectiveness of retrieval practice in this population. Methods: The present study compared 36 individuals with ADHD to 36 controls. Participants studied Swahili-English word pairs that varied in difficulty. Half of the pairs were repeatedly studied, and the other half repeatedly tested. Results: On a final test, all participants showed a benefit of retrieval practice relative to restudy and participant status did not moderate the effect. However, unmedicated individuals with ADHD performed worse overall, both during the encoding phase and on the final test, whereas medicated participants were not significantly different from controls. Discussion: An examination of self-reported encoding strategies found unmedicated participants used fewer deep strategies at encoding, consistent with prior work on ADHD and memory. Although retrieval practice is effective in this group, improved strategy use may be necessary to ensure performance that is fully equivalent to that of students without ADHD.

Implicit measures of anthropomorphism: affective priming and recognition of apparent animal emotions.

It has long been recognized that humans tend to anthropomorphize. That is, we naturally and effortlessly interpret the behaviors of nonhuman agents in the same way we interpret human behaviors. This tendency has only recently become a subject of empirical research. Most of this work uses explicit measures. Participants are asked whether they attribute some human-like trait to a nonhuman agent on some scale. These measures, however, have two limitations. First, they do not capture automatic components of anthropomorphism. Second, they generally only track one anthropomorphic result: the attribution (or non-attribution) of a particular trait. However, anthropomorphism can affect how we interpret animal behavior in other ways as well. For example, the grin of a nonhuman primate often looks to us like a smile, but it actually signals a state more like fear or anxiety. In the present work, we tested for implicit components of anthropomorphism based on an affective priming paradigm. Previous work suggests that priming with human faces displaying emotional expressions facilitated categorization of words into congruent emotion categories. In Experiments 1-3, we primed participants with images of nonhuman animals that appear to express happy or sad emotions, and asked participants to categorize words as positive or negative. Experiment 4 used human faces as control. Overall, we found consistent priming congruency effects in accuracy but not response time. These appeared to be more robust in older adults. They also appear to emerge with more processing time, and the pattern was the same with human as with primate faces. This demonstrates a role for automatic processes of emotion recognition in anthropomorphism. It also provides a potential measure for further exploration of implicit anthropomorphism.

Older adults recover more marginal knowledge and use feedback more effectively than younger adults: evidence using "I don't know" vs. "I don't remember" for general knowledge questions.

Through three experiments, we examined older and younger adults' metacognitive ability to distinguish between what is not stored in the knowledge base versus merely inaccessible. Difficult materials were selected to test this ability when retrieval failures were very frequent. Of particular interest was the influence of feedback (and lack thereof) in potential new learning and recovery of marginal knowledge across age groups. Participants answered short-answer general knowledge questions, responding "I do not know" (DK) or "I do not remember" (DR) when retrieval failed. After DKs, performance on a subsequent multiple-choice (Exp. 1) and short-answer test following correct-answer feedback (Exp. 2) was lower than after DRs, supporting self-reported not remembering reflects failures of accessibility whereas not knowing captures a lack of availability. Yet, older adults showed a tendency to answer more DK questions correctly on the final tests than younger adults. Experiment 3 was a replication and extension of Experiment 2 including two groups of online participants in which one group was not provided correct answer feedback during the initial short-answer test. This allowed us to examine the degree to which any new learning and recovery of access to marginal knowledge was occurring across the age groups. Together, the findings indicate that (1) metacognitive awareness regarding underlying causes of retrieval failures is maintained across different distributions of knowledge accessibility, (2) older adults use correct answer feedback more effectively than younger adults, and (3) in the absence of feedback, older adults spontaneously recover marginal knowledge.

Lay Definitions of Intelligence, Knowledge, and Memory: Inter- and Independence of Constructs.

