Concurrent response and action effect representations across the somatomotor cortices during novel task preparation.

Instructions allow us to fulfill novel and complex tasks on the first try. This skill has been linked to preparatory brain signals that encode upcoming demands in advance, facilitating novel performance. To deepen insight into these processes, we explored whether instructions pre-activated task-relevant motoric and perceptual neural states. Critically, we addressed whether these representations anticipated activity patterns guiding overt sensorimotor processing, which could reflect that internally simulating novel tasks facilitates the preparation. To do so, we collected functional magnetic resonance imaging data while female and male participants encoded and implemented novel stimulus-response associations. Participants also completed localizer tasks designed to isolate the neural representations of the mappings-relevant motor responses, perceptual consequences, and stimulus categories. Using canonical template tracking, we identified whether and where these sensorimotor representations were pre-activated. We found that response-related templates were encoded in advance in regions linked with action control, entailing not only the instructed responses but also their somatosensory consequences. This result was particularly robust in primary motor and somatosensory cortices. While, following our predictions, we found a systematic decrease in the irrelevant stimulus templates' representational strength compared to the relevant ones, this difference was due to below-zero estimates linked to the irrelevant category activity patterns. Overall, our findings reflect that instruction processing relies on the sensorimotor cortices to anticipate motoric and kinesthetic representations of prospective action plans, suggesting the engagement of motor imagery during novel task preparation. More generally, they stress that the somatomotor system could participate with higher-level frontoparietal regions during anticipatory task control.

Relating different perspectives on how outcomes of behavior influence behavior.

Many researchers have tackled the question of how behavior is influenced by its outcomes. Some have adopted a nonmechanistic (functional) perspective that attempts to describe the influence of outcomes on behavior. Others have adopted a mechanistic (cognitive) perspective that attempts to explain the influence of outcomes on behavior. Orthogonal to this distinction, some have focused on the influence of outcomes that a behavior had in the past, whereas others also consider the influence of outcomes that a behavior might have in the future. In this article, we relate these different perspectives with the goal of reducing misunderstandings and fostering collaborations between researchers who adopt different perspectives on the common question of how behavior is influenced by its outcomes.

Putting relating at the core of language-of-thought.

Propositional representations are units of information with a relational content. Their relational nature allows for the six distinctive properties of language-of-thought representations. Putting relating at the core of language-of-thought also fits well with the idea that thinking and reasoning are instances of relational behavior. These propositional and behavioral perspectives can be combined within a functional-cognitive framework.

What is intuiting and deliberating? A functional-cognitive perspective.

We applaud De Neys for drawing attention to the interaction between intuiting and deliberating without committing to single- or dual process models. It remains unclear, however, how he conceptualizes the distinction between intuiting and deliberating. We propose several levels at which the distinction can be made and discuss the merits of defining intuiting and deliberating as different types of behavior.

Effects of Experiencing CS-US Pairings on Instructed Fear Reversal.

Fear learning allows us to identify and anticipate aversive events and adapt our behavior accordingly. This is often thought to rely on associative learning mechanisms where an initially neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) is repeatedly paired with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US), eventually leading to the CS also being perceived as aversive and threatening. Importantly, however, humans also show verbal fear learning. Namely, they have the ability to change their responses to stimuli rapidly through verbal instructions about CS-US pairings. Past research on the link between experience-based and verbal fear learning indicated that verbal instructions about a reversal of CS-US pairings can fully override the effects of previously experienced CS-US pairings, as measured through fear ratings, skin conductance, and fear-potentiated startle. However, it remains an open question whether such instructions can also annul learned CS representations in the brain. Here, we used a fear reversal paradigm (female and male participants) in conjunction with representational similarity analysis of fMRI data to test whether verbal instructions fully override the effects of experienced CS-US pairings in fear-related brain regions or not. Previous research suggests that only the right amygdala should show lingering representations of previously experienced threat ("pavlovian trace"). Unexpectedly, we found evidence for the residual effect of prior CS-US experience to be much more widespread than anticipated, in the amygdala but also cortical regions like the dorsal anterior cingulate or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This finding shines a new light on the interaction of different fear learning mechanisms, at times with unexpected consequences.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Humans are able to learn about aversive stimuli both from experience (i.e., repeated pairings of conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US; pavlovian conditioning), and from verbal instructions about stimulus pairings. Understanding how experience-based and verbal learning processes interact is key for understanding the cognitive and neural underpinnings of fear learning. We tested whether prior aversive experiences (CS-US pairings) affected subsequent verbal learning, searching for lingering threat signals after verbal instructions reversed a CS from being threatening to being safe. While past research suggested such threat signals can only be found in the amygdala, we found evidence to be much more widespread, including the medial and lateral PFC. This highlights how experience-based and verbal learning processes interact to support adaptive behavior.

