Hand movement trajectories illustrate the mechanism underlying Kurt Lewin's distinction between approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance motivational conflicts.

Classic motivational conflicts theory (Lewin, 1931) distinguishes between approach-approach, and avoidance-avoidance conflicts. Previous research has focused solely on testing the theory's prediction that avoidance-avoidance conflicts are more difficult to resolve than approach-approach ones, using outcome measures (decision time and self-reports). The theory, however, specifies a force-fields mechanism to account for this difference in conflict resolution difficulty, whereby avoidance-avoidance conflicts (compared to approach-approach ones) elicit more (a) oscillations and (b) return to the middle point between options. However, this force-fields mechanism has never been empirically tested, arguably due to a lack of the tools to do so. In five studies (N = 534 U.K. residents), we use mouse-tracking measures to provide insight into the force-fields mechanism. We show that the force-fields' mechanistic properties-oscillations and returns to the middle point-distinguish the two types of conflict and uniquely account for conflict resolution difficulty beyond standard conflict-strength measures. Moreover, we test a novel, theory-driven prediction and robustly show a differential pattern of increased oscillations as a function of the decision-maker's proximity to the decision options. Finally, we test a boundary condition moderating the influence of conflict type on both the force-fields' mechanistic properties and conflict resolution difficulty. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The relative difficulty of resolving motivational conflicts is affective context-dependent.

According to Lewin's seminal motivational theory, conflicts between undesirable alternatives (avoidance-avoidance conflicts) are more difficult to resolve than conflicts between desirable alternatives (approach-approach conflicts). This difference in the difficulty of resolving approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance conflicts was suggested as a general law for human behavior, and subsequent research provided robust evidence to support it. Here we challenge this assertion. We argue that the difference in conflict resolution difficulty depends on the compatibility between the type of conflict (approach-approach vs. avoidance-avoidance) and the affective context (positive vs. negative) in which the conflict is being resolved. We report five studies. Data were collected from 2019 to 2021. In Studies 1-4, we presented participants with both conflict types, embedded in either a positive or a negative affective context. Across different designs and stimuli, and for both experienced difficulty and decision time, we found that in a positive affective context, avoidance-avoidance conflicts were more difficult to resolve than approach-approach conflicts; however, in a negative affective context, no difference between the conflict types was found. In Study 5, we added a neutral control condition to relate our findings to previous research, which did not manipulate the affective context. Taken together, our findings challenge a seminal motivational theory and show that choosing the lesser of two evils is not always more difficult than choosing the greater of two goods. Instead, the difference in conflict resolution difficulty depends on the affective context in which the choice is being made. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Midfrontal theta as an index of conflict strength in approach-approach vs avoidance-avoidance conflicts.

The seminal theory of motivational conflicts distinguishes between approach-approach (AP-AP) conflicts, in which a decision is made between desirable alternatives, and avoidance-avoidance (AV-AV) conflicts, in which a decision is made between undesirable alternatives. The behavioral differences between AP-AP and AV-AV conflicts are well documented: abundant research showed that AV-AV conflicts are more difficult to resolve than AP-AP ones. However, there is little to no research looking into the neural underpinnings of the differences between the two conflict types. Here, we show that midfrontal theta, an established neural marker of conflict, distinguished between the two conflict types such that midfrontal theta power was higher in AV-AV conflicts than in AP-AP conflicts. We further demonstrate that higher midfrontal theta power was associated with shorter decision times on a single-trial basis, indicating that midfrontal theta played a role in promoting successful controlled behavior. Taken together, our results show that AP-AP and AV-AV conflicts are distinguishable on the neural level. The implications of these results go beyond motivational conflicts, as they establish midfrontal theta as a measure of the continuous degree of conflict in subjective decisions.

Choice changes preferences, not merely reflects them: A meta-analysis of the artifact-free free-choice paradigm.

One of the prominent, by now seminal, paradigms in the research tradition of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) is the free-choice paradigm developed by Brehm (1956) to measure choice-induced preference change. Some 50 years after Brehm introduced the paradigm, Chen and Risen (2010) published an influential critique arguing that what the paradigm measures is not necessarily a choice-induced preference change, but possibly an artifact of the choice revealing existing preferences. They showed that once the artifact is experimentally controlled for, there is either no or very little evidence for choice-induced preference change. Given the prominence of the paradigm, this critique meant that much of what we thought we knew about the psychological process of cognitive dissonance might not be true. Following the critique, research using the paradigm applied various corrections to overcome the artifact. The present research examined whether choice truly changes preferences, or rather merely reflects them. We conducted a meta-analysis on 43 studies (N = 2,191), all using an artifact-free free-choice paradigm. Using different meta-analytical methods, and conceptually different analyses, including a Bayesian one, we found an overall effect size of Cohen's d = 0.40, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.32, 0.49]. Furthermore, we found no evidence for publication bias as an alternative explanation for the choice-induced preference change effect. These results support the existence of true preference change created by choice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).