The present study examined how lay participants define the following concepts used widely in psychology: being intelligent, knowing, and remembering. In the scientific community, knowledge overlaps with the contents of semantic memory, crystallized intelligence reflects the accumulation of knowledge, knowledge and event memory interact, and fluid intelligence and working memory correlate. Naturally, the lay public has implicit theories of these constructs. These theories mainly distinguish between intelligent and unintelligent behaviors and tend to include characteristics outside psychometric studies of intelligence, such as emotional intelligence. Here, we asked lay participants from the online platform Prolific to explain "what does being intelligent mean to you?" as well as "knowing" and "remembering" to understand their degree of alignment with theoretical conceptualizations in the research community. Qualitative coding of participant definitions showed that intelligence and knowledge are closely related, but asymmetrically-when defining what it means to be intelligent, participants reference knowledge, but intelligence is not considered in explaining knowing. Although participants note that intelligence is multi-faceted and related to problem-solving, there is an emphasis (in terms of frequency of mentions) on the crystallized side of intelligence (i.e., knowledge). A deeper understanding of lay participants' mental models of these constructs (i.e., their metacognitions) is essential for bridging gaps between experts and the general public.

Ecological validity of don't remember and don't know for distinguishing accessibility- versus availability-based retrieval failures in older and younger adults: knowledge for news events.

With pursuit of incremental progress and generalizability of findings in mind, we examined a possible boundary for older and younger adults' metacognitive distinction between what is not stored in memory versus merely inaccessible with materials that are not process pure to knowledge or events: information regarding news events. Participants were asked questions about public events such as celebrity news, tragedies, and political events that were widely experienced in the previous 10-12 years, responding "I don't know" (DK) or "I don't remember" (DR) when retrieval failed. Memories of these events are relatively recently acquired in rich, naturalistic contexts and are likely not fully separated from episodic details. When retrieval failed, DR items were recognized with higher accuracy than DK items, both immediately and 2 years later, confirming that self-reported not remembering reflects failures of accessibility, whereas not knowing better captures a lack of availability. In fact, older adults distinguished between the causes of retrieval failures more precisely than younger adults. Together, these findings advance the reliability, validity, and generalizability of using DR and DK as a metacognitive tool to address the phenomenological experience and behavioral consequences of retrieval failures of information that contains both semantic and episodic features. Implications for metacognition in aging and related constructs like familiarity, remembering, and knowing are discussed.

Using the phenomenology of memory for recent events to bridge the gap between episodic and semantic memory.

Public events such as celebrity news, tragedies, and political events are widely experienced. Initially at least, memories of these events are "episodic" in nature; however, these events are also stored in associative networks similar to the semantic organization of knowledge (N. R. Brown, 1990, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 119[3], 297-314). Thus, these memories provide a novel way of examining how episodically experienced events might become semanticized and integrated into the knowledge base. Younger and older adults rated their subjective memory strength for and answered questions about details of events occurring over the previous 12 years. Participants also rated their phenomenological experience using a modified remember/know paradigm, in which no instructions about usage of the terms were provided. Interestingly, remembered and known items were equal in terms of subjective strength. Know responses were highly accurate, and more so than remember responses. Older and younger adults performed similarly. Participants' own definitions of remember, know, and just familiar revealed that knowing is associated with retrieval from semantic memory, whereas remembering and just familiarity are more associated with event/episodic memory. These results suggest that memory for public events shares phenomenological features with both episodic/event memory and semantic memory. Public events thus allow researchers to examine the complex ways in which storage of novel information can be jointly maintained in both episodic and semantic memory.

Manipulations of List Type in the DRM Paradigm: A Review of How Structural and Conceptual Similarity Affect False Memory.

The use of list-learning paradigms to explore false memory has revealed several critical findings about the contributions of similarity and relatedness in memory phenomena more broadly. Characterizing the nature of "similarity and relatedness" can inform researchers about factors contributing to memory distortions and about the underlying associative and semantic networks that support veridical memory. Similarity can be defined in terms of semantic properties (e.g., shared conceptual and taxonomic features), lexical/associative properties (e.g., shared connections in associative networks), or structural properties (e.g., shared orthographic or phonological features). By manipulating the type of list and its relationship to a non-studied critical item, we review the effects of these types of similarity on veridical and false memory. All forms of similarity reviewed here result in reliable error rates and the effects on veridical memory are variable. The results across a variety of paradigms and tests provide partial support for a number of theoretical explanations of false memory phenomena, but none of the theories readily account for all results.

