How the environment evokes actions that lead to different goals: the role of object multi-functionality in pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer.

Research shows that stimuli in the environment can trigger behavior via the activation of goal representations. This process can be tested in the Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) paradigm, where stimuli can only affect behavior through the activation of the representation of its desired outcome (i.e., the PIT effect). Previous research has demonstrated that the PIT effect is stronger when the goal is more desirable. While this research only looked at actions that have single outcomes (e.g., obtaining a snack to satisfy appetite), in the present paper, we reason that actions that are instrumental in obtaining outcomes that are desirable in multiple ways (e.g., obtaining a snack to satisfy one's appetite, giving it to a friend, trading it for money) should produce stronger PIT effects. In two experiments, participants learned to perform left and right key presses to earn a snack, either framed as having a single function or multiple functions. Participants also learned to associate the two differently framed snacks with two cues. In a PIT test, they were required to press the keys as fast as possible upon exposure to the cues (i.e., the PIT effect). We found that cues associated with the multi-functional snack facilitated the actions that earned those snacks before, while cues associated with the single-functional snack did not facilitate such actions. We discuss these findings in the context of research on free choice and personal autonomy and how people appreciate the multi-functional nature of their goal-directed behavior in the environment. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04612-2.

Environmental control of social goals: using Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer to test cue-based pro-self and pro-social outcome responses.

A large amount of literature demonstrates that social behaviour can be triggered by environmental cues. A long-standing debate involves the question of whether such stimuli trigger behaviour directly (i.e. habits) or whether these effects mediate goals. As studies on automatic goal pursuit typically use real-world cues that are already associated with the behaviour and potentially the goal, it is impossible to make strong claims about the nature of the effects. In the present paper, we use a paradigm inspired by the Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) literature to examine how the environment can trigger goal-directed behaviour. Building on the essence of pro-self and pro-social motives in humans, two experiments explored the PIT effect when the outcomes were framed in terms of self- versus other-interest. Participants performed actions to earn money for themselves or a charity. Each outcome was linked to a different cue. The results showed that a cue predictive of self-interest outcomes facilitated responses instrumental in gaining the outcome, while such specific PIT effect for other-interest outcomes only emerged when participants were free to donate the money. We briefly discuss these findings reflecting on whether the PIT effect in our paradigm is indeed sensitive to the value of social goals.

Examining mechanistic explanations for ideomotor effects.

Ideomotor (IM) theory provides a popular mechanistic account for understanding how goal-directed action can be learned and instigated. That is, when associations between actions and outcomes have been established in memory, the perception or thought of the outcome could automatically activate the associated action. Whereas a sizable literature provides evidence in line with this account, it does not successfully exclude alternative explanations in terms of propositions based on causal inferences. In the present paper, we present an online IM paradigm, in which learning and testing occurs on the same trials. In line with recent findings, we demonstrate that IM effects can emerge within a couple of trials, but also that people can update learned action-outcome associations immediately when a new mapping of outcomes on actions is introduced, without any switch costs. Together, this suggests that IM effects may be driven by propositions about causal relations, rather than bidirectional associations stored in memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Sustained and Transient Processes in Event-based Prospective Memory in Adolescence and Adulthood.

Prospective memory (PM) refers to the cognitive processes associated with remembering to perform an intended action after a delay. Varying the salience of PM cues while keeping the intended response constant, we investigated the extent to which participants relied on strategic monitoring, through sustained, top-down control, or on spontaneous retrieval via transient bottom-up processes. There is mixed evidence regarding developmental improvements in event-based PM performance after the age of 13 years. We compared PM performance and associated sustained and transient neural correlates in 28 typically developing adolescents (12-17 years old) and 19 adults (23-30 years old). Lower PM cue salience associated with slower ongoing task (OT) RTs, reflected by increased µ ex-Gaussian parameter, and sustained increases in frontoparietal activation during OT blocks, both thought to reflect greater proactive control supporting cue monitoring. Behavioral and neural correlates of PM trials were not specifically modulated by cue salience, revealing little difference in reactive control between conditions. The effect of cue salience was similar across age groups, suggesting that adolescents are able to adapt proactive control engagement to PM task demands. Exploratory analyses showed that younger, but not older, adolescents were less accurate and slower in PM trials relative to OT trials than adults and showed greater transient activation in PM trials in an occipito-temporal cluster. These results provide evidence of both mature and still maturing aspects of cognitive processes associated with implementation of an intention after a delay during early adolescence.

