The detection of anisochrony in monaural and interaural sound sequences.

Nakao and Axelrod (1976) and van Noorden (1975) showed that the threshold for discriminating an anisochronous duple rhythm (a series of clicks with a temporal offset on every other one) from an isochronous rhythm (no offset) is poorer when the clicks are presented alternately to the two ears than when they are presented to the same ears. Van Noorden reported that the difference between the thresholds in the alternating and nonalternating conditions varied with the tempo of the sequence. Nakao and Axelrod found invariance of this threshold difference with sequence speed. According to our quantification of temporal processing of interaural sequences, the latter result should be expected. We carried out five psychophysical experiments to establish interaural and monaural discrimination between isochronous and anisochronous rhythms. Across experiments, base time intervals of 60-720 msec were spanned. The main result was that we replicated the poorer discrimination for interaural sequences. This deterioration in discrimination was the same for all sequence speeds. It was also the case that the thresholds were almost constant up to a sound repetition rate of about 3 per second, but increased linearly with slower rates. This result supports evidence in the literature that temporal processing of sequences faster than about 3-4 sounds per second differs from temporal processing of slower sequences.

Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held.

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.