A database of general knowledge question performance in older adults.

General knowledge questions are used across a variety of research and clinical settings to measure cognitive processes such as metacognition, knowledge acquisition, retrieval processes, and intelligence. Existing norms only report performance in younger adults, rendering them of limited utility for cognitive aging research because of well-documented differences in semantic memory and knowledge as a function of age. Specifically, older adults typically outperform younger adults in tasks assessing retrieval of information from the knowledge base. Here we present older adult performance on 421 general knowledge questions across a range of difficulty levels. Cued recall data, including data on the phenomenology of retrieval failures, and multiple-choice data are available. These norms will allow researchers to identify questions that are not likely to be known by older adult participants to examine learning or acquisition processes, or to select questions within a range of marginal accessibility, for example. Comparisons with young adult data from prior databases confirms previous findings of greater knowledge in older adults and indicates there is preservation of knowledge from early adulthood into older adulthood.

Mapping the time course of semantic activation in mediated false memory: Immediate classification, naming, and recognition.

We evaluated the time course of persistent automatic spreading activation from a mediated list of indirect associates (e.g., meow, day, and basement) that all converged upon a non-presented critical item (CI; e.g., black). Mediated lists were related to CIs through non-presented mediators (e.g., cat, night, and bottom). Three speeded tasks were used to evaluate the time course of semantic activation of the CI: a continuous semantic classification task (concrete/abstract decisions), a naming task (reading words aloud), or a recognition test (old/new memory decisions). Test lists were presented immediately following the mediated lists, and CIs were presented in the first, third, or eighth positions. The results revealed that in both the classification and naming tasks, CI priming was greatest in the first test position and declined across the remaining test positions. Importantly, priming was statistically reliable in the late test positions, providing evidence for long-term semantic priming (i.e., across positions on immediate tasks). False recognition, however, was stable across test positions. Collectively, these patterns suggest that spreading-activation processes decline, consistent with implicit spreading activation, and these processes may contribute to long-term false recognition.

Face Validity of Remembering and Knowing: Empirical Consensus and Disagreement Between Participants and Researchers.

Ever since Endel Tulving first distinguished between episodic and semantic memory, the remember/know paradigm has become a standard means of probing the phenomenology of participants' memorial experiences by memory researchers, neuropsychologists, neuroscientists, and others. However, this paradigm has not been without its problems and has been used to capture many different phenomenological experiences, including retrieval from episodic versus semantic memory, recollection versus familiarity, strength of memory traces, and so on. We first conducted a systematic review of its uses across the literature and then examined how memory experts, other cognitive psychology experts, experts in other areas of psychology, and lay participants (Amazon Mechanical Turk workers) define what it means when one says "I remember" and "I know." From coding their open-ended responses using a number of theory-bound dimensions, it seems that lay participants do not see eye to eye with memory experts in terms of associating "I remember" responses with recollection and "I know" responses with familiarity. However, there is general consensus with Tulving's original distinction, linking remembering with memory for events and knowing with semantic memory. Recommendations and implications across fields are discussed.

Reading the news on Twitter: Source and item memory for social media in younger and older adults.

BACKGROUND: Social media content is well-remembered, possibly because of its personal relevance and gossipy nature. It is unclear whether the mnemonic advantage of social media extends to a population less familiar with these platforms and whether knowing the content is from social media sources influences memory. This study examined how the presentation of news-like content in social media affected both item and source memory across two age groups. Younger adults (n = 42) and older adults (n = 32) studied tweets and news headlines that appeared in the format of Twitter posts or CNN headlines - these items were designed to be either congruent (e.g., tweets formatted as Twitter posts) or incongruent (e.g., tweets formatted as CNN headlines). RESULTS: For item memory, both age groups correctly recognized tweets more than headlines. Source identification was more accurate when format and content were congruent than incongruent. Signal detection analyses indicated that the source advantage for congruent items was largely driven by a bias to select the format that matched the content's original source and that this tendency was stronger in older adults. CONCLUSIONS: These results replicate previous literature on the mnemonic advantage of social media content. Although both younger and older adults remembered the content of social media better than the content of news sources, older adults were more sensitive than younger adults to congruency effects in source memory. These findings suggest that older adults rely more on their prior knowledge of conventional language and style in traditional and social media.