Biased preferences through exploitation: How initial biases are consolidated in reward-rich environments.

In the current article, we test the prediction that an initial bias favoring 1 of 2 equally rewarding options-either based on a genuine contingency or a pseudocontingency in a small sample of initial observations-can survive over an extended period of further sampling from both options, when the reward structure fosters exploitation. Specifically, we argue and demonstrate that in reward-rich environments where two options predominantly-but equally frequently-yield positive outcomes, the initial bias should be upheld because exploitation of the allegedly superior option reinforces the biased preference. In contrast, in reward-impoverished environments, where both options yield predominantly negative outcomes, initial biases can be expected to be eradicated through exploration, which increases the chance of recognizing the equality of the initially nonpreferred option. In 3 experiments, initial evidence in a guided-sampling phase was set up for participants to perceive an actual contingency (Experiment 1) or infer a pseudocontingency (Experiment 2a and b) that made 1 option look more rewarding. In a subsequent free-sampling phase this led to a sustained bias toward this option when the environment contained mostly positive but not when it contained mostly negative outcomes. We argue that biased sampling in reward-rich environments could be responsible for false beliefs about the outcomes of behavioral options, and as such could be relevant to a broad range of topics including social interactions or health contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Ideomotor Action: Evidence for Automaticity in Learning, but Not Execution.

Human habits are widely assumed to result from stimulus-response (S-R) associations that are formed if one frequently and consistently does the same thing in the same situation. According to Ideomotor Theory, a distinct but similar process could lead to response-outcome (R-O) associations if responses frequently and consistently produce the same outcomes. This process is assumed to occur spontaneously, and because these associations can operate in a bidirectional manner, merely perceiving or thinking of an outcome should automatically activate the associated action. In the current paper we test this automaticity feature of ideomotor learning. In four experiments, participants completed the same learning phase in which they could acquire associations, and were either explicitly informed about the contingency between actions and outcomes, or not. Automatic action selection and initiation were investigated using a free-choice task in Experiment 1 and forced-choice tasks in Experiment 2, 3a, and 3b. An ideomotor effect was only obtained in the free-choice, but not convincingly in the forced-choice tasks. Together, this suggests that action-outcome relations can be learned spontaneously, but that there may be limits to the automaticity of the ideomotor effect.

The Differential Impact of a Response's Effectiveness and its Monetary Value on Response-Selection.

While known reinforcers of behavior are outcomes that are valuable to the organism, recent research has demonstrated that the mere occurrence of an own-response effect can also reinforce responding. In this paper we begin investigating whether these two types of reinforcement occur via the same mechanism. To this end, we modified two different tasks, previously established to capture the influence of a response's effectiveness on the speed of motor-responses (indexed here by participants' reaction times). Specifically, in six experiments we manipulated both a response's 'pure' effectiveness and its outcome value (e.g., substantial versus negligible monetary reward) and measured the influence of both on the speed of responding. The findings strongly suggest that post action selection, responding is influenced only by pure effectiveness, as assessed by the motor system; thus, at these stages responding is not sensitive to abstract representations of the value of a response (e.g., monetary value). We discuss the benefit of distinguishing between these two necessary aspects of adaptive behavior namely, fine-tuning of motor-control and striving for desired outcomes. Finally, we embed the findings in the recently proposed Control-based response selection (CBRS) framework and elaborate on its potential for understanding motor-learning processes in developing infants.

False prophets and Cassandra's curse: The role of credibility in belief updating.

