The public health theory of populism.

Successful public health interventions have, in recent decades, improved the health of the working classes in significant ways across much of the western world. Nevertheless, here, I argue that populist electoral breakthroughs over the last decade may be considered side-effects of 'successful' public health policies: crucially, the claim is that those political side-effects resulted because of-rather than despite-the health-measured success of those public health interventions.

Sexual rights puzzle: re-solved?

My sexual rights puzzle according to which positive sexual rights are not compatible with negative sexual rights has been recently criticised in the Journal of Medical Ethics by Steven J Firth, who has put forward three objections to the puzzle. In this brief response, I analyse and reject each of these three objections.

Sex: we can't have it both ways.

I analyse the tension between a plausible liberal view of sex work and the similarly plausible idea that rape and other forms of sexual violence are made morally worse by their sexual nature. I find no conclusive reason to drop the liberal view of sex work, at least as long as the concept of voluntary and informed consent at the core of it is robust enough to account for the realities of prostitution around the world; nor should we abandon the idea that rape is no ordinary immoral act: reducing sexual violence to non-sexual violence would misrepresent the relevant phenomena and perpetuate injustice.

Should we be afraid of medical AI?

I analyse an argument according to which medical artificial intelligence (AI) represents a threat to patient autonomy-recently put forward by Rosalind McDougall in the Journal of Medical Ethics The argument takes the case of IBM Watson for Oncology to argue that such technologies risk disregarding the individual values and wishes of patients. I find three problems with this argument: (1) it confuses AI with machine learning; (2) it misses machine learning's potential for personalised medicine through big data; (3) it fails to distinguish between evidence-based advice and decision-making within healthcare. I conclude that how much and which tasks we should delegate to machine learning and other technologies within healthcare and beyond is indeed a crucial question of our time, but in order to answer it, we must be careful in analysing and properly distinguish between the different systems and different delegated tasks.

I love my children: am I racist? On the wish to be biologically related to one's children.

Is the wish to be biologically related to your children legitimate? Here, I respond to an argument in support of a negative answer to this question according to which a preference towards having children one is biologically related to is analogous to a preference towards associating with members of one's own race. I reject this analogy, mainly on the grounds that only the latter constitutes discrimination; still, I conclude that indeed a preference towards children one is biologically related to is morally illegitimate because, in the context of parental love, biological considerations are normatively irrelevant.

IVF, same-sex couples and the value of biological ties.

Ought parents, in general, to value being biologically tied to their children? Is it important, in particular, that both parents be biologically tied to their children? I will address these fundamental questions by looking at a fairly new practice within IVF treatments, so-called IVF-with-ROPA (Reception of Oocytes from Partner), which allows lesbian couples to 'share motherhood', with one partner providing the eggs while the other becomes pregnant. I believe that IVF-with-ROPA is, just like other IVF treatments, morally permissible, but here I argue that the increased biological ties which IVF-with-ROPA allows for do not have any particular value beside the satisfaction of a legitimate wish, because there is no intrinsic value in a biological tie between parents and children; further, I argue that equality within parental projects cannot be achieved by redistributing biological ties.

Consent ain't anything: dissent, access and the conditions for consent.

I argue against various versions of the 'attitude' view of consent and of the 'action' view of consent: I show that neither an attitude nor an action is either necessary or sufficient for consent. I then put forward a different view of consent based on the idea that, given a legitimate epistemic context, absence of dissent is sufficient for consent: what is crucial is having access to dissent. In the latter part of the paper I illustrate my view of consent by applying it to the case of consenting to being an organ donor.

Successful ageing: A study of the literature using citation network analysis.

BACKGROUND: Ageing is accompanied by an increased risk of disease and a loss of functioning on several bodily and mental domains and some argue that maintaining health and functioning is essential for a successful old age. Paradoxically, studies have shown that overall wellbeing follows a curvilinear pattern with the lowest point at middle age but increases thereafter up to very old age. OBJECTIVE: To shed further light on this paradox, we reviewed the existing literature on how scholars define successful ageing and how they weigh the contribution of health and functioning to define success. METHODS: We performed a novel, hypothesis-free and quantitative analysis of citation networks exploring the literature on successful ageing that exists in the Web of Science Core Collection Database using the CitNetExplorer software. Outcomes were visualized using timeline-based citation patterns. The clusters and sub-clusters of citation networks identified were starting points for in-depth qualitative analysis. RESULTS: Within the literature from 1902 through 2015, two distinct citation networks were identified. The first cluster had 1146 publications and 3946 citation links. It focused on successful ageing from the perspective of older persons themselves. Analysis of the various sub-clusters emphasized the importance of coping strategies, psycho-social engagement, and cultural differences. The second cluster had 609 publications and 1682 citation links and viewed successful ageing based on the objective measurements as determined by researchers. Subsequent sub-clustering analysis pointed to different domains of functioning and various ways of assessment. CONCLUSION: In the current literature two mutually exclusive concepts of successful ageing are circulating that depend on whether the individual himself or an outsider judges the situation. These different points of view help to explain the disability paradox, as successful ageing lies in the eyes of the beholder.

Broadening the future of value account of the wrongness of killing.

On Don Marquis's future of value account of the wrongness of killing, 'what makes it wrong to kill those individuals we all believe it is wrong to kill, is that killing them deprives them of their future of value'. Marquis has recently argued for a narrow interpretation of his future of value account of the wrongness of killing and against the broad interpretation that I had put forward in response to Carson Strong. In this article I argue that the narrow view is problematic because it violates some basic principles of equality and because it allows for some of the very killing that Marquis sets out to condemn; further, I argue that the chief reason why Marquis chooses the narrow view over the broad view-namely that the broad view would take the killing of some non-human animals to be also wrong-should rather be considered a welcome upshot of the broad view.

Fathers and abortion.

I argue that it is possible for prospective mothers to wrong prospective fathers by bearing their child; and that lifting paternal liability for child support does not correct the wrong inflicted to fathers. It is therefore sometimes wrong for prospective mothers to bear a child, or so I argue here. I show that my argument for considering the legitimate interests of prospective fathers is not a unique exception to an obvious right to procreate. It is, rather, part of a growing consensus that procreation can be morally problematic and that generally talking of rights in this context might not be warranted. Finally, I argue that giving up a right to procreate does not imply nor suggest giving up on women's absolute right to abort, which I defend.

Killing fetuses and killing newborns.

The argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns is a challenge to liberal positions on abortion because it can be considered a reductio of their defence of abortion. Here I defend the liberal stance on abortion by arguing that the argument for the moral permissibility of killing newborns on ground of the social, psychological and economic burden on the parents recently put forward by Giubilini and Minerva is not valid; this is because they fail to show that newborns cannot be harmed and because there are morally relevant differences between fetuses and newborns.