A deliberative method for ranking risks (I): Overview and test bed development.

Risk ranking offers a potentially powerful means for gathering public input to help set risk-management priorities. In most rankings conducted to date, the categories and attributes used to describe the risks have varied widely, the materials and procedures have not been designed to facilitate comparisons among risks on all important attributes, and the validity and reproducibility of the resulting rankings have not been assessed. To address these needs, a risk-ranking method was developed in which risk experts define and categorize the risks to be ranked, identify the relevant risk attributes, and characterize the risks in a set of standardized risk summary sheets, which are then used by lay or other groups in structured ranking exercises. To evaluate this method, a test bed involving 22 health and safety risks in a fictitious middle school was created. This article provides an overview of the risk-ranking method and describes the challenges faced in designing the middle school test bed. A companion article in this issue reports on the validity of the ranking procedures and the level of agreement among risk managers regarding ranking of risks and attributes.

A deliberative method for ranking risks (II): Evaluation of validity and agreement among risk managers.

A deliberative method for ranking risks was evaluated in a study involving 218 risk managers. Both holistic and multiattribute procedures were used to assess individual and group rankings of health and safety risks facing students at a fictitious middle school. Consistency between the rankings that emerged from these two procedures was reasonably high for individuals and for groups, suggesting that these procedures capture an underlying construct of riskiness. Participants reported high levels of satisfaction with their groups' decision-making processes and the resulting rankings, and these reports were corroborated by regression analyses. Risk rankings were similar across individuals and groups, even though individuals and groups did not always agree on the relative importance of risk attributes. Lower consistency between the risk rankings from the holistic and multiattribute procedures and lower agreement among individuals and groups regarding these rankings were observed for a set of high-variance risks. Nonetheless, the generally high levels of consistency, satisfaction, and agreement suggest that this deliberative method is capable of producing risk rankings that can serve as informative inputs to public risk-management decision making.

Categorizing risks for risk ranking.

Any practical process of risk ranking must group hazards into a manageable number of categories. Defining such categories requires value choices that can have important implications for the rankings that result. Most risk-management organizations will find it useful to begin defining categories in terms of environmental loadings or initiating events. However, the resulting categories typically need to be modified in light of other considerations. Risk-ranking projects can benefit from considering several alternative categorization strategies and drawing upon elements of each in developing their final categorization of risks. In principle, conducting multiple ranking exercises by using different categorizations could be interesting and useful. In practice, agencies are unlikely to have either the resources or patience to do this, but other groups in society might. Done well, such additional independent rankings could add valuable inputs to democratic risk-management decision making.

Further explorations of medical decisions for individuals and for groups.

BACKGROUND: Important discrepancies between clinical practice and health policy may be related to the ways in which physicians and others make decisions about individuals and groups. Previous research has found that physicians and laypersons asked to consider an individual patient generally make different decisions than those asked to consider a group of comparable patients, but this discrepancy has not been observed in more recent studies. This study was designed to explore possible reasons for these findings. METHODS: Prospective jurors (N = 1,013) each made a recommendation regarding a risky treatment for an incurable blood condition. Perspective (individual vs group) was crossed with uncertainty frame (probability vs frequency) and response wording (original vs revised) in a 2 x 2 x 2 between-participants design. RESULTS: When the strength of participants' recommendations was considered, the effects of perspective, uncertainty frame, and response wording were not statistically significant. When recommendations were dichotomized, participants in the revised-response-wording conditions were more likely to recommend treatment to the group than to the individual. CONCLUSIONS: These results conflict with previous findings for this scenario and suggest that reported differences between decisions for individuals and decisions for groups are not robust.

Public preferences for prevention versus cure: what if an ounce of prevention is worth only an ounce of cure?