Information from other sources can be beneficial or detrimental, depending on the veracity of the report. Along with prior beliefs and context, recipients have two main routes to determine veracity; the perceived credibility of the source and direct-evaluation via first-hand evidence, i.e. testing the advice against observation. Using a probabilistic learning paradigm, we look at the interplay of these two factors in the uptake (or rejection) of communicated beliefs, and the subsequent evaluation of the credibility of the communicator in light of this process. Whether the communicated belief is false (Experiment 1), or true (Experiment 2), we show that beliefs are interpreted in light of the perceived credibility of the source, such that beliefs from high trust sources are taken up (hypothesis 1), whilst beliefs from low trust sources are treated with suspicion and potentially rejected - dependent on early evidence experiences (hypothesis 2). Finally, we show that these credibility-led biased interpretations of evidence (whether belief or suspicion confirming) lead to further polarization of the perceived credibility of communicators (hypothesis 3). Crucially, this occurs irrespective of the veracity of the communication, such that sources accompanied by a high trust cue not only get away with communicating falsehoods, but see their perceived credibility increase, whilst sources accompanied by low trust cues not only have truthful communications rejected, but have their low trust penalized even further. These findings carry important implications for the consequences of artificially inflating or deflating the credibility of communicators (e.g., politicians or scientists in public debate).

Rewards Enhance Proactive and Reactive Control in Adolescence and Adulthood.

Cognitive control allows the coordination of cognitive processes to achieve goals. Control may be sustained in anticipation of goal-relevant cues (proactive control) or transient in response to the cues themselves (reactive control). Adolescents typically exhibit a more reactive pattern than adults in the absence of incentives. We investigated how reward modulates cognitive control engagement in a letter-array working memory (WM) task in 30 adolescents (12-17 years) and 20 adults (23-30 years) using a mixed block- and event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging design. After a Baseline run without rewards, participants performed a Reward run where 50% trials were monetarily rewarded. Accuracy and reaction time (RT) differences between Reward and Baseline runs indicated engagement of proactive control, which was associated with increased sustained activity in the bilateral anterior insula (AI), right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and right posterior parietal cortex (PPC). RT differences between Reward and No reward trials of the Reward run suggested additional reactive engagement of cognitive control, accompanied with transient activation in bilateral AI, lateral PFC, PPC, supplementary motor area, anterior cingulate cortex, putamen and caudate. Despite behavioural and neural differences during Baseline WM task performance, adolescents and adults showed similar modulations of proactive and reactive control by reward.

Moving Forward: On the Limits of Motor-Based Forward Models.

The human ability to anticipate the consequences that result from action is an essential building block for cognitive, emotional, and social functioning. A dominant view is that this faculty is based on motor predictions, in which a forward model uses a copy of the motor command to predict imminent sensory action-consequences. Although this account was originally conceived to explain the processing of action-outcomes that are tightly coupled to bodily movements, it has been increasingly extrapolated to effects beyond the body. Here, we critically evaluate this generalization and argue that, although there is ample evidence for the role of predictions in the processing of environment-related action-outcomes, there is hitherto little reason to assume that these predictions result from motor-based forward models.

The Role of Intentional Strength in Shaping the Sense of Agency.

Awareness of action is a pervasive personal experience that is crucial in understanding self-generated and other-generated actions as well as their effects. A large body of research suggests that action awareness, as measured by the magnitude of temporal binding between an action and its effect in an operant action task (i.e., intentional binding), is rooted in the human capacity to experience self-agency and establish action intentions. Whereas previous research mainly addressed the role of intentionality itself in these socially well-shared experiences, in the present study we focused specifically on one important aspect of it: the quality or strength of action intentions. We expected and established that stronger intentions increase intentional binding. Specifically, the magnitude of the binding effect, as assessed by the Libet clock task in which two actions were followed by the same neutral tone, was elevated for the action that was enacted with stronger intentions. We briefly discuss the implications of the observed role of intentional strength in temporal binding between action and effect, for promoting a better understanding and examination of how the concept of intentionality is associated with action awareness in general, and the experience of being the agent of one's own actions in particular.

Perception of action-outcomes is shaped by life-long and contextual expectations.

The way humans perceive the outcomes of their actions is strongly colored by their expectations. These expectations can develop over different timescales and are not always complementary. The present work examines how long-term (structural) expectations - developed over a lifetime - and short-term (contextual) expectations jointly affect perception. In two studies, including a pre-registered replication, participants initiated the movement of an ambiguously rotating sphere by operating a rotary switch. In the absence of any learning, participants predominantly perceived the sphere to rotate in the same direction as their rotary action. This bias toward structural expectations was abolished (but not reversed) when participants were exposed to incompatible action-effect contingencies (e.g., clockwise actions causing counterclockwise percepts) during a preceding learning phase. Exposure to compatible action-effect contingencies, however, did not add to the existing structural bias. Together, these findings reveal that perception of action-outcomes results from the combined influence of both long-term and immediate expectations.

