Prices for Common Services at Quaternary vs Nonquaternary Hospitals.

This study uses commercial claims data to assess whether quaternary hospitals charge higher prices for common, unspecialized services also offered by nonquaternary hospitals.

Regulating Hospital Prices Based On Market Concentration Is Likely To Leave High-Price Hospitals Unaffected.

Concern about high hospital prices for commercially insured patients has motivated several proposals to regulate these prices. Such proposals often limit regulations to highly concentrated hospital markets. Using a large sample of 2017 US commercial insurance claims, we demonstrate that under the market definition commonly used in these proposals, most high-price hospitals are in markets that would be deemed competitive or "moderately concentrated," using antitrust guidelines. Limiting policy actions to concentrated hospital markets, particularly when those markets are defined broadly, would likely result in poor targeting of high-price hospitals. Policies that target the undesired outcome of high price directly, whether as a trigger or as a screen for action, are likely to be more effective than those that limit action based on market concentration.

Treatment Of Opioid Use Disorder Among Commercially Insured US Adults, 2008-17.

There is abundant literature on efforts to reduce opioid prescriptions and misuse, but comparatively little on the treatment provided to people with opioid use disorder (OUD). Using claims data representing 12-15 million nonelderly adults covered through commercial group insurance during the period 2008-17, we explored rates of OUD diagnoses, treatment patterns, and spending. We found three key patterns: The rate of diagnosed OUD nearly doubled during 2008-17, and the distribution has shifted toward older age groups; the likelihood that diagnosed patients will receive any treatment has declined, particularly among those ages forty-five and older, because of a reduction in the use of medication-assisted treatment (MAT) and despite clinical evidence demonstrating its efficacy; and treatment spending is lower for patients who choose MAT. These patterns suggest that policies supporting the use of MAT are critical to addressing the undertreatment of OUD among the commercially insured and that further research to assess the cost-effectiveness of treatment with versus without medication is needed.

Changes in Quality of Care after Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions.

BACKGROUND: The hospital industry has consolidated substantially during the past two decades and at an accelerated pace since 2010. Multiple studies have shown that hospital mergers have led to higher prices for commercially insured patients, but research about effects on quality of care is limited. METHODS: Using Medicare claims and Hospital Compare data from 2007 through 2016 on performance on four measures of quality of care (a composite of clinical-process measures, a composite of patient-experience measures, mortality, and the rate of readmission after discharge) and data on hospital mergers and acquisitions occurring from 2009 through 2013, we conducted difference-in-differences analyses comparing changes in the performance of acquired hospitals from the time before acquisition to the time after acquisition with concurrent changes for control hospitals that did not have a change in ownership. RESULTS: The study sample included 246 acquired hospitals and 1986 control hospitals. Being acquired was associated with a modest differential decline in performance on the patient-experience measure (adjusted differential change, -0.17 SD; 95% confidence interval [CI], -0.26 to -0.07; P = 0.002; the change was analogous to a fall from the 50th to the 41st percentile) and no significant differential change in 30-day readmission rates (-0.10 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.53 to 0.34; P = 0.72) or in 30-day mortality (-0.03 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.20 to 0.14; P = 0.72). Acquired hospitals had a significant differential improvement in performance on the clinical-process measure (0.22 SD; 95% CI, 0.05 to 0.38; P = 0.03), but this could not be attributed conclusively to a change in ownership because differential improvement occurred before acquisition. CONCLUSIONS: Hospital acquisition by another hospital or hospital system was associated with modestly worse patient experiences and no significant changes in readmission or mortality rates. Effects on process measures of quality were inconclusive. (Funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.).

Decreases In Readmissions Credited To Medicare's Program To Reduce Hospital Readmissions Have Been Overstated.

Medicare's Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) has been credited with lowering risk-adjusted readmission rates for targeted conditions at general acute care hospitals. However, these reductions appear to be illusory or overstated. This is because a concurrent change in electronic transaction standards allowed hospitals to document a larger number of diagnoses per claim, which had the effect of reducing risk-adjusted patient readmission rates. Prior studies of the HRRP relied upon control groups' having lower baseline readmission rates, which could falsely create the appearance that readmission rates are changing more in the treatment than in the control group. Accounting for the revised standards reduced the decline in risk-adjusted readmission rates for targeted conditions by 48 percent. After further adjusting for differences in pre-HRRP readmission rates across samples, we found that declines for targeted conditions at general acute care hospitals were statistically indistinguishable from declines in two control samples. Either the HRRP had no effect on readmissions, or it led to a systemwide reduction in readmissions that was roughly half as large as prior estimates have suggested.

Narrow Networks On The Health Insurance Marketplaces: Prevalence, Pricing, And The Cost Of Network Breadth.

Anecdotal reports and systematic research highlight the prevalence of narrow-network plans on the Affordable Care Act's health insurance Marketplaces. At the same time, Marketplace premiums in the period 2014-16 were much lower than projected by the Congressional Budget Office in 2009. Using detailed data on the breadth of both hospital and physician networks, we studied the prevalence of narrow networks and quantified the association between network breadth and premiums. Controlling for many potentially confounding factors, we found that a plan with narrow physician and hospital networks was 16 percent cheaper than a plan with broad networks for both, and that narrowing the breadth of just one type of network was associated with a 6-9 percent decrease in premiums. Narrow-network plans also have a sizable impact on federal outlays, as they depress the premium of the second-lowest-price silver plan, to which subsidy amounts are linked. Holding all else constant, we estimate that federal subsidies would have been 10.8 percent higher in 2014 had Marketplaces required all plans to offer broad provider networks. Narrow networks are a promising source of potential savings for other segments of the commercial insurance market.

Evaluating the Impact of Health Insurance Industry Consolidation: Learning from Experience.

Research shows consolidation in the private health insurance industry leads to premium increases, even though insurers with larger local market shares generally obtain lower prices from health care providers. Additional research is needed to understand how to protect against harms and unlock benefits from scale. Data on enrollment, premiums, and costs of commercial health insurance--by insurer, plan, customer segment, and local market--would help us understand whether, when, and for whom consolidation is harmful or beneficial. Such transparency is common where there is a strong public interest and substantial public regulation, both of which characterize this vital sector.

Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?

To gauge the competitiveness of the group health insurance industry, I investigate whether health insurers charge higher premiums, ceteris paribus, to more profitable firms. Such "direct price discrimination" is feasible only in imperfectly competitive settings. Using a proprietary national database of health plans offered by a sample of large, multisite firms from 1998­2005, I find firms with positive profit shocks subsequently face higher premium growth, even for the same health plans. Moreover, within a given firm, those sites located in concentrated insurance markets experience the greatest premium increases. The findings suggest health care insurers are exercising market power in an increasing number of geographic markets.

How Do Hospitals Respond to Price Changes?

This paper examines hospital responses to changes in diagnosis-specific prices by exploiting a 1988 policy reform that generated large price changes for 43 percent of Medicare admissions. I find hospitals responded primarily by "upcoding" patients to diagnosis codes with the largest price increases. This response was particularly strong among for-profit hospitals. I find little evidence hospitals increased the volume of admissions differentially for diagnoses subject to the largest price increases, despite the financial incentive to do so. Neither did they increase intensity or quality of care in these diagnoses, suggesting hospitals do not compete for patients at the diagnosis level.