Surprisingly good talk: Misunderstanding others creates a barrier to constructive confrontation.

Open communication is important for maintaining relationships when conflicts inevitably arise. Nevertheless, people may avoid constructive confrontation to the extent that they expect others to respond negatively. In experiments involving recalled (Experiment 1), imagined (Experiment 2), simulated (Experiment 3), and actual confrontations (Experiments 4a and 4b), we find that people's expectations are systematically miscalibrated such that they overestimate how negatively others respond to confrontation. These overly negative expectations stem, at least in part, from biased attention to potentially negative outcomes of a constructive confrontation (Experiment 5), and from failing to recognize the power of relationship-maintenance processes that are activated in direct conversations (Experiment 6). Underestimating how positively relationship partners will respond to an open, direct, and honest conversation about relationship concerns may create a misplaced barrier to confronting issues when they arise in relationships, thereby keeping people from confronting issues that would strengthen their relationships. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

How unexpected events are processed in theory of mind regions: A conceptual replication.

Recent research in social neuroscience has postulated that Theory of Mind (ToM) regions play a role in processing social prediction error (PE: the difference between what was expected and what was observed). Here, we tested whether PE signal depends on the type of prior information people use to make predictions - an agent's prior mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, preferences) or an agent's prior behavior - as well as the type of information that confirms or violates such predictions. That is, does prior information about mental states (versus behavior) afford stronger predictions about an agent's subsequent mental states or behaviors? Additionally, when information about an agent's prior mental states or behavior is available, is PE signal strongest when information about an agent's subsequent mental state (vs behavior) is revealed? In line with prior research, results suggest that DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ are recruited more for unexpected than expected outcomes. However, PE signal does not seem to discriminate on the basis of prior or outcome information type. These findings suggest that ToM regions may flexibly incorporate any available information to make predictions about, monitor, and perhaps explain, inconsistencies in social agents.

Too Reluctant to Reach Out: Receiving Social Support Is More Positive Than Expressers Expect.

Receiving social support is critical for well-being, but concerns about a recipient's reaction could make people reluctant to express such support. Our studies indicate that people's expectations about how their support will be received predict their likelihood of expressing it (Study 1, N = 100 online adults), but these expectations are systematically miscalibrated. Participants who sent messages of support to others they knew (Study 2, N = 120 students) or who expressed support to a new acquaintance in person (Study 3, N = 50 adult pairs) consistently underestimated how positively their recipients would respond. A systematic perspective gap between expressers and recipients may explain miscalibrated expectations: Expressers may focus on how competent their support seems, whereas recipients may focus on the warmth it conveys (Study 4, N = 300 adults). Miscalibrated concerns about how to express support most competently may make people overly reluctant to reach out to someone in need.

Asking 'why?' enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations.

Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed important differences in the cognitive processes underlying judgments of harm and purity violations. In particular, research has demonstrated that whether a violation was committed intentionally vs accidentally has a larger impact on moral judgments of harm violations (e.g. assault) than purity violations (e.g. incest). Here, we manipulate the instructions provided to participants for a moral judgment task to further probe the boundary conditions of this intent effect. Specifically, we instructed participants undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging to attend to either a violator's mental states (why they acted that way) or their low-level behavior (how they acted) before delivering moral judgments. Results revealed that task instructions enhanced rather than diminished differences between how harm and purity violations are processed in brain regions for mental state reasoning or theory of mind. In particular, activity in the right temporoparietal junction increased when participants were instructed to attend to why vs how a violator acted to a greater extent for harm than for purity violations. This result constrains the potential accounts of why intentions matter less for purity violations compared to harm violations and provide further insight into the differences between distinct moral norms.

Neural substrates for moral judgments of psychological versus physical harm.

While we may think about harm as primarily being about physical injury, harm can also take the form of negative psychological impact. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined the extent to which moral judgments of physical and psychological harms are processed similarly, focusing on brain regions implicated in mental state reasoning or theory of mind, a key cognitive process for moral judgment. First, univariate analyses reveal item-specific features that lead to greater recruitment of theory of mind regions for psychological harm versus physical harm. Second, multivariate pattern analyses reveal sensitivity to the psychological/physical distinction in two regions implicated in theory of mind: the right temporoparietal junction and the precuneus. Third, we find no reliable differences between neurotypical adults and adults with autism spectrum disorder with regard to neural activity related to theory of mind during moral evaluations of psychological and physical harm. Altogether, these results reveal neural sensitivity to the distinction between psychological harm and physical harm.

The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions.

Recent efforts to partition the space of morality have focused on the descriptive content of distinct moral domains (e.g., harm versus purity), or alternatively, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of moral violations. Across three studies, we demonstrate that harm and purity norms are relevant in distinct relational contexts. Moral judgments of purity violations, compared to harm violations, are relatively more sensitive to the negative impact perpetrators have on themselves versus other victims (Study 1). This pattern replicates across a wide array of harm and purity violations varying in severity (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, while perceptions of harm predict moral judgment consistently across relational contexts, perceptions of purity predict moral judgment more for self-directed actions, where perpetrators violate themselves, compared to dyadic actions, where perpetrators violate other victims (Study 3). Together, these studies reveal how an action's content and its relational context interact to influence moral judgment, providing novel insights into the adaptive functions of harm and purity norms.

Distinct neural patterns of social cognition for cooperation versus competition.