Exploring the role of motor and non-motor predictive mechanisms in sensory attenuation: Perceptual and neurophysiological findings.

Sounds that result from our own actions are perceptually and neurophysiologically attenuated compared to sounds with an external origin. This sensory attenuation phenomenon is commonly attributed to prediction processes implicated in motor control. However, accumulating evidence suggests that attenuation effects can also result from prediction processes beyond the motor domain. The aim of the present study was two-fold. First, we attempted to replicate the role of identity-specific motor predictions in sensory attenuation. Second, we set out to examine whether attenuation effects can be observed when tones cannot be predicted from preceding actions, but only from the non-motor cues accompanying them. Participants completed a two-alternative forced choice task on the loudness of tones whose pitch was congruent or incongruent with previously learned key-tone or cue-tone associations. No convincing evidence was observed for identity predictions on a perceptual level nor on a neurophysiological level. However, exploratory analyses revealed that attenuation was more pronounced for participants who first learned to rely on motor (instead of non-motor predictions). Together, these findings suggest that the role of motor identity predictions in sensory attenuation might have to be reconsidered.

The influence of action-effect anticipation on bistable perception: differences between onset rivalry and ambiguous motion.

Perception is strongly shaped by the actions we perform. According to the theory of event coding, and forward models of motor control, goal-directed action preparation activates representations of desired effects. These expectations about the precise stimulus identity of one's action-outcomes (i.e. identity predictions) are thought to selectively influence perceptual processing of action-contingent effects. However, the existing evidence for such identity-prediction effects is scarce and mixed. Here, we developed a new paradigm to capture such effects and examined whether action-outcome predictions can bias the perception of binocular onset rivalry (Experiments 1a and 1b) and bistable motion (Experiment 2). Participants performed learning tasks in which they were exposed to action-outcome associations. On test trials, actions were followed by bistable stimuli that could be perceived as being either congruent or incongruent with the aforementioned associations (i.e. rivalrous oriented gratings in Experiments 1a and 1b and spheres with ambiguous rotation directions in Experiment 2). Across three experiments, we show that, whilst exposure to action-effect associations can bias the apparent motion direction of ambiguous spheres, it fails to influence perceptual selection of grating orientations in binocular onset rivalry. This pattern of results extends previous work on ambiguous motion by demonstrating that action-induced modulations do not generalize to all types of bistable percepts.

Communicated beliefs about action-outcomes: The role of initial confirmation in the adoption and maintenance of unsupported beliefs.

As agents seeking to learn how to successfully navigate their environments, humans can both obtain knowledge through direct experience, and second-hand through communicated beliefs. Questions remain concerning how communicated belief (or instruction) interacts with first-hand evidence integration, and how the former can bias the latter. Previous research has revealed that people are more inclined to seek out confirming evidence when they are motivated to uphold the belief, resulting in confirmation bias. The current research explores whether merely communicated beliefs affect evidence integration over time when it is not of interest to uphold the belief, and all evidence is readily available. In a novel series of on-line experiments, participants chose on each trial which of two options to play for money, being exposed to outcomes of both. Prior to this, they were exposed to favourable communicated beliefs regarding one of two options. Beliefs were either initially supported or undermined by subsequent probabilistic evidence (probabilities reversed halfway through the task, rendering the options equally profitable overall). Results showed that while communicated beliefs predicted initial choices, they only biased subsequent choices when supported by initial evidence in the first phase of the experiment. Findings were replicated across contexts, evidence sequence lengths, and probabilistic distributions. This suggests that merely communicated beliefs can prevail even when not supported by long run evidence, and in the absence of a motivation to uphold them. The implications of the interaction between communicated beliefs and initial evidence for areas including instruction effects, impression formation, and placebo effects are discussed.

