Group membership does not modulate automatic imitation.

Individuals have the automatic tendency to imitate each other. A key prediction of different theories explaining automatic imitation is that individuals imitate in-group members more strongly than out-group members. However, the empirical basis for this prediction is rather inconclusive. Only a few experiments have investigated the influence of group membership using classic automatic imitation paradigms and these experiments led to mixed results. To put the group membership prediction to a critical test, we carried out six high-powered experiments (total N = 1538) in which we assessed imitation with the imitation-inhibition task and manipulated group membership in different ways. Evidence across all experiments indicates that group membership does not modulate automatic imitation. Moreover, we do not find support for the idea that feelings of affiliation or perceived similarity moderate the effect of group membership on automatic imitation. These results have important implications for theories explaining automatic imitation and contribute to the current discussion of whether automatic imitation can be socially modulated.

A direct test of the similarity assumption - Focusing on differences as compared with similarities decreases automatic imitation.

Individuals automatically imitate a wide range of different behaviors. Previous research suggests that imitation as a social process depends on the similarity between interaction partners. However, some of the experiments supporting this notion could not be replicated and all of the supporting experiments manipulated not only similarity between actor and observer, but also other features. Thus, the existing evidence leaves open whether similarity as such moderates automatic imitation. To directly test the similarity account, in four experiments, we manipulated participants' focus on similarities or differences while holding the stimulus material constant. In Experiment 1, we presented participants with a hand and let them either focus on similarities, differences, or neutral aspects between their own hand and the other person's hand. The results indicate that focusing on similarities increased perceived similarity between the own and the other person's hand. In Experiments 2 to 4, we tested the hypothesis that focusing on similarities, as compared with differences, increases automatic imitation. Experiment 2 tested the basic effect and found support for our prediction. Experiment 3 and 4 replicated this finding with higher-powered samples. Exploratory investigations further suggest that it is a focus on differences that decreases automatic imitation, and not a focus on similarities that increases automatic imitation. Theoretical implications and future directions are discussed.

Imitation and interindividual differences: Belief in free will is not related to automatic imitation.

It is well known that individuals have the tendency to automatically imitate each other and that such imitative behavior is fostered by perceiving intentions in others' actions. That is, past research has shown that perceiving an action as internally driven enhances the shared representation of observed and executed actions increasing automatic imitation. An interpersonal factor that increases the perception that a behavior is internally driven is belief in free will. Consequently, we hypothesized that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they automatically imitate others. To test this prediction, we conducted two high-powered (total N = 642) and preregistered studies in which we assessed automatic imitation with the imitation-inhibition task. Contrary to our predictions, belief in free will did not correlate with automatic imitation. This finding contributes to current findings challenging the assumption that automatic imitation is modulated by interindividual differences. Further theoretical implications are discussed.

Counterfactual thoughts distinguish benign and malicious envy.

When people encounter others surpassing them in terms of an important quality, possession, or achievement, they often think about what might have happened differently so that they would have obtained a better outcome. Such upward counterfactual thoughts have been shown to contribute to the intensity of envy. We investigated whether specific counterfactual thoughts distinguish different forms of envy, namely benign envy, which entails upward motivation, and malicious envy-which entails hostility. A meta-analysis of 8 studies (1 preregistered, N = 1,264) of a first line of research supports that recalled episodes of benign versus malicious envy are characterized by more additive, self-focused counterfactuals or by more other-focused counterfactuals, respectively. Furthermore, a meta-analysis of 6 studies (1 preregistered, N = 1,299) of a second line of research supports that eliciting these counterfactuals promotes the corresponding form of envy. In line with functional accounts of counterfactual thinking and envy, the results highlight cognitive processes that underlie functionally diverging pathways of envious responding. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Does social psychology persist over half a century? A direct replication of Cialdini et al.'s (1975) classic door-in-the-face technique.