How do people consider other minds during cooperation versus competition? Some accounts predict that theory of mind (ToM) is recruited more for cooperation versus competition or competition versus cooperation, whereas other accounts predict similar recruitment across these two contexts. The present fMRI study examined activity in brain regions for ToM (bilateral temporoparietal junction, precuneus, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex) across cooperative and competitive interactions with the same individual within the same paradigm. Although univariate analyses revealed that ToM regions overall were recruited similarly across interaction contexts, multivariate pattern analyses revealed that these regions nevertheless encoded information separating cooperation from competition. Specifically, ToM regions encoded differences between cooperation and competition when people believed the outcome was determined by their and their partner's choices but not when the computer determined the outcome. We propose that, when people are motivated to consider others' mental states, ToM regions encode different aspects of mental states during cooperation versus competition. Given the role of these regions for ToM, these findings reveal distinct patterns of social cognition for distinct motivational contexts.

Theory of mind for processing unexpected events across contexts.

Theory of mind, or mental state reasoning, may be particularly useful for making sense of unexpected events. Here, we investigated unexpected behavior across both social and non-social contexts in order to characterize the precise role of theory of mind in processing unexpected events. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine how people respond to unexpected outcomes when initial expectations were based on (i) an object's prior behavior, (ii) an agent's prior behavior and (iii) an agent's mental states. Consistent with prior work, brain regions for theory of mind were preferentially recruited when people first formed expectations about social agents vs non-social objects. Critically, unexpected vs expected outcomes elicited greater activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, which also discriminated in its spatial pattern of activity between unexpected and expected outcomes for social events. In contrast, social vs non-social events elicited greater activity in precuneus across both expected and unexpected outcomes. Finally, given prior information about an agent's behavior, unexpected vs expected outcomes elicited an especially robust response in right temporoparietal junction, and the magnitude of this difference across participants correlated negatively with autistic-like traits. Together, these findings illuminate the distinct contributions of brain regions for theory of mind for processing unexpected events across contexts.

When minds matter for moral judgment: intent information is neurally encoded for harmful but not impure acts.

Recent behavioral evidence indicates a key role for intent in moral judgments of harmful acts (e.g. assault) but not impure acts (e.g. incest). We tested whether the neural responses in regions for mental state reasoning, including the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), are greater when people evaluate harmful vs impure violations. In addition, using multivoxel pattern analysis, we investigated whether the voxel-wise pattern in these regions distinguishes intentional from accidental actions, for either kind of violation. The RTPJ was preferentially recruited in response to harmful vs impure acts. Moreover, although its response was equally high for intentional and accidental acts, the voxel-wise pattern in the RTPJ distinguished intentional from accidental acts in the harm domain but not the purity domain. Finally, we found that the degree to which the RTPJ discriminated between intentional and accidental acts predicted the impact of intent information on moral judgments but again only in the harm domain. These findings reveal intent to be a uniquely critical factor for moral evaluations of harmful vs impure acts and shed light on the neural computations for mental state reasoning.

Correction: Harming Ourselves and Defiling Others: What Determines a Moral Domain?

[This corrects the article on p. e74434 in vol. 8.].

Harming ourselves and defiling others: what determines a moral domain?

Recent work has distinguished "harm" from "purity" violations, but how does an act get classified as belonging to a domain in the first place? We demonstrate the impact of not only the kind of action (e.g., harmful versus impure) but also its target (e.g., oneself versus another). Across two experiments, common signatures of harm and purity tracked with other-directed and self-directed actions, respectively. First, participants judged self-directed acts as primarily impure and other-directed acts as primarily harmful. Second, conservatism predicted harsher judgments of self-directed but not other-directed acts. Third, while participants delivered harsher judgments of intentional versus accidental acts, this effect was smaller for self-directed than other-directed acts. Finally, participants judged self-directed acts more harshly when focusing on the actor's character versus the action itself; other-directed acts elicited the opposite pattern. These findings suggest that moral domains are defined not only by the kind of action but also by the target of the action.

Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions.

Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions), which is supported by a group of brain regions including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that interfering with activity in RTPJ can impair mental state reasoning for moral judgment and that high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders make moral judgments based less on intent information than neurotypical participants. Three experiments, using multivoxel pattern analysis, find that (i) in neurotypical adults, the RTPJ shows reliable and distinct spatial patterns of responses across voxels for intentional vs. accidental harms, and (ii) individual differences in this neural pattern predict differences in participants' moral judgments. These effects are specific to RTPJ. By contrast, (iii) this distinction was absent in adults with autism spectrum disorders. We conclude that multivoxel pattern analysis can detect features of mental state representations (e.g., intent), and that the corresponding neural patterns are behaviorally and clinically relevant.

Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference.

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference tasks in terms of their effects on spatial working memory. We found equal success on false-belief reasoning during both verbal and nonverbal interference, suggesting that language is not specifically necessary for adult theory of mind.

Where in the brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe nowhere.

The neuroscience of morality has focused on how morality works and where it is in the brain. In tackling these questions, researchers have taken both domain-specific and domain-general approaches-searching for neural substrates and systems dedicated to moral cognition versus characterizing the contributions of domain-general processes. Where in the brain is morality? On one hand, morality is made up of complex cognitive processes, deployed across many domains and housed all over the brain. On the other hand, no neural substrate or system that uniquely supports moral cognition has been found. In this review, we will discuss early assumptions of domain-specificity in moral neuroscience as well as subsequent investigations of domain-general contributions, taking emotion and social cognition (i.e., theory of mind) as case studies. Finally, we will consider possible cognitive accounts of a domain-specific morality: Does uniquely moral cognition exist?