Subjective feelings associated with expectations and rewards during risky decision-making in impulse control disorder.

Impulse Control Disorder (ICD) in Parkinson's disease is a behavioral addiction induced by dopaminergic therapies, but otherwise unclear etiology. The current study investigates the interaction of reward processing variables, dopaminergic therapy, and risky decision-making and subjective feelings in patients with versus without ICD. Patients with (n = 18) and without (n = 12) ICD performed a risky decision-making task both 'on' and 'off' standard-of-care dopaminergic therapies (the task was performed on 2 different days with the order of on and off visits randomized for each patient). During each trial of the task, participants choose between two options, a gamble or a certain reward, and reported how they felt about decision outcomes. Subjective feelings of 'pleasure' are differentially driven by expectations of possible outcomes in patients with, versus without ICD. While off medication, the influence of expectations about risky-decisions on subjective feelings is reduced in patients with ICD versus without ICD. While on medication, the influence of expected outcomes in patients with ICD versus without ICD becomes similar. Computational modeling of behavior supports the idea that latent decision-making factors drive subjective feelings in patients with Parkinson's disease and that ICD status is associated with a change in the relationship between factors associated with risky behavior and subjective feelings about the experienced outcomes. Our results also suggest that dopaminergic medications modulate the impact expectations have on the participants' subjective reports. Altogether our results suggest that expectations about risky decisions may be decoupled from subjective feelings in patients with ICD, and that dopaminergic medications may reengage these circuits and increase emotional reactivity in patients with ICD.

Sub-second and multi-second dopamine dynamics underlie variability in human time perception.

Timing behaviour and the perception of time are fundamental to cognitive and emotional processes in humans. In non-human model organisms, the neuromodulator dopamine has been associated with variations in timing behaviour, but the connection between variations in dopamine levels and the human experience of time has not been directly assessed. Here, we report how dopamine levels in human striatum, measured with sub-second temporal resolution during awake deep brain stimulation surgery, relate to participants' perceptual judgements of time intervals. Fast, phasic, dopaminergic signals were associated with underestimation of temporal intervals, whereas slower, tonic, decreases in dopamine were associated with poorer temporal precision. Our findings suggest a delicate and complex role for the dynamics and tone of dopaminergic signals in the conscious experience of time in humans.

Subsecond fluctuations in extracellular dopamine encode reward and punishment prediction errors in humans.

In the mammalian brain, midbrain dopamine neuron activity is hypothesized to encode reward prediction errors that promote learning and guide behavior by causing rapid changes in dopamine levels in target brain regions. This hypothesis (and alternatives regarding dopamine's role in punishment-learning) has limited direct evidence in humans. We report intracranial, subsecond measurements of dopamine release in human striatum measured, while volunteers (i.e., patients undergoing deep brain stimulation surgery) performed a probabilistic reward and punishment learning choice task designed to test whether dopamine release encodes only reward prediction errors or whether dopamine release may also encode adaptive punishment learning signals. Results demonstrate that extracellular dopamine levels can encode both reward and punishment prediction errors within distinct time intervals via independent valence-specific pathways in the human brain.

Time perception reflects individual differences in motor and non-motor symptoms of Parkinson's disease.

Decreasing dopaminergic function is at the core of Parkinson's disease (PD) motor symptoms and changes in dopaminergic action are associated with many comorbid non-motor symptoms in PD. Notably, dopaminergic signaling in the striatum has been shown to play a critical role in the perception of time. We hypothesize that patients with PD perceive time differently and in accordance with their specific comorbid non-motor symptoms and clinical state. This means that individual differences in clinical symptoms may be reflected in individual differences in timing behavior. To test this hypothesis, we recruited patients with PD and compared individual differences in patients' clinical state with their ability to judge intervals of time ranging from 500 ms to 1100 ms while on and off their prescribed dopaminergic medications. We show that medication state (on vs. off medications) did not affect timing behavior, but individual differences in timing behavior are able to predict individual differences in comorbid non-motor symptoms, duration of PD diagnosis, and prescribed dopaminergic medications. We show that comorbid impulse control disorder is associated with temporal overestimation; depression is associated with decreased temporal accuracy; and increased PD duration and prescribed levodopa monotherapy are associated with reduced temporal precision and accuracy. Observed differences in time perception are consistent with hypothesized dopaminergic mechanisms thought to underlie the respective motor and non-motor symptoms in PD. In future work, time perception tasks may augment clinical diagnosis strategies, or help disentangle the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying PD motor and non-motor symptom etiology.

Time perception reflects individual differences in motor and non-motor symptoms of Parkinson's disease.