Influence of positive subliminal and supraliminal affective cues on goal pursuit in schizophrenia.

Goal pursuit is known to be impaired in schizophrenia, but nothing much is known in these patients about unconscious affective processes underlying goal pursuit. Evidence suggests that in healthy individuals positive subliminal cues are taken as a signal that goal pursuit is easy and therefore reduce the effort that is mobilized for goal attainment. Patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls were instructed that a long run of successive correct responses in a visual attention task would entitle them to a reward (the goal to attain). Affective pictures were displayed supraliminally or subliminally during each run and electrophysiological activity was recorded. Patients self-assessed the emotional content of the pictures correctly. However, differences between patients and controls emerged during the goal pursuit task. Healthy controls mobilized less effort for the positive than the neutral subliminal pictures, as suggested by increased error rates and the weaker contingent negative variation (CNV). For the patients, no influence of positive subliminal pictures was found on performance and on the CNV. Similarly the influence of positive pictures was absent or abnormal on components which are usually impaired in patients (fronto-central P2 and N2). In contrast, positive pictures influenced normally the parieto-occipital N2, related to a component of visual attention which has been proposed to be preserved in schizophrenia. The present study indicates the difficulties of patients to modulate effort mobilization during goal pursuit in the presence of positive subliminal cues. The results question the role of cognitive deficits on affective influences.

Effort responses to suboptimal reward cues are related to striatal dopaminergic functioning.

Reward cues have been found to increase the investment of effort in tasks even when cues are presented suboptimally (i.e. very briefly), making them hard to consciously detect. Such effort responses to suboptimal reward cues are assumed to rely mainly on the mesolimbic dopamine system, including the ventral striatum. To provide further support for this assumption, we performed two studies investigating whether these effort responses vary with individual differences in markers of striatal dopaminergic functioning. Study 1 investigated the relation between physical effort responses and resting state eye-blink rate. Study 2 examined cognitive effort responses in relation to individually averaged error-related negativity. In both studies effort responses correlated with the markers only for suboptimal, but not for optimal reward cues. These findings provide further support for the idea that effort responses to suboptimal reward cues are mainly linked to the mesolimbic dopamine system, while responses to optimal reward cues also depend on higher-level cortical functions.

Distinct neural responses to conscious versus unconscious monetary reward cues.

Human reward pursuit is often assumed to involve conscious processing of reward information. However, recent research revealed that reward cues enhance cognitive performance even when perceived without awareness. Building on this discovery, the present functional MRI study tested two hypotheses using a rewarded mental-rotation task. First, we examined whether subliminal rewards engage the ventral striatum (VS), an area implicated in reward anticipation. Second, we examined differences in neural responses to supraliminal versus subliminal rewards. Results indicated that supraliminal, but not subliminal, high-value reward cues engaged brain areas involved in reward processing (VS) and task performance (supplementary motor area, motor cortex, and superior temporal gyrus). This pattern of findings is striking given that subliminal rewards improved performance to the same extent as supraliminal rewards. So, the neural substrates of conscious versus unconscious reward pursuit are vastly different-but despite their differences, conscious and unconscious reward pursuit may still produce the same behavioral outcomes.

Mechanisms of motivation-cognition interaction: challenges and opportunities.

Recent years have seen a rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation-cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The present issue of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation-cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas, in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming toward a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed toward them.

A new perspective on human reward research: how consciously and unconsciously perceived reward information influences performance.

The question of how human performance can be improved through rewards is a recurrent topic of interest in psychology and neuroscience. Traditional, cognitive approaches to this topic have focused solely on consciously communicated rewards. Recently, a largely neuroscience-inspired perspective has emerged to examine the potential role of conscious awareness of reward information in effective reward pursuit. The present article reviews research employing a newly developed monetary-reward-priming paradigm that allows for a systematic investigation of this perspective. We analyze this research to identify similarities and differences in how consciously and unconsciously perceived rewards impact three distinct aspects relevant to performance: decision making, task preparation, and task execution. We further discuss whether conscious awareness, in modulating the effects of reward information, plays a role similar to its role in modulating the effects of other affective information. Implications of these insights for understanding the role of consciousness in modulating goal-directed behavior more generally are discussed.