The feature boost in false memory: the roles of monitoring and critical item identifiability.

The feature boost refers to increased false memories for word lists that are both associatively and categorically (C + A) related to a non-presented critical item (CI) relative to lists that are only associatively (NC-A) related [Coane, J. H., McBride, D. M., Termonen, M.-L., & Cutting, J. C. (2016). Categorical and associative relations increase false memory relative to purely associative relations. Memory & Cognition, 44(1), 37-49. doi:10.3758/s13421-015-0543-1]. We explored the replicability of the feature boost and its dependance on monitoring processes by explicitly warning participants about the nature of the lists or by asking participants to guess the CI (implicit warning). Overall, the feature boost was replicated. Guessing performance was higher for C + A lists than for NC-A lists. Explicit warnings were equally effective for both list types in reducing false memory relative to recall and to a no-recall math condition. When the CI was not guessed or recalled, the feature boost emerged. However, when the CI was guessed or previously recalled, false alarms did not differ as a function of list type. The feature boost seems to be driven in part by differences in the identifiability of the CI, such that CIs related to C + A lists are harder to identify and thus reject. These results suggest that differences in monitoring processes that are sensitive to CI identifiability contribute to the effect.

Short-term false memories vary as a function of list type.

False memories have primarily been investigated at long-term delays in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure, but a few studies have reported meaning-based false memories at delays as short as 1-4 s. The current study further investigated the processes that contribute to short-term false memories with semantic and phonological lists (Experiment 1) and hybrid lists containing items of each type (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, more false memories were found for phonological than for semantic lists. In Experiment 2, an asymmetrical hyper-additive effect was found such that including one or two phonological associates in pure semantic lists yielded a robust increase in false alarms, whereas including semantic associates in pure phonological lists did not affect false alarms. These results are more consistent with the activation-monitoring account of false memory creation than with fuzzy trace theory that has not typically been referenced when describing phonological false memories.

The benefits of retrieval practice depend on item difficulty and intelligence.

The authors examined whether individual differences in fluid intelligence (gF) modulate the testing effect. Participants studied Swahili-English word pairs and repeatedly studied half the pairs or attempted retrieval, with feedback, for the remaining half. Word pairs were easy or difficult to learn. Overall, participants showed a benefit of testing over restudy. However, almost 1/3 of the sample had a negative testing effect and benefitted more from restudy than testing, as well as performing better overall. These individuals self-reported less use of shallower encoding strategies than positive testing effect participants but did not differ in other dimensions. For individuals with a positive testing effect, difficulty had differential effects on participants who scored high or low on a measure of gF, with high gF participants showing larger testing effects for difficult over easy items, whereas low gF participants showed the opposite. Working memory performance was not related to the magnitude of the testing effect; however, vocabulary knowledge revealed a similar pattern as gF, with higher vocabulary associated with a testing effect for difficult but not easy items. This suggests that the benefit of retrieval practice varies with item difficulty and participant abilities. Thus, recommendations to engage in retrieval practice should take into consideration the interactive effects of to-be-learned materials and individual differences in the learners. (PsycINFO Database Record

Remembering that big things sound big: Sound symbolism and associative memory.

