Projected network performance for multiple isotopes using next-generation xenon monitoring systems.

Since about 2000 (Bowyer et al., 1998), radioxenon monitoring systems have been under development and testing for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Operation of the systems since then has resulted in development of a next-generation of systems that are nearly ready for operational deployment. By 2010, the need to screen out civilian sources was well known (Auer et al., 2010; Saey, 2009), and isotopic ratio approaches were soon considered (Kalinowski and Pistner, 2006) to identify specific sources. New generation systems are expected to improve the ability to verify the absence of nuclear tests by using isotopic ratios when multiple isotopes are detected. In this work, thousands of releases were simulated to compute the global detection probability of 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe, and 135Xe at 39 noble gas systems in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for both current and next-generation systems. Three release scenarios are defined at 1 h, 1 d, and 10 d past a 1 kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. Multiple cases using from one part in a million to the complete release of the xenon isotopic activity are evaluated for each scenario. Coverage maps and global integrals comparing current and next-generation monitoring systems are presented showing that next-generation noble gas systems will create measurable improvements in the IMS. The global detection probability for 133Xe is shown to be strong in all scenarios, but only modestly improved by next-generation equipment. However, the detection probability for 131mXe and 133mXe increased to about 50% in different scenarios, providing a second detectable isotope for many events. As anticipated from shorter sampling intervals, the expected number of detecting samples roughly doubled and the expected number of detecting stations rose by approximately 50% for all release scenarios. Thus, it might be anticipated that future events would consist of multiple 133Xe detections and one or more second isotope detections. Signals of this nature should increase detection confidence, tighten release location estimates, improve rejection of civilian signals, and lessen the impacts from individual systems being offline for maintenance or repair reasons.

Investigating the detection of underground nuclear explosions by radon displacement.

A novel approach is proposed to detect underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) through the displacement of natural radon isotopes (222Rn and 220Rn). Following an explosion, it is hypothesized that the disturbance and pressurization of the sub-surface would facilitate the movement of radon from the depth of the UNE towards the surface resulting in increased soil gas activity. The resulting signal may be magnified by a factor of 2.0-4.9 by the decay of radon to its short-lived progeny. Increases in background activity may be useful for identifying locations to perform additional measurements, or as a detectable signal at monitoring stations. To validate this hypothesis, radon detection instrumentation was deployed at the Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) site of the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Natural fluctuations in the soil gas activity due to barometric pumping, and the lower yield of the chemical explosions (1-50 t) made it difficult to confirm a displacement of radon from the explosions, and further study to validate the proposed hypothesis is recommended.