Authorship and justice: Credit and responsibility.

According to the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE), those who make significant intellectual contributions to a research project, and accept indirect responsibility for the entirety of the work should be listed as authors. All other contributors should be merely acknowledged. I argue that the ICMJE policy is unjust by consequentialist, deontological, and common sense standards. Because different sorts of contributions are incommensurable, ranking contributions is usually impossible. In particular, privileging intellectual contributions, and banishing non-intellectual contributions (e.g. funding, administration, routine data collection) to the Acknowledgments section is unfair to non-intellectual contributors. Holding contributors responsible for the errors or misconduct of others is also unjust. Contributors should be blamed (and sometimes punished) for all and only their own errors or misconduct. Their punishment should be proportional to the harm done; their blame to the ease with which their errors and misconduct could have been avoided. The ICMJE policy goes wrong by using the outdated, overly constraining practice of authorship as a vehicle for allocation of credit and responsibility. My alternative policy would replace the author byline and Acknowledgment sections of articles with Contributors pages listing all contributors to the research project, along with descriptions of their contributions.

The Three Rs of Animal Research: What they Mean for the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and Why.

The Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) is entrusted with assessing the ethics of proposed projects prior to approval of animal research. The role of the IACUC is detailed in legislation and binding rules, which are in turn inspired by the Three Rs: the principles of Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement. However, these principles are poorly defined. Although this provides the IACUC leeway in assessing a proposed project, it also affords little guidance. Our goal is to provide procedural and philosophical clarity to the IACUC without mandating a particular outcome. To do this, we analyze the underlying logic of the Three Rs and conclude that the Three Rs accord animals moral standing, though not necessarily "rights" in the philosophical sense. We suggest that the Rs are hierarchical, such that Replacement, which can totally eliminate harm, should be considered prior to Reduction, which decreases the number of animals harmed, with Refinement being considered last. We also identify the need for a hitherto implicit fourth R: Reject, which allows the IACUC to refuse permission for a project which does not promise sufficient benefit to offset the pain and distress likely to be caused by the proposed research.

Patients who make terrible therapeutic choices.

The traditional approaches to dental ethics include appeals to principles, duties (deontology), and consequences (utilitarianism). These approaches are often inadequate when faced with the case of a patient who refuses reasonable treatment and does not share the same ethical framework the dentist is using. An approach based on virtue ethics may be helpful in this and other cases. Virtue ethics is a tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle. It depends on forming a holistic character supporting general appropriate behavior. By correctly diagnosing the real issues at stake in a patient's inappropriate oral health choices and working to build effective habits, dentists can sometimes respond to ethical challenges that remain intractable given rule-based methods.

The ethics of wildlife research: a nine R theory.

The commonsense ethical constraints on laboratory animal research known as the three Rs are widely accepted, but no constraints tailored to research on animals in the wild are available. In this article, we begin to fill that gap. We sketch a set of commonsense ethical constraints on ecosystem research parallel to the constraints that govern laboratory animal research. Then we combine the animal and ecosystem constraints into a single theory to govern research on animals in the wild.

Managing conflict of interest in research: some suggestions for investigators.

Conflict of interest situations threaten to compromise objectivity and tempt researchers to act wrongly. Allowing oneself to drift into such situations without appropriate preparation is negligence which is, itself, a sort of wrongdoing. Since conflict of interest is unlikely to be eliminated or tamed by the professional--and institutional--level safeguards currently under discussion, individual researchers must make their own preparations. We offer individuals ten strategies for managing their own conflicts of interest.

Withdrawal of life-support: four problems in medical ethics.

... In this paper I shall consider the following four beliefs which often cluster together: A) Passive euthanasia is justifiable, but "pulling the plug" and active euthanasia are wrong; B) There is no right to health care. We have no duty to provide free riders with health care; C) Abortion is immoral because it violates the right to life of the fetus; D) Justice sometimes requires us to increase a patient's risk of death by shifting a scarce resource to someone who needs it more. For the sake of concreteness I shall attribute these beliefs along with certain, often invoked rationales to a purely imaginary person named Ron. I shall not show that the individual beliefs are right or wrong or that the individual rationales are strong or weak. Instead, I shall show that Ron cannot consistently use these four rationales to justify these four beliefs. More precisely, I shall show that beliefs (A) through (D) together with certain common, general background beliefs involve incompatible views about the withdrawal of life-support. My objective is to make the incompatibility explicit and thus to persuade people like Ron to abandon some of their beliefs.