Dopaminergic signaling in the striatum has been shown to play a critical role in the perception of time. Decreasing striatal dopamine efficacy is at the core of Parkinson's disease (PD) motor symptoms and changes in dopaminergic action have been associated with many comorbid non-motor symptoms in PD. We hypothesize that patients with PD perceive time differently and in accordance with their specific comorbid non-motor symptoms and clinical state. We recruited patients with PD and compared individual differences in patients' clinical features with their ability to judge millisecond to second intervals of time (500ms-1100ms) while on or off their prescribed dopaminergic medications. We show that individual differences in comorbid non-motor symptoms, PD duration, and prescribed dopaminergic pharmacotherapeutics account for individual differences in time perception performance. We report that comorbid impulse control disorder is associated with temporal overestimation; depression is associated with decreased temporal accuracy; and PD disease duration and prescribed levodopa monotherapy are associated with reduced temporal precision and accuracy. Observed differences in time perception are consistent with hypothesized dopaminergic mechanisms thought to underlie the respective motor and non-motor symptoms in PD, but also raise questions about specific dopaminergic mechanisms. In future work, time perception tasks like the one used here, may provide translational or reverse translational utility in investigations aimed at disentangling neural and cognitive systems underlying PD symptom etiology. One Sentence Summary: Quantitative characterization of time perception behavior reflects individual differences in Parkinson's disease motor and non-motor symptom clinical presentation that are consistent with hypothesized neural and cognitive mechanisms.

Intracranial subsecond dopamine measurements during a "sure bet or gamble" decision-making task in patients with alcohol use disorder suggest diminished dopaminergic signals about relief.

OBJECTIVE: To the authors' knowledge, no data have been reported on dopamine fluctuations on subsecond timescales in humans with alcohol use disorder (AUD). In this study, dopamine release was monitored in 2 patients with and 2 without a history of AUD during a "sure bet or gamble" (SBORG) decision-making task to begin to characterize how subsecond dopamine responses to counterfactual information, related to psychological notions of regret and relief, in AUD may be altered. METHODS: Measurements of extracellular dopamine levels were made once every 100 msec using human voltammetric methods. Measurements were made in the caudate during deep brain stimulation electrode implantation surgeries (for treatment of movement disorders) in patients who did (AUD, n = 2) or did not (non-AUD, n = 2) have a history of AUD. Participants performed an SBORG decision-making task in which they made choices between sure bets and 50%-chance monetary gamble outcomes. RESULTS: Fast changes were found in dopamine levels that appear to be modulated by "what could have been" and by patients' AUD status. Positive counterfactual prediction errors (related to relief) differentiated patients with versus without a history of AUD. CONCLUSIONS: Dopaminergic encoding of counterfactual information appears to differ between patients with and without AUD. The current study has a major limitation of a limited sample size, but these data provide a rare insight into dopaminergic physiology during real-time decision-making in humans with an addiction disorder. The authors hope future work will expand the sample size and determine the generalizability of the current results.

Computational reinforcement learning, reward (and punishment), and dopamine in psychiatric disorders.

In the DSM-5, psychiatric diagnoses are made based on self-reported symptoms and clinician-identified signs. Though helpful in choosing potential interventions based on the available regimens, this conceptualization of psychiatric diseases can limit basic science investigation into their underlying causes. The reward prediction error (RPE) hypothesis of dopamine neuron function posits that phasic dopamine signals encode the difference between the rewards a person expects and experiences. The computational framework from which this hypothesis was derived, temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL), is largely focused on reward processing rather than punishment learning. Many psychiatric disorders are characterized by aberrant behaviors, expectations, reward processing, and hypothesized dopaminergic signaling, but also characterized by suffering and the inability to change one's behavior despite negative consequences. In this review, we provide an overview of the RPE theory of phasic dopamine neuron activity and review the gains that have been made through the use of computational reinforcement learning theory as a framework for understanding changes in reward processing. The relative dearth of explicit accounts of punishment learning in computational reinforcement learning theory and its application in neuroscience is highlighted as a significant gap in current computational psychiatric research. Four disorders comprise the main focus of this review: two disorders of traditionally hypothesized hyperdopaminergic function, addiction and schizophrenia, followed by two disorders of traditionally hypothesized hypodopaminergic function, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Insights gained from a reward processing based reinforcement learning framework about underlying dopaminergic mechanisms and the role of punishment learning (when available) are explored in each disorder. Concluding remarks focus on the future directions required to characterize neuropsychiatric disorders with a hypothesized cause of underlying dopaminergic transmission.