ABSTRACT
In 1990, in response to the occurrence of Ebola virus (subsequently identified as subtype Reston) infection among cynomolgus monkeys imported from the Philippines, the United States implemented strict disease control measures for handling nonhuman primates during transit and quarantine and initiated importer facility compliance inspections. Disease control measures emphasized protection of workers from exposure, use of containment facilities and procedures, measures to prevent spread of infection among animals, and laboratory testing of animals that die or become ill during quarantine. From 1991-1995, no outbreaks of filovirus infection occurred, and only one other disease outbreak (caused by Mycobacterium species) was recognized. In April 1996, Ebola virus (subtype Reston) infection was identified in another group of cynomolgus monkeys imported from the Philippines. The disease control measures implemented since the first Ebola virus (subtype Reston) outbreak appeared to work well. Currently, the 27 registered importer facilities import approximately 8500 nonhuman primates annually, and mortality rates are <1.0%. Importer facilities receive regular inspections, and compliance with disease control measures and disease reporting is excellent.
Subject(s)
Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/prevention & control , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/veterinary , Infection Control/methods , Primates/virology , Animals , Animals, Laboratory/virology , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Infection Control/legislation & jurisprudence , Macaca fascicularis/virology , Monkey Diseases/prevention & control , Mycobacterium Infections/prevention & control , Mycobacterium Infections/veterinary , Quarantine , United States , ZoonosesABSTRACT
In April 1996, laboratory testing of imported nonhuman primates (as mandated by quarantine regulations) identified 2 cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis) infected with Ebola (subtype Reston) virus in a US-registered quarantine facility. The animals were part of a shipment of 100 nonhuman primates recently imported from the Philippines. Two additional infected animals, who were thought to be in the incubation phase, were identified among the remaining 48 animals in the affected quarantine room. The other 50 macaques, who had been held in a separate isolation room, remained asymptomatic, and none of these animals seroconverted during an extended quarantine period. Due to the rigorous routine safety precautions, the facility personnel had no unprotected exposures and remained asymptomatic, and no one seroconverted. The mandatory quarantine and laboratory testing requirements, put in place after the original Reston outbreak in 1989-1990, were effective for detecting and containing Ebola virus infection in newly imported nonhuman primates and minimizing potential human transmission.
Subject(s)
Animals, Laboratory/virology , Ebolavirus/isolation & purification , Macaca fascicularis/virology , Animals , Antibodies, Viral/blood , Antigens, Viral/blood , Disease Outbreaks/veterinary , Ebolavirus/classification , Ebolavirus/immunology , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/epidemiology , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/transmission , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/veterinary , Humans , Medical Laboratory Personnel , Monkey Diseases/epidemiology , Monkey Diseases/transmission , Monkey Diseases/virology , Philippines , Quarantine/veterinary , Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction , United StatesABSTRACT
Two waves of vomiting and/or diarrhoea affected approximately 215 of the 715 passengers on a Caribbean cruise ship. The outbreak was independently associated with eating cream-filled pastries at two separate meals. Staphylococcus aureus phage type 85/+ was isolated from cases and pastry cooks, but not from controls. This is the first well-documented outbreak of staphylococcal food poisoning on a cruise ship.