Thinking of learning phenomena as instances of relational behavior.

We explore the idea that some learning phenomena can be thought of as instances of relational behavior-more specifically, arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR). After explaining the nature of AARR, we discuss what it means to say that learning phenomena such as evaluative and fear conditioning are instances of AARR. We then list several implications of this perspective for empirical and theoretical research on learning, as well as for how learning phenomena relate to other psychological phenomena in human and nonhuman animals.

Learning in Individual Organisms, Genes, Machines, and Groups: A New Way of Defining and Relating Learning in Different Systems.

Learning is a central concept in many scientific disciplines. Communication about research on learning is, however, hampered by the fact that different researchers define learning in different ways. In this article, we introduce the extended functional definition of learning that can be used across scientific disciplines. We provide examples of how the definition can be applied to individual organisms, genes, machines, and groups. Using the extended functional definition (a) reveals a heuristic framework for research that can be applied across scientific disciplines, (b) allows researchers to engage in intersystem analyses that relate the behavior and learning of different systems, and (c) clarifies how learning differs from other phenomena such as (changes in) behavior, damaging systems, and programming systems.

A goal-directed account of action slips: The reliance on old contingencies.

People often keep engaging in behaviors that used to be successful in the past but which are knowingly no longer effective in the current situation, so-called "action slips." Such action slips are often explained with stimulus-driven processes in which behavior is caused by a stimulus-response association and without information about the outcome of the behavior. This process is contrasted with a goal-directed process in which behavior is selected because it is expected to lead to a desired outcome. Failing to act in line with changes in the outcome is taken as evidence for stimulus-driven processes. Stimulus-driven processes are assumed to get installed after overtraining and to be deployed under poor operating conditions. In line with this, previous research has found that action slips are more likely to occur after extensive training and when under time pressure. We propose an alternative goal-directed explanation according to which action slips are caused by a goal-directed process that relies on old, no longer accurate, outcome information. In the current study, participants learned four stimulus-response-outcome contingencies during a single (i.e., moderate training) or a 4-day training schedule (i.e., extensive training). Afterward, two contingencies were reversed and performance was assessed under time pressure. Results show that after extensive training, participants not only committed more action slips but also reported more old response-outcome contingencies in line with these action slips. This is consistent with the goal-directed explanation that action slips result from a reliance on old, no longer accurate outcome information. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Reasons to Remain Critical About the Literature on Habits: A Commentary on Wood et al. (2022).

Wood et al. (2022) reviewed arguments in support of the idea that much of human behavior is habitual. In this commentary, we first point at ambiguities in the way Wood et al. referred to habits. This allows us to clarify the question that lies at the core of the debate on habits: To what extent is habitual behavior mediated by stimulus-response associations or by goal representations? We then argue that Wood et al. dismissed goal-directed explanations of habitual behavior too easily. Finally, we point out that Wood et al.'s reanalysis of our data is misleading in that a more fine-grained analysis supports rather than questions goal-directed accounts.

Testing the practical utility of implicit measures of beliefs for predicting drunk driving.

Despite the potential benefits of implicit measures over self-report measures, they are rarely used in real-world contexts to predict behavior. Two potential reasons are that (a) traditional implicit measures typically show low predictive validity and (b) the practical utility of implicit measures has hardly been investigated. The current studies test the practical utility of a new generation of implicit measures for predicting drunk driving. Study 1 (N = 290) examined whether an implicit measure of beliefs about past drunk driving (i.e., the Past Driving Under the Influence Implicit Association Test; P-DUI-IAT) retrospectively predicts drunk driving in driving school students, a population for which this measure could have applied value. Study 1 also explored whether P-DUI-IAT scores prospectively predicted drunk driving over six months. Due to the low number of offenders, however, Study 1 had low statistical power to test this latter question. In Study 2 (N = 228), we therefore examined the utility of the P-DUI-IAT and a new variant of this test (i.e., the Acceptability of Driving Under the Influence Implicit Association Test; A-DUI-IAT) to prospectively predict drunk driving in an online sample with a high number of offenders. Results from Study 1 show that the P-DUI-IAT predicts self-rated past drunk driving behavior in driving school students (ORs = 3.11-6.12, ps < .043, 95% CIs = [1.11, 37.69]). Results from Study 1 do not show evidence for utility of the P-DUI-IAT to prospectively predict self-rated drunk driving. Results from Study 2, on the other hand, show strong evidence for the utility of both implicit measures to prospectively predict self-rated drunk driving (ORs = 3.80-5.82, ps < .002, 95% CIs = [1.72, 14.47]). Although further applied research is necessary, the current results could provide a first step towards the application of implicit measures in real-world contexts.

Learned helplessness and its relevance for psychological suffering: a new perspective illustrated with attachment problems, burn-out, and fatigue complaints.