BACKGROUND: The belief that small preventive efforts bring large benefits may explain why many people say they value prevention above all other types of health care. However, it often takes a great deal of preventive medicine to prevent a bad outcome. This study explores whether people value prevention or cure more when each brings the same magnitude of benefit and examines whether preferences for prevention or cure vary according to the severity of the disability of the patients who can receive the preventive or curative intervention. METHODS: 289 prospective jurors were presented with a policy dilemma involving how best to allocate funds to benefit people with varying levels of disability. Each project was said to influence the functional ability of 100 nursing home residents, either by improving their level of function or by preventing their level of function from declining. RESULTS: When given a choice between preventive and curative interventions, more subjects preferred the preventive intervention (37% vs 21%, p=0.002). However, when the strength of people's preferences was taken into account, the preference for preventive interventions was not statistically significant (p=0.135). With both preventive and curative interventions, the subjects preferred helping patients with more severe disabilities (p < 0.005 for both comparisons). This preference for helping more severely disabled patients did not differ for prevention and cure (p=0.663). CONCLUSION: When the magnitude of benefit was held constant, the subjects slightly preferred prevention over cure. In addition, they preferred directing limited resources toward those with greater disabilities, regardless of whether those resources were targeted toward prevention or cure. These findings suggest that previously stated preferences for prevention over cure may result from a belief that small efforts at prevention will be repaid by large reductions in the later need for cure.

Carrier screening for cystic fibrosis: costs and clinical outcomes.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the costs and clinical effects of 16 alternative strategies for cystic fibrosis (CF) carrier screening in the reproductive setting; and to test the sensitivity of the results to assumptions about cost and detection rate, stakeholder perspective, DNA test specificity, chance of nonpaternity, and couples' reproductive plans. METHOD: Cost-effectiveness analysis. RESULTS: A sequential screening strategy had the lowest cost per CF birth avoided. In this strategy, the first partner was screened with a standard test that identifies 85% of carriers. The second partner was screened with an expanded test if the first partner's screen was positive. This strategy identified 75% of anticipated CF births at a cost of $367,000 each. This figure does not include the lifetime medical costs of caring for a patient with CF, and it assumes that couples who identify a pregnancy at risk will choose to have prenatal diagnosis and termination of affected pregnancies. The cost per CF birth identified is approximately half this figure when couples plan two children. CONCLUSIONS: The cost-effectiveness of CF carrier screening depends greatly on couples' reproductive plans. CF carrier screening is most cost-effective when it is performed sequentially, when the information is used for more than one pregnancy, and when the intention of the couple is to identify and terminate affected pregnancies. These conclusions are important for policy considerations regarding population-based screening for CF, and may also have important implications for screening for less common diseases.

Is the defensive use of diagnostic tests good for patients, or bad?

Physicians sometimes order diagnostic tests to reduce the risk of malpractice liability. The authors develop an expected-utility model that links a rational physician's concerns about malpractice liability to increases in the use of diagnostic tests and use this model to assess the effects of defensive testing on patients' interests. To do so, they adapt the threshold approach to clinical decision making to incorporate the physician's interests, focusing on 1) the effect of the physician's expected liability risks and 2) the effect of any expected liability reduction due to diagnostic testing. Surprisingly, the mere existence of liability risks is often sufficient to widen the range of disease probabilities for which diagnostic testing is the preferred clinical strategy. If testing reduces the physician's expected liability risks, the testing range is widened further. For some disease probabilities, testing is preferred by the physician even though it is not in the patient's best interests. When tests are performed in such instances, utility is transferred from the patient to the physician and the physician's insurer. Although the defensive use of diagnostic tests improves clinical outcomes for some patients, it worsens clinical outcomes for others. Moreover, defensive testing worsens the expected outcomes of all patients whose clinical strategies are changed. Physicians should realize that defensive testing necessarily reduces the overall quality of patient care.

Euthanasia among US critical care nurses. Practices, attitudes, and social and professional correlates.

OBJECTIVES: The authors sought to identify associations between critical care nurses' self-reported participation in euthanasia, their social and professional characteristics, and their attitudes toward end-of-life care. METHODS: Data were collected through an anonymous mail survey of 1,560 US critical care nurses, of whom 1,139 (73%) responded. Nurses were asked to report whether they had received requests to engage in euthanasia and whether they had engaged in euthanasia. In addition, nurses were asked to respond to items assessing their attitudes toward end-of-life care. RESULTS: Of 852 nurses who identified themselves as practicing exclusively in adult intensive care units, 164 (19%) reported that they had engaged in euthanasia, 650 (76%) reported that they had not engaged in euthanasia, and 38 (4%) could not be classified. Only 30% of respondents believed that euthanasia is unethical. Logistic regression indicated that older nurses, more religious nurses, nurses practicing in cardiac care units, and nurses with less favorable attitudes toward euthanasia were significantly less likely to report having engaged in euthanasia, although the effects of age and religious beliefs appear to have been mediated by attitudes. CONCLUSIONS: These results help explain why some US critical care nurses engaged in euthanasia despite legal and professional prohibitions against it. Because critical care nurses may have a special understanding of the needs of critically ill patients, these results may indicate that current guidelines for end-of-life care are inadequate.

