Processing methods for human amniotic membrane as scaffold for tissue engineering with mesenchymal stromal human cells.

Tissue engineering is an interdisciplinary field that applies the principles of engineering and life sciences toward the development of biological substitutes that restore, maintain, or improve tissue function. The aims of this work were to compare chemically and physically processed human Amniotic Membranes (hAM) and analyze the cytocompatibility and proliferation rate (PR) of two primary human mesenchymal stromal cell lines, from different sources and donor conditions seeded over these scaffolds. The evaluated hAM processes were: cold shock to obtain a frozen amniotic membrane (FEAM) with remaining dead epithelial cells, denudation of hAM with trypsin for 20/10 min (DEAM20/10) or treatment with sodium dodecyl sulfate to decellularized hAM (DAM). All samples were sterilized with gamma radiation. The selection of the treated hAM to then generate composites was performed by scanning and transmission electron microscopy and characterization by X-ray diffraction, selecting DEAM10 and FEAM as scaffolds for cell seeding. Two sources of primary human stromal cells were used, both developed by our researchers, human Dental Pulp Stem Cells (hDPSC) from living donors and human Mesenchymal Stromal Cells (hMSC) from bone marrow isolated from brain dead donors. This last line of cells conveys a novel source of human cells that, to our knowledge, have not been tested as part of this type of construct. We developed four in vitro constructs without cytotoxicity signs and with different PR depending on the scaffolds and cells. hDPSC and hMSC grew over both FEAM and DEAM10, but DEAM10 allowed higher PR.

Synthesis and characterization of a bovine collagen: GAG scaffold with Uruguayan raw material for tissue engineering.

Tissue engineering (TE) and regenerative medicine offer strategies to improve damaged tissues by using scaffolds and cells. The use of collagen-based biomaterials in the field of TE has been intensively growing over the past decades. Mesenchymal stromal cells (MSCs) and dental pulp stem cells (DPSCs) are promising cell candidates for development of clinical composites. In this study, we proposed the development of a bovine collagen type I: chondroitin-6-sulphate (CG) scaffold, obtained from Uruguayan raw material (certified as free bovine spongiform encephalopathy), with CG crosslinking enhancement using different gamma radiation doses. Structural, biomechanical and chemical characteristics of the scaffolds were assessed by Scanning Electron Microscopy, axial tensile tests, FT-IR and Raman Spectroscopy, respectively. Once we selected the most appropriate scaffold for future use as a TE product, we studied the behavior of MSCs and DPSCs cultured on the scaffold by cytotoxicity, proliferation and differentiation assays. Among the diverse porous scaffolds obtained, the one with the most adequate properties was the one exposed to 15 kGy of gamma radiation. This radiation dose contributed to the crosslinking of molecules, to the formation of new bonds and/or to the reorganization of the collagen fibers. The selected scaffold was non-cytotoxic for the tested cells and a suitable substrate for cell proliferation. Furthermore, the scaffold allowed MSCs differentiation to osteogenic, chondrogenic, and adipogenic lineages. Thus, this work shows a promising approach to the synthesis of a collagen-scaffold suitable for TE.

Identity and conflicts in the ethics of neural implants.

The development of neuroprosthetics has given rise to significant theoretical and practical challenges concerning personal identity. The Extended Mind Theory (EMT) attempts to provide an answer to these challenges by arguing that the mind and the external world are co-extensive to the point that both can make a seamless unified entity. The EMT also proposes that physical states determine the nature of mental states. Here, we propose a non-deterministic and less locationist view of mental states that we will call iEMT. The iEMT articulates, firstly, that the co-extensivity of the mind and the world does not justify the dissolution of the mind in the objects of the external world with which the mind interacts. Consequently, the agent's mind is still part of his unique personal identity. Secondly, neural implants cannot be regarded as mere replacement parts in the context of a weak concept of personal identity. Thirdly, there are no compelling reasons to believe or to fear that neuroprosthetics can alter personal identity at the profound level.