Bringing thought experiments back into the philosophy of science.

To a large extent, the evidential base of claims in the philosophy of science has switched from thought experiments to case studies. We argue that abandoning thought experiments was a wrong turn, since they can effectively complement case studies. We make our argument via an analogy with the relationship between experiments and observations within science. Just as experiments and observations can together evidence claims in science, each mitigating the downsides of the other, so too can thought experiments and case studies be mutually supporting. After presenting the main argument, we look at potential concerns about thought experiments, suggesting that a judiciously applied mixed-methods approach can overcome them.

Not by signalling alone: Music's mosaicism undermines the search for a proper function.

Mehr et al. seek to explain music's evolution in terms of a unitary proper function - signalling cooperative intent - which they cash out in two guises, coalition signalling and (allo)parental attention signalling. Although we recognize the role signalling almost certainly played in the evolution of music, we reject "ultimate" causal explanations which focus on a unidirectional, narrow range of causal factors.

An agent-based model clarifies the importance of functional and developmental integration in shaping brain evolution.

BACKGROUND: Vertebrate brain structure is characterised not only by relative consistency in scaling between components, but also by many examples of divergence from these general trends.. Alternative hypotheses explain these patterns by emphasising either 'external' processes, such as coordinated or divergent selection, or 'internal' processes, like developmental coupling among brain regions. Although these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, there is little agreement over their relative importance across time or how that importance may vary across evolutionary contexts. RESULTS: We introduce an agent-based model to simulate brain evolution in a 'bare-bones' system and examine dependencies between variables shaping brain evolution. We show that 'concerted' patterns of brain evolution do not, in themselves, provide evidence for developmental coupling, despite these terms often being treated as synonymous in the literature. Instead, concerted evolution can reflect either functional or developmental integration. Our model further allows us to clarify conditions under which such developmental coupling, or uncoupling, is potentially adaptive, revealing support for the maintenance of both mechanisms in neural evolution. Critically, we illustrate how the probability of deviation from concerted evolution depends on the cost/benefit ratio of neural tissue, which increases when overall brain size is itself under constraint. CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that both developmentally coupled and uncoupled brain architectures can provide adaptive mechanisms, depending on the distribution of selection across brain structures, life history and costs of neural tissue. However, when constraints also act on overall brain size, heterogeneity in selection across brain structures will favour region specific, or mosaic, evolution. Regardless, the respective advantages of developmentally coupled and uncoupled brain architectures mean that both may persist in fluctuating environments. This implies that developmental coupling is unlikely to be a persistent constraint, but could evolve as an adaptive outcome to selection to maintain functional integration.

Creativity, conservativeness & the social epistemology of science.

The special issue Creativity, Conservatism & the Social Epistemology of Science collects six papers which, in different ways, tackle 'promotion questions' concerning scientific communities: which features shape those communities, and which might be changed to promote the kinds of epistemic features we desire. In this introduction, I connect these discussions with more traditional debate in the philosophy of science and reflect upon the notions of creativity which underwrite the papers.

Existential risk, creativity & well-adapted science.

Existential risks, particularly those arising from emerging technologies, are a complex, obstinate challenge for scientific study. This should motivate studying how the relevant scientific communities might be made more amenable to studying such risks. I offer an account of scientific creativity suitable for thinking about scientific communities, and provide reasons for thinking contemporary science doesn't incentivise creativity in this specified sense. I'll argue that a successful science of existential risk will be creative in my sense. So, if we want to make progress on those questions we should consider how to shift scientific incentives to encourage creativity. The analysis also has lessons for philosophical approaches to understanding the social structure of science. I introduce the notion of a 'well-adapted' science: one in which the incentive structure is tailored to the epistemic situation at hand.

Simplicity, one-shot hypotheses and paleobiological explanation.

Paleobiologists (and other historical scientists) often provide simple narratives to explain complex, contingent episodes. These narratives are sometimes 'one-shot hypotheses' which are treated as being mutually exclusive with other possible explanations of the target episode, and are thus extended to accommodate as much about the episode as possible. I argue that a provisional preference for such hypotheses provides two kinds of productive scaffolding. First, they generate 'hypothetical difference-makers': one-shot hypotheses highlight and isolate empirically tractable dependencies between variables. Second, investigations of hypothetical difference-makers provision explanatory resources, the 'raw materials' for constructing more complex-and likely more adequate-explanations. Provisional preferences for simple, one-shot hypotheses in historical science, then, is defeasibly justified on indirect-strategic-grounds. My argument is made in reference to recent developments regarding the K-Pg extinction.

Recent developments in scholarly publishing to improve research practices in the life sciences.

We outline recent developments in scholarly publishing that we think will improve the working environment and career prospects for life scientists. Most prominently, we discuss two key developments. (1) Life scientists are now embracing a preprint culture leading to rapid dissemination of research findings. (2) We outline steps to overcome the reproducibility crisis. We also briefly describe other innovations in scholarly publishing, along with changes to open access mandates from funding agencies.

In defence of story-telling.

We argue that narratives are central to the success of historical reconstruction. Narrative explanation involves tracing causal trajectories across time. The construction of narrative, then, often involves postulating relatively speculative causal connections between comparatively well-established events. But speculation is not always idle or harmful: it also aids in overcoming local underdetermination by forming scaffolds from which new evidence becomes relevant. Moreover, as our understanding of the past's causal milieus become richer, the constraints on narrative plausibility become increasingly strict: a narrative's admissibility does not turn on mere logical consistency with background data. Finally, narrative explanation and explanation generated by simple, formal models complement one another. Where models often achieve isolation and precision at the cost of simplification and abstraction, narratives can track complex changes in a trajectory over time at the cost of simplicity and precision. In combination both allow us to understand and explain highly complex historical sequences.

Ethnographic analogy, the comparative method, and archaeological special pleading.

Ethnographic analogy, the use of comparative data from anthropology to inform reconstructions of past human societies, has a troubled history. Archaeologists often express concern about, or outright reject, the practice--and sometimes do so in problematically general terms. This is odd, as (or so I argue) the use of comparative data in archaeology is the same pattern of reasoning as the 'comparative method' in biology, which is a well-developed and robust set of inferences which play a central role in discovering the biological past. In pointing out this continuity, I argue that there is no 'special pleading' on the part of archaeologists in this regard: biologists must overcome analogous epistemic difficulties in their use of comparative data. I then go on to emphasize the local, empirically tractable ways in which particular ethnographic analogies may be licensed.