Stimulus recognition and the mere exposure effect.

A meta-analysis of research on Zajonc's (1968) mere exposure effect indicated that stimuli perceived without awareness produce substantially larger exposure effects than do stimuli that are consciously perceived (Bornstein, 1989a). However, this finding has not been tested directly in the laboratory. Two experiments were conducted comparing the magnitude of the exposure effect produced by 5-ms (i.e., subliminal) stimuli and stimuli presented for longer durations (i.e., 500 ms). In both experiments, 5-ms stimuli produced significantly larger mere exposure effects than did 500-ms stimuli. These results were obtained for polygon (Experiment 1), Welsh figure (Experiment 2), and photograph stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2). Implications of these findings for theoretical models of the mere exposure effect are discussed.

Relationship between physical and conceptual color codes.

The experiment was designed to determine whether the efficacy of the conceptual color code increases as the availability of the physical color code decreases. On each trial subjects judged whether two color chips were physically identical. On primed trials the prototype color chip was presented for 2 s prior to the test pair. After exposure to test pairs involving moderate goodness levels, all subjects responded to test pairs consisting of either good or poor members of a category. For some subjects the test pairs were presented immediately after the termination of the prototype chip. For other subjects there was either a 1- or 2-s delay between viewing the prototype chip and the presentation of the test pair. Under delay conditions of both 0 s and 1 s, priming with the prototype chip facilitated responses to good members of the category and inhibited responses to poor members of the category. However, after a 2-s delay, priming facilitated responses to both good and poor category members. It was argued that under the 0- and 1-s conditions priming effects were mediated by the physical color code. When the availability of the physical code was reduced by the 2-s delay, priming effects were determined by the modified conceptual representation.

Plasticity of mental color codes.

The present experiment was designed to examine the plasticity of mental color codes. On each trial, subjects judged whether two color chips were physically identical. On primed trials in the chip condition, the prototype color chip was presented for 2 sec prior to the test pair. In the name condition, the category name was presented prior to the test pair. In one context condition, all test pairs involving moderate goodness levels were presented prior to the presentation of more extreme test pairs. In the other context condition, subjects were initially exposed only to the extremes of category membership. For same judgments in the name condition, initial exposure to the extremes of category membership produced priming effects that were restricted to good examples of the color category, whereas initial exposure to moderate goodness levels extended priming effects to all goodness levels. The relationship between priming and goodness level did not vary with test order in the chip condition. It was concluded that the nature of the mental representation generated to a category name can be readily modified by context.

Specificity of mental color codes.

This experiment used a priming paradigm to examine the specificity of mental color codes. On each trial subjects judged whether two color chips were physically identical. On primed trials under the chip condition the prototype color chip was presented for 2 sec prior to the test pair. Under the visual and auditory name conditions the category name was presented prior to the test pair. For same judgments, the chip prime facilitated responses to good members of the color category but inhibited responses to poor members. Under the same conditions the category prime facilitated responses at all goodness levels. It was argued that, under the present conditions, information contained in the mental representation generated to the category name was less specific than that contained in the physical code produced when the prototype chip was perceived.

Memory for pictures and words as a function of level of processing: Depth or dual coding?

The experiment was designed to test differential predictions derived from dual-coding and depth-of-processing hypotheses. Subjects under incidental memory instructions free recalled a list of 36 test events, each presented twice. Within the list, an equal number of events were assigned to structural, phonemic, and semantic processing conditions. Separate groups of subjects were tested with a list of pictures, concrete words, or abstract words. Results indicated that retention of concrete words increased as a direct function of the processing-task variable (structural < phonemic