(e)Managing the uncertainty of tuberculosis in the post-Soviet limbo: Tracking prisoners' coerced mobility for treatment in Ukrainian prisons.

The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered an escalation of the tuberculosis (TB) epidemic in many post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine. The main reasons for this situation include both the approach to TB care and the concentration of TB cases in prisons. The neoliberal approach to TB care system reform promises the optimization of treatment terms, "dehospitalization" and "despecialization" of the system of care, and a different type of control, established through digital technologies. One such technology is the "e-TB Manager", which was designated as a national TB registry, including in the prison system in 2012. In prison, where everyone "is to be fixed" and isolated, the uncertainty of patients' movements seems to be avoided by pre-existing conditions. In practice, however, the vertically aligned, centralized organizational structure of the post-Soviet prison implies a constant need to link its elements together through "coerced" mobility carried out in secrecy. Treatment in exile may not be the primary goal of such a practice, but it becomes the result when prisoners from numerous prison facilities are sent to a limited number of prison TB hospitals. The integration of the e-TB Manager as a tool to enable the tracking of patient movements and, consequently, improve the efficiency of diagnostic and treatment processes in prison, can be seen as both a purely technical measure and a "magic bullet". In this article, we argue that, in the case of Ukrainian prisons, the neoliberal approach and the Soviet socialist approach to gaining control over TB indeed adapt and reinforce each other but fail to compete meaningfully. The fragmented implementation of one is absorbed by the fundamental and resilient nature of the other to produce and reproduce the state of "post-Soviet limbo". We use the "post-Soviet limbo" as an overall framework aimed at conceptualizing the post-Soviet transformation as a combination of efforts to avoid and manage the uncertainty of TB treatment, especially in prison. We examine the empirical case of coerced mobility of prisoners who require TB treatment, seeking to trace how this process is reflected in the e-TB Manager. We provide a more in-depth picture of this journey with details gathered from qualitative research materials to situate numbers and variables in their contexts, deconstructing the way the data are recorded according to the logic of the system in which they are produced.

More evidence or stronger political will: exploring the feasibility of needle and syringe programs in Ukrainian prisons.

INTRODUCTION: In 2007, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended for prison authorities to introduce prison needle and syringe programs (PNSP) if they have any evidence that injecting drug use is taking place in prisons. This article presents descriptive evidence that injecting drug use takes place in Ukrainian prisons, it discusses how (denial of) access to injection equipment is regulated in the current system and what changes should be considered in order to implement PNSP. BACKGROUND: Ukrainian prisons still live by the laws and policies adopted in the Soviet Union. Besides laws and regulations, these legacies are replicated through the organization and infrastructure of the prison's physical space, and through "carceral collectivism" as a specific form of living and behaving. Inviolability of the prison order over time helps the prison staff to normalize and routinely rationalize punishment enforcement as a power "over" prisoners, but not a power "for" achieving a specific goal. METHODS: The Participatory Action Research approach was used as a way of involving different actors in the study's working group and research process. The data were gathered through 160 semi-structured interviews with prison health care workers, guards, people who inject drugs (PWID) who served one or several terms and other informants. RESULTS: The "expertise" in drug use among prisoners demonstrated by prison staff tells us two things-they admit that injecting use takes place in prisons, and that the surveillance of prisoner behavior has been carried out constantly since the very beginning as a core function of control. The communal living conditions and prison collectivism may not only produce and reproduce a criminal subculture but, using the same mechanisms, produce and reproduce drug use in prison. The "political will" incorporated into prison laws and policies is essential for the revision of outdated legacies and making PNSP implementation feasible. CONCLUSION: PNSP implementation is not just a question of having evidence of injecting drug use in the hands of prison authorities. For PNSP to be feasible in the prison environment, there is a need for specific changes to transition from one historical period and political leadership to another. And, thus, to make PNSP work requires making power work for change, and not just for reproducing the power itself.

A New Generation of Drug Users in St. Petersburg, Russia? HIV, HCV, and Overdose Risks in a Mixed-Methods Pilot Study of Young Hard Drug Users.

Russia has a widespread injection drug use epidemic with high prevalence of HIV and HCV among people who inject drugs (PWID). We conducted a mixed methods study of young (age 18-26) hard drug users in St. Petersburg. Thirty-nine structured and 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted. No HIV cases and two HCV cases were detected among the PWID subsample (n = 29). Amphetamine and other stimulants were common (70%), opioid use was rare and episodic. Consistent condom use was 10%. No PWID reported syringe-sharing, 51% reported other drug paraphernalia sharing. Most (89%) never or rarely communicated with older (30 +) opiate users. A new cohort of drug users in St. Petersburg may have emerged, which is much safer in its injection practices compared to previous cohorts. However, risky sexual practices among this new cohort may expose them to the possibility of sexual transmission of HIV and widespread drug paraphernalia sharing to the HCV epidemic.

Performance indicator as the main and the only goal: a "dark side" of the intervention aims to accelerate HIV treatment entry among people who inject drugs in Kyiv, Ukraine.

BACKGROUND: To improve healthcare entry and antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation for HIV-positive people who inject drugs (PWID) in Ukraine, an intervention built upon a successful community-based harm reduction project and the existing best practices was developed. In this article, we present the results of the study conducted in collaboration with one of the recipient organizations of the intervention in Kyiv. The research question was formulated as follows: how does the interaction between different actors work to lead it to a positive outcome (initiation PWIDs into ART) within the limited period of the intervention implementation? METHODS: The central focus of the study was on the work activities of case managers. Their daily routines as well as their interactions with their clients and medical workers were observed and analyzed. Using the institutional ethnography approach, we explore the institutional orders, power imbalances, and social factors that play different roles in coordinating the process of PWIDs entry into healthcare and HIV treatment. RESULTS: The most intriguing result of the study is that the performance indicator that must be completed in order to receive a full salary-as a way to manage the activities of case managers-produces conditions for them to develop their cooperation with medical workers but leaves the clients and their needs out of this "boat" because interaction with them, in fact, does not help to meet case managers' goals. CONCLUSIONS: Accountability of case managers' work assumes the primacy of the result over the process, which makes the process itself less important and the need to achieve the goal becomes the main and the only goal. This can be identified as an unintended consequence of the intervention implementation on the ground, or wider-an unintended consequence of the payment by results practice as a part of the general number-based policy.