We develop a new perspective on various forms of psychological suffering - including attachment issues, burn-out, and fatigue complaints - by drawing on the construct of learned helplessness. We conceptualise learned helplessness in operant terms as the behavioural effects of a lack of reinforcement and in goal-directed terms as the dysregulation of goal-directed behaviour. Our central claim is that if one fails to reach a goal (e.g. the goal to secure a job), then not only this goal but also other related goals (e.g. the goal to maintain social relationships) may lose their motivating effects. The similarity relation between goal stimuli can therefore shed light on how failure in one life domain can come to affect various other life domains. We detail the relation between our proposal and existing theories and discuss new research and clinical directions.

Do evaluation and self-identification relate to self-reported and actual social media use?

Background and aims: Social media use can sometimes become excessive and damaging. To deal with this issue, scholars and practitioners have called for the development of measures that predict social media use. The current studies test the utility of evaluation and self-identification measures for predicting social media use. Method: Study 1 examined the relation between evaluation (n = 58) and self-identification (n = 56) measures on the one hand and several self-report measures of social media use on the other hand. Study 2 examined whether the main results of Study 1 could be replicated and whether evaluation (n = 68) and self-identification (n = 48) also relate to actual social media use. We probed evaluation and self-identification using implicit and explicit measures. Results: Explicit evaluation and self-identification measures significantly correlated with several of the self-report measures of social media. Explicit evaluation also significantly correlated with several indices of actual social media use. Implicit measures did not relate to social media use. Discussion and conclusions: The current results suggest that researchers and practitioners could benefit from using explicit evaluation and self-identification measures when predicting social media use, especially an evaluation measure since this measure also seems to relate to actual social media use. Study 2 was one of the first to test the ecological validity of social media use measures. Although implicit measures could provide benefits for predicting social media use, the current studies did not show evidence for their predictive utility.

Predicting drunk driving using a variant of the implicit association test.

INTRODUCTION: Drunk driving is one of the primary causes of road traffic injuries and fatalities. A possible approach to reduce drunk driving rates is to identify which individuals are at risk of such behavior and establish targeted prevention. Simply asking individuals about drunk driving in real-world contexts would be problematic because of potential deception. The use of implicit measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) could overcome this problem because they are less controllable than self-reports and thus less susceptible to deception. However, previous studies have shown poor predictive utility of implicit measures for drunk driving behavior. The current studies aimed to test the predictive utility of a variant of the IAT designed to assess beliefs about past driving under the influence (the P-DUI-IAT). METHOD: Study 1 (N = 216) tested whether the P-DUI-IAT could predict self-reported prior drunk driving and future likelihood of drunk driving. We also examined incremental predictive validity of the P-DUI-IAT for these outcomes. Study 2 (N = 159) examined whether results from Study 1 were reproducible. RESULTS: In both studies, results showed that the P-DUI-IAT discriminated well between participants who had engaged in drunk driving and participants who had not. The P-DUI-IAT also showed independent and incremental predictive validity for past drunk driving and future likelihood of drunk driving. CONCLUSIONS: These studies provided initial evidence for the predictive utility of the P-DUI-IAT for drunk driving. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS: The P-DUI-IAT is a promising tool for identifying which individuals are at risk of drunk driving. The application of this measure could especially be valuable for identifying young novice drivers at risk for drunk driving-related accidents.

Tenacious instructions: How to dismantle newly instructed task rules?

Humans excel in instruction following to boost performance in unfamiliar situations. We can do so through so-called prepared reflexes: Abstract instructions are instantly translated into appropriate task rules in procedural working memory, after which imperative stimuli directly trigger their corresponding responses in a ballistic, reflex-like manner. But how much control do we have over these instructed task rules when their reflexes suddenly lose their relevance? Inspired by the phenomenon of directed forgetting in declarative working memory, we here tested across four experiments whether the presentation of (implicit or explicit) task cancellation cues results in the directed dismantling of recently instructed task rules. Our findings suggest that-even when cancelation cues are actively processed-such dismantling does not occur (Experiment 1-3) unless the no-longer relevant task rules are replaced by a new set of rules (Experiment 4). These findings and their implications are discussed in the broader context of action control and working memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Learning via instructions about observations: exploring similarities and differences with learning via actual observations.

Our behaviour toward stimuli can be influenced by observing how another person (a model) interacts with those stimuli. We investigated whether mere instructions about a model's interactions with stimuli (i.e. instructions about observations) are sufficient to alter evaluative and fear responses and whether these changes are similar in magnitude to those resulting from actually observing the interactions. In Experiments 1 (n = 268) and 2 (n = 260), participants either observed or read about a model reacting positively or negatively to stimuli. Evaluations of those stimuli were then assessed via ratings and a personalized implicit association test. In Experiments 3 (n = 60) and 4 (n = 190), we assessed participants' fear toward stimuli after observing or reading about a model displaying distress in the presence of those stimuli. While the results consistently indicated that instructions about observations induced behavioural changes, they were mixed with regard to whether instructions were as powerful in changing behaviour as observations. We discuss whether learning via observations and via instructions may be mediated by similar or different processes, how they might differ in their suitability for conveying certain types of information, and how their relative effectiveness may depend on the information to be transmitted.