Many failed replications in social psychology have cast doubt on the validity of the field. Most of these replication attempts have focused on findings published from the 1990s on, ignoring a large body of older literature. As some scholars suggest that social psychological findings and theories are limited to a particular time, place, and population, we sought to test whether a classical social psychological finding that was published nearly half a century ago can be successfully replicated in another country on another continent. To this end, we directly replicated Cialdini et al.'s (1975) door-in-the-face (DITF) technique according to which people's likelihood to comply with a target request increases after having turned down a larger request. Thereby, we put the reciprocal concessions theory-the original process explanation of the DITF technique-to a critical test. Overall, compliance rates in our replication were similarly high as those Cialdini et al. (1975) found 45 years ago. That is, participants were more likely to comply with a target request after turning down an extreme request than participants who were exposed to the target request only or to a similarly small request before being exposed to the target request. These findings support the idea that reciprocity norms play a crucial role in DITF strategies. Moreover, the results suggest that at least some social psychological findings can transcend a particular time, place, and population. Further theoretical implications are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Correcting misperceptions of exponential coronavirus growth increases support for social distancing.

The most effective way to stem the spread of a pandemic such as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is social distancing, but the introduction of such measures is hampered by the fact that a sizeable part of the population fails to see their need. Three studies conducted during the mass spreading of the virus in the United States toward the end of March 2020 show that this results partially from people's misperception of the virus's exponential growth in linear terms and that overcoming this bias increases support for social distancing. Study 1 shows that American participants mistakenly perceive the virus's exponential growth in linear terms (conservatives more so than liberals). Studies 2 and 3 show that instructing people to avoid the exponential growth bias significantly increases perceptions of the virus's growth and thereby increases support for social distancing. Together, these results show the importance of statistical literacy to recruit support for fighting pandemics such as the coronavirus.

A Status-Seeking Account of Psychological Entitlement.

We propose that people high in entitlement are characterized by motivation to attain status. Five studies (total N = 2,372) support that entitlement promotes motivation to seek status. This motivation, in turn, relates to affective processes when facing upward comparisons and contributes to status attainment. Specifically, entitlement fostered prestige and dominance motivation. These, in turn, predicted greater benign and malicious envy, respectively, when encountering high-status others. The indirect effects occurred when entitlement was measured (Studies 1A and 1B) and manipulated (Studies 2A and 2B). Finally, entitlement related to status attainment, yet not always in line with more entitled people's motivation. Although they ascribed themselves both more prestige and dominance, others ascribed them only more dominance, yet less prestige (Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C). These findings suggest that a status-seeking account offers important insights into the complexities of entitled behavior and its social consequences.

The painful duality of envy: Evidence for an integrative theory and a meta-analysis on the relation of envy and schadenfreude.

Despite envy's importance as a driver of social behavior, scholars disagree on its conceptualization. We review the literature and distinguish three incongruent theories: (a) Malicious Envy Theory (i.e., envy as uniform and malicious), (b) Dual Envy Theory (i.e., envy as taking on 2 forms, benign and malicious), and (c) Pain Theory of Envy (i.e., envy as uniform and driven by pain). Moreover, within and across theories, operationalizations of envy have included various different components. We integrate these conceptualizations using a data-driven approach, deriving a comprehensive theory of envy in 5 studies (total N = 1,237)-the Pain-driven Dual Envy (PaDE) Theory. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of an exhaustive set of envy components (Studies 1-4) suggest that envy consists of 3 factors: Pain (i.e., preoccupation with the envy-eliciting situation, inferiority), predicts both benign envy (i.e., desire for the envy object, improvement motivation, emulation of the other), and malicious envy (i.e., communication about the other, directed aggression, nondirected aggression). An experience-sampling study (Study 5) suggests that pain constitutes a quickly fading reaction, whereas benign and malicious envy are enduring attitudinal constructs. We apply this theory in a meta-analysis on the controversial relation of envy and schadenfreude (N = 4,366), finding that envy and schadenfreude are more strongly and positively correlated to the extent that the respective research operationalizes envy as malicious, compared with as pain or benign envy. We discuss how the PaDE Theory can illuminate research on envy in diverse settings, and envy's relation to other distinct emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record

Elucidating the Dark Side of Envy: Distinctive Links of Benign and Malicious Envy With Dark Personalities.

