On the psychology and economics of antisocial personality.

How do fundamental concepts from economics, such as individuals' preferences and beliefs, relate to equally fundamental concepts from psychology, such as relatively stable personality traits? Can personality traits help us better understand economic behavior across strategic contexts? We identify an antisocial personality profile and examine the role of strategic context (the "situation"), personality traits (the "person"), and their interaction on beliefs and behaviors in trust games. Antisocial individuals exhibit a specific combination of beliefs and preferences that is difficult to reconcile with a rational choice approach that assumes that beliefs about others' behaviors are formed rationally and therefore, independently from preferences. Variations in antisocial personality are associated with effect sizes that are as large as strong variations in strategic context. Antisocial individuals have lower trust in others unless they know that they can punish them. They are also substantially less trustworthy, believe that others are like themselves, and respond to the possibility of being sanctioned more strongly, suggesting that they anticipate severe punishment if they betray their partner's trust. Antisocial individuals are not simply acting in their economic self-interest, because they harshly punish those who do not reciprocate their trust, although that reduces their economic payoff, and they do so nonimpulsively and in a very calculated manner. Antisocial individuals honor others' trust significantly less (if they cannot be punished) but also, harshly punish those who betray their trust. Overall, it seems that antisocial individuals have beliefs and behaviors based on a view of the world that assumes that most others are as antisocial as they themselves are.

Pupil Mimicry Correlates With Trust in In-Group Partners With Dilating Pupils.

During close interactions with fellow group members, humans look into one another's eyes, follow gaze, and quickly grasp emotion signals. The eye-catching morphology of human eyes, with unique eye whites, draws attention to the middle part, to the pupils, and their autonomic changes, which signal arousal, cognitive load, and interest (including social interest). Here, we examined whether and how these changes in a partner's pupils are processed and how they affect the partner's trustworthiness. Participants played incentivized trust games with virtual partners, whose pupils dilated, remained static, or constricted. Results showed that (a) participants trusted partners with dilating pupils and withheld trust from partners with constricting pupils, (b) participants' pupils mimicked changes in their partners' pupils, and (c) dilation mimicry predicted trust in in-group partners, whereas constriction mimicry did not. We suggest that pupil-contingent trust is in-group bounded and possibly evolved in and because of group life.