Observational evaluative conditioning is sensitive to relational information.

Social learning represents an important avenue via which evaluations can be formed or changed. Rather than learning slowly through trial and error, we can instead observe how another person (a "model") interacts with stimuli and quickly adjust our own behaviour. We report five studies (n = 912) that focused on one subtype of social learning, observational evaluative conditioning (OEC), and how it is moderated by relational information (i.e., information indicating how a stimulus and a model's reactions are related). Participants observed a model reacting positively to one stimulus and negatively to another, and were either told that these reactions were genuine, faked, or opposite to the model's actual feelings. Stimulus evaluations were then indexed using ratings and a personalised Implicit Association Test (pIAT). When the model's reactions were said to be genuine, OEC effects emerged in the expected direction. When the model's reactions were said to be faked, the magnitude of self-reported, but not pIAT, effects was reduced. Finally, stating that the model's reactions were opposite to his actual feelings eliminated or reversed self-reported effects and eliminated pIAT effects. We consider how these findings relate to previous work as well as mental-process theories.

Examining Automatic Stereotyping From a Propositional Perspective: Is Automatic Stereotyping Sensitive to Relational and Validity Information?

Research on automatic stereotyping is dominated by the idea that automatic stereotyping reflects the activation of (group-trait) associations. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 391), we tested predictions derived from an alternative perspective that suggests that automatic stereotyping is the result of the activation of propositional representations that, unlike associations, can encode relational information and have truth values. Experiment 1 found that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the validity of information about pairs of traits and groups. Experiment 2 showed that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the specific relations (e.g., whether a particular group is more or less friendly than a reference person) between pairs of traits and groups. Interestingly, both experiments found a weaker influence of validity/relational information on automatic stereotyping than on non-automatic stereotyping. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on automatic stereotyping.

Exploring the Link between Novel Task Proceduralization and Motor Simulation.

Our ability to generate efficient behavior from novel instructions is critical for our adaptation to changing environments. Despite the absence of previous experience, novel instructed content is quickly encoded into an action-based or procedural format, facilitating automatic task processing. In the current work, we investigated the link between proceduralization and motor simulation, specifically, whether the covert activation of the task-relevant responses is used during the assembly of action-based instructions representations. Across three online experiments, we used a concurrent finger-tapping task to block motor simulation during the encoding of novel stimulus-response (S-R) associations. The overlap between the mappings and the motor task at the response level was manipulated. We predicted a greater impairment at mapping implementation in the overlapping condition, where the mappings' relevant response representations were already loaded by the motor demands, and thus, could not be used in the upcoming task simulation. This hypothesis was robustly supported by the three datasets. Nonetheless, the overlapping effect was not modulated by further manipulations of proceduralization-related variables (preparation demands in Exp.2, mapping novelty in Exp.3). Importantly, a fourth control experiment ruled out that our results were driven by alternative accounts as fatigue or negative priming. Overall, we provided strong evidence towards the involvement of motor simulation during anticipatory task reconfiguration. However, this involvement was rather general, and not restricted to novelty scenarios. Finally, these findings can be also integrated into broader models of anticipatory task control, stressing the role of the motor system during preparation.

Predicting nonsuicidal self-injury using a variant of the implicit association test.

OBJECTIVE: Nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) is a severe problem, and its prevalence is increasing. To aid prevention and treatment, there is an urgent need for evidence-based measures to identify individuals at risk for NSSI. Measures that probe past NSSI are most promising, but people are often motivated to conceal NSSI behavior. This problem can be overcome by using implicit measures, which do not require individuals to self-report on their behavior. Yet, prior research typically found weak predictive utility of implicit measures. Based on a new perspective on implicit measures and recent findings in NSSI research, we developed an Implicit Association Test that probes past NSSI (the P-NSSI-IAT). METHOD: We report two preregistered studies (N = 83; N = 372) in which we tested the utility of the P-NSSI-IAT to detect past NSSI and predict NSSI one month later. RESULTS: P-NSSI-IAT scores (a) differentiated injury groups from non-injury groups and (b) prospectively predicted NSSI and improved prediction above and beyond risk factors of NSSI. CONCLUSIONS: These initial findings suggest that the P-NSSI-IAT is a promising tool for NSSI risk assessment. Future studies should further examine the predictive utility of this newly developed measure for NSSI behavior.