Researchers have recently drawn a contrast between two forms of envy: benign and malicious envy. In three studies (total N = 3,123), we challenge the assumption that malicious envy is destructive, whereas benign envy is entirely constructive. Instead, both forms have links with the Dark Triad of personality. Benign envy is associated with Machiavellian behaviors, whereas malicious envy is associated with both Machiavellian and psychopathic behaviors. In Study 1, this pattern emerged from meta-analyzed trait correlations. In Study 2, a manipulation affecting the envy forms mediated an effect on antisocial behavioral intentions. Study 3 replicated these patterns by linking envy to specific antisocial behaviors and their impact on status in the workplace. Together, our correlational and experimental results suggest that the two forms of envy can both be malevolent. Instead of evaluating envy's morality, we propose to focus on its functional value.

The tango of two deadly sins: The social-functional relation of envy and pride.

Envy stems from a social comparison with a superior standard. Its 2 distinct forms are directed at changing this situation in different ways, either by becoming as successful as the envied person (in benign envy) or by lowering the envied person's advantage (in malicious envy). In essence, envy is thus a social phenomenon. Nevertheless, most previous research has focused on its underlying intrapersonal processes, overlooking envy's interpersonal core. In contrast, we show in 6 studies (N = 1,513) that envy and pride are intertwined in a social-functional relationship. Envy and pride often co-occur (Study 1) and pride displays enhance envious feelings (Studies 2 and 3). Specifically, authentic (success attributed to effort) and hubristic pride (success attributed to talent) modulate envious intentions and behavior toward their benign and malicious form (Study 2 to 6). This effect is mediated via liking, perceived prestige, and perceived dominance (Study 4). In accordance with a social-functional approach, the effects emerge only when authentic and hubristic pride are expressed by the superior person and not when the respective information about the superior person's feelings is simply available in the environment (Study 5). These effects are present when participants recall envy situations (Study 1), when they imagine being in a competitive situation (Studies 3, 4, and 5), or when envy is elicited in situ (Studies 2 and 6). Our findings show the value of studying envy as a social phenomenon and open up numerous avenues for research on envy at the interpersonal and intergroup level.

Dispositional envy revisited: unraveling the motivational dynamics of benign and malicious envy.

Previous research has conceptualized dispositional envy as a unitary construct. Recently however, episodic envy has been shown to emerge in two qualitatively different forms. Benign envy is related to the motivation to move upward, whereas malicious envy is related to pulling superior others down. In four studies (N = 1,094)--using the newly developed Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS)--we show that dispositional envy is also characterized by two independent dimensions related to distinct motivational dynamics and behavioral consequences. Dispositional benign and malicious envy uniquely predict envious responding following upward social comparisons. Furthermore, they are differentially connected to hope for success and fear of failure. Corresponding to these links, dispositional benign envy predicted faster race performance of marathon runners mediated via higher goal setting. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy predicted race goal disengagement. The findings highlight that disentangling the two sides of envy opens up numerous research avenues.

When people want what others have: the impulsive side of envious desire.

Envy is the unpleasant emotion that can arise when people are exposed to others with superior possessions. Common wisdom and scholarly opinion suggest that when people experience envy they may be motivated to obtain the others' superior possession. Despite the vast interpersonal, societal, and economical consequences attributed to this potential aspect of envious responding, experimental demonstrations of the affective and behavioral consequences of envy-inducing situations are scarce. We propose that social comparisons with better-off others trigger an impulsive envious response that entails a behavioral tendency to strive for their superior good. However, given that the experience of envy is painful, self-threatening, and met with social disapproval, people typically attempt to control their envious reactions. Doing so requires self-control capacities, so that envious reactions may only become apparent if self-control is taxed. In line with these predictions, four experiments show that only when self-control resources are taxed, upward comparisons elicit envy paired with an increased willingness to pay for, to spontaneously purchase and to impulsively approach the superior good.