According to sound symbolism theory, individual sounds or clusters of sounds can convey meaning. To examine the role of sound symbolic effects on processing and memory for nonwords, we developed a novel set of 100 nonwords to convey largeness (nonwords containing plosive consonants and back vowels) and smallness (nonwords containing fricative consonants and front vowels). In Experiments 1A and 1B, participants rated the size of the 100 nonwords and provided definitions to them as if they were products. Nonwords composed of fricative/front vowels were rated as smaller than those composed of plosive/back vowels. In Experiment 2, participants studied sound symbolic congruent and incongruent nonword and participant-generated definition pairings. Definitions paired with nonwords that matched the size and participant-generated meanings were recalled better than those that did not match. When the participant-generated definitions were re-paired with other nonwords, this mnemonic advantage was reduced, although still reliable. In a final free association study, the possibility that plosive/back vowel and fricative/front vowel nonwords elicit sound symbolic size effects due to mediation from word neighbors was ruled out. Together, these results suggest that definitions that are sound symbolically congruent with a nonword are more memorable than incongruent definition-nonword pairings. This work has implications for the creation of brand names and how to create brand names that not only convey desired product characteristics, but also are memorable for consumers.

Categorical and associative relations increase false memory relative to purely associative relations.

The goal of the present study was to examine the contributions of associative strength and similarity in terms of shared features to the production of false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott list-learning paradigm. Whereas the activation/monitoring account suggests that false memories are driven by automatic associative activation from list items to nonpresented lures, combined with errors in source monitoring, other accounts (e.g., fuzzy trace theory, global-matching models) emphasize the importance of semantic-level similarity, and thus predict that shared features between list and lure items will increase false memory. Participants studied lists of nine items related to a nonpresented lure. Half of the lists consisted of items that were associated but did not share features with the lure, and the other half included items that were equally associated but also shared features with the lure (in many cases, these were taxonomically related items). The two types of lists were carefully matched in terms of a variety of lexical and semantic factors, and the same lures were used across list types. In two experiments, false recognition of the critical lures was greater following the study of lists that shared features with the critical lure, suggesting that similarity at a categorical or taxonomic level contributes to false memory above and beyond associative strength. We refer to this phenomenon as a "feature boost" that reflects additive effects of shared meaning and association strength and is generally consistent with accounts of false memory that have emphasized thematic or feature-level similarity among studied and nonstudied representations.

The ironic effect of guessing: increased false memory for mediated lists in younger and older adults.

Younger and older adults studied lists of words directly (e.g., creek, water) or indirectly (e.g., beaver, faucet) related to a nonpresented critical lure (CL; e.g., river). Indirect (i.e., mediated) lists presented items that were only related to CLs through nonpresented mediators (i.e., directly related items). Following study, participants completed a condition-specific task, math, a recall test with or without a warning about the CL, or tried to guess the CL. On a final recognition test, warnings (vs. math and recall without warning) decreased false recognition for direct lists, and guessing increased mediated false recognition (an ironic effect of guessing) in both age groups. The observed age-invariance of the ironic effect of guessing suggests that processes involved in mediated false memory are preserved in aging and confirms the effect is largely due to activation in semantic networks during encoding and to the strengthening of these networks during the interpolated tasks.

False memory for idiomatic expressions in younger and older adults: evidence for indirect activation of figurative meanings.

Idiomatic expressions can be interpreted literally or figuratively. These two meanings are often processed in parallel or very rapidly, as evidenced by online measures of idiomatic processing. Because in many cases the figurative meaning cannot be derived from the component lexical elements and because of the speed with which this meaning is accessed, it is assumed such meanings are stored in semantic memory. In the present study, we examined how literal equivalents and intact idiomatic expressions are stored in memory and whether episodic memory traces interact or interfere with semantic-level representations and vice versa. To examine age-invariance, younger and older adults studied lists of idioms and literal equivalents. On a recognition test, some studied items were presented in the alternative form (e.g., if the idiom was studied, its literal equivalent was tested). False alarms to these critical items suggested that studying literal equivalents activates the idiom from which they are derived, presumably due to spreading activation in lexical/semantic networks, and results in high rates of errors. Importantly, however, the converse (false alarms to literal equivalents after studying the idiom) were significantly lower, suggesting an advantage in storage for idioms. The results are consistent with idiom processing models that suggest obligatory access to figurative meanings and that this access can also occur indirectly, through literal equivalents.