Cost-effectiveness analysis in a setting of budget constraints--is it equitable?

BACKGROUND: One of the promises of cost-effective analysis is that it can demonstrate how to maximize health benefits attainable within a specific limited budget. Many people argue, however, that when there are budget limitations, the use of cost-effectiveness analysis leads to health care policies that are inequitable. METHODS: We asked prospective jurors, medical ethicists, and experts in medical decision making to choose between two screening tests for a population at low risk for colon cancer. One test was more cost effective than the other but because of budget constraints was too expensive to be given to everyone in the population. With the use of the more effective test for only half the population, 1100 lives could be saved at the same cost as that of saving 1000 lives with the use of the less effective test for the entire population. RESULTS: Fifty-six percent of the prospective jurors, 53 percent of the medical ethicists, and 41 percent of the experts in medical decision making recommended offering the less effective screening test to everyone, even though 100 more lives would have been saved by offering the more expensive test to only a portion of the population. Most of the study participants justified this recommendation on the basis of equity. A smaller number stated either that it was not politically feasible to offer a test to only half the population or that the additional benefit of the more expensive test (100 more lives saved) was too small to justify offering it to only a portion of the public. CONCLUSIONS: People place greater importance on equity than is reflected by cost-effectiveness analysis. Even many experts in medical decision making -- those often responsible for conducting cost-effectiveness analyses -- expressed discomfort with some of its implications. Basing health care priorities on cost effectiveness may not be possible without incorporating explicit considerations of equity into cost-effectiveness analyses or the process used to develop health care policies on the basis of such analyses.

Aggregating social behavior into person models: perceiver-induced consistency.

Two experiments explored the role of perceivers (judges) in aggregating social behavior into impressions. In Experiment 1, it was predicted and found that judges influence impressions (i.e., eye-of-the-beholder effects) not only because they disagree on how to interpret single acts but because they aggregate multiple acts in unique ways to arrive at idiosyncratic impressions. Using D. A. Kenny's (1991) general model of accuracy and consensus, it was found that judges perceived much greater consistency in the behavior of targets across situations when they were asked to aggregate the behavior than when they were not. Differential interpretation of single acts did not change as a function of aggregating behavior. This aggregation process was characterized as the construction of models of persons. In Experiment 2, the concept of person models was explored further, and it was argued that perceivers develop these models on the basis of what is viewed as the central concept of a target. For any given target, a limited number of models can be identified, and different perceivers develop different models. The particular model formed has implications for the perceiver's underlying memory representation and the perceived personality profile of the target.

Representational momentum in memory for pitch.

When a visual pattern is displayed at successively different orientations such that a rotation or translation is implied, an observer's memory for the final position is displaced forward. This phenomenon of representational momentum shares some similarities with physical momentum. For instance, the amount of memory shift is proportional to the implied velocity of the inducing display; representational momentum is specifically proportional to the final, not the average, velocity; representational momentum follows a continuous stopping function for the first 250 ms or so of the retention interval. In a previous paper (Kelly & Freyd, 1987) we demonstrated a forward memory asymmetry using implied changes in pitch, for subjects without formal musical training. In the current paper we replicate our earlier finding and show that the forward memory asymmetry occurs for subjects with formal musical training as well (Experiment 1). We then show the structural similarity between representational momentum in memory for pitch with previous reports of parametric effects using visual stimuli. We report a velocity effect for auditory momentum (Experiment 2), we demonstrate specifically that the velocity effect depends on the implied acceleration (Experiment 3), and we show that the stopping function for auditory momentum is qualitatively the same as that for visual momentum (Experiment 4). We consider the implications of these results